Posts in Science (20 found)
iDiallo 2 days ago

Boredom is the Gatekeeper

That first Monday of my holiday break, I made a promise to myself. No work emails, no side projects, not even glancing at my blog. This time was for family, for Netflix queues, for rereading dog-eared novels. One thing I was really looking forward to was learning something new, a new skill. Not for utility, but purely for curiosity. I wanted to learn about batteries. They power our world, yet they're a complete mystery to me. I only vaguely remember what I learned in high school decades ago. This would be the perfect subject for me. I went straight to a website I had bookmarked years ago in a fit of intellectual ambition: BatteryUniversity.com. I started with the chemistry of lead acid batteries. I was ready to be enlightened. Twenty minutes later, I was three paragraphs in, my mind adrift. The text was dense, packed with terms like "lead-antimony" and "acid-starved." My finger twitched. Then I read this: the sealed lead acid battery is designed with a low over-voltage potential to prohibit the battery from reaching its gas-generating potential during charge. I thought, wouldn't this be easier to understand as a YouTube video? A nice animation? I clicked away. It seemed like I had just met the gatekeeper, and it had turned me away. I was bored. We talk about boredom as if it's the absence of stimulation. Having nothing to do. But in our hyperconnected world, where information is constantly flowing and distractions are a finger tap away, true emptiness is rare. Modern boredom isn't having nothing to do. I had plenty of material to go over. Instead, it's the friction of deep focus. It's the resistance you feel when you move from consuming information to building those neural connections in your brain. Learning feels slow and hard, and it is ungratifying compared to dopamine-induced YouTube videos. Have you ever watched a pretty good video on YouTube and learned nothing from it? This reaction to learning the hard way, masquerading as boredom, is the gatekeeper. And almost every important skill in life lives on the other side of that gate. When I started working for an AI startup, I was fascinated by what we were able to accomplish with a team of just two engineers. It looked like magic to me at first. You feed the AI some customer's message, and it tells you exactly what this person needs. So, to be an effective employee, I decided to learn profoundly about the subject. Moving from just a consumer of an API to a model creator made the process look un-magical. It started with spreadsheets where we cleaned data. There was a loss function that stubbornly refused to budge for hours. There was staring at a single Python error that said the tensor dimensions don't align. The boring part was the meticulous engineering upon which the magic is built. I find it fascinating now, but it was frustrating at the time, and I had to force myself to learn it. Like most developers, video games inspired me to become a programmer. I wanted to code my own game from scratch. I remember playing Devil May Cry and thinking about how I would program those boss battles. But when I sat with a keyboard and the cursor on my terminal flashed before me, I struggled to move a gray box on the screen using SDL. For some reason, when I pressed arrow keys, the box jittered instead of following a straight line. I would spend the whole day reading OpenGL and SDL documentation only to fix a single bug. Boredom was going through all this documentation, painfully, only to make small incremental progress. When you start a business, the gatekeeper shows its face. It stares back at you when you open that blank document and write a single line of text in it: My idea. For indie developers, it's the feeling you get when you build the entire application and feel compelled to start over rather than ship what you've built. This boredom is the feeling of creation from nothing, which is always harder than passive consumption. We've conflated "interesting" with "easy to consume." The most interesting things in the world, like building software, writing a book, mastering a craft, understanding a concept, are never easy to produce. Their initial stages are pure effort. Gamification tries to trick us past the gatekeeper with points and badges, but that's just putting a costume on it. The real work remains. There is no way around it. You can't eliminate that feeling. Instead, you have to recognize it for what it is and push through. When you feel that itchy tug toward a distracting tab, that's the gatekeeper shaking its keys. It's telling you that what you're doing is really hard, and it would be easier to just passively consume it. You might even enjoy the process without ever learning anything. Instead, whenever you feel it, set a timer for 25 minutes. Agree to wrestle with the battery chemistry, the Python error, or the empty page. Just for that short time span. There is no dopamine hit waiting on the other side of boredom like you get from passive consumption. Instead, the focus, the struggle, the sustained attention, that's the process of learning. The gatekeeper ensures only those willing to engage in the hard, quiet work of thinking get to the good stuff. I did not become a battery expert over the holidays. But at least I learned to recognize the gatekeeper's face. Now, when I feel that familiar, restless boredom descend as I'm trying to learn something hard, I smile a little. I know I'm at the threshold. And instead of turning back, I take a deep breath, set my timer to 25 minutes, and I power through the gate.

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devansh 4 days ago

Is Complexity just an illusion?

Most of what we call “complexity” is not a property of reality. It’s a property of our descriptions of reality. The world is what it is; what changes is the language you have available to carve it up. When someone says “that’s a golden retriever,” they’re not just using two words, they’re using a compressed concept that bundles size, coat, temperament, typical behavior, and a bunch of implied background. If you don’t share that vocabulary, you’re forced into a longer, clumsier description of the same dog. The dog didn’t get more complex. Your map did. This is why expertise feels like magic. A chess novice sees a board with dozens of pieces and a combinatorial explosion of interactions. A grandmaster sees “a fork motif,” “a weak back rank,” “a pinned knight,” and a small set of candidate lines. They’re not seeing less detail. They’re carrying a better compression scheme. They have words for patterns that occur often, and those words collapse chaos into structure. Complexity shrinks when you acquire the right abstractions. Once you internalize this, you stop worshipping “simple explanations” in the naive sense. People don’t actually want explanations that are short. They want explanations that keep working when conditions change, that don’t fall apart on new data, and that don’t assume more than the evidence forces. Word count is not the virtue. Appropriate restraint is. Compare the proverb"Red sky at night, sailor’s delight" to a messier but truer model: weather depends on pressure systems, humidity, wind, and local geography; red skies correlate sometimes, depending on context. The proverb is shorter. The second is less wrong in more places because it commits less. This is also why simplicity often correlates with truth in mature domains. Over time, languages evolve to give short handles to recurring, broadly useful structure. We coin compact terms like “germs,” “incentives,” “feedback loops,” “network effects.” They’re easy to say because the underlying patterns are valuable and frequent, so the culture compresses them into vocabulary. The causality isn’t “short explanations generalize.” It’s “general structure gets named,” and once named it looks simple. Simplicity is often a dashboard indicator, not the engine. Learning anything complex is mostly representation engineering in your own head. You are not trying to stuff facts into memory. You are trying to acquire compression, concept that turn many details into a small number of stable handles. Following is a basic mental model: 1) Steal the field’s primitives before you invent your own. Every domain has a small set of basic concepts that do a shocking amount of work. If you skip them, you’ll experience the domain as irreducible complexity. In calculus, “derivative” is not a symbol; it’s “local linear approximation.” Once that clicks, a lot of problems stop being special cases. In economics, “opportunity cost” and “incentives” are compression handles that cut through moralizing narratives. In product work, “retention,” “activation,” and “unit economics” prevent you from drowning in vibes. Early learning should look like building a precise glossary, not collecting trivia. 2) Build a pattern library by grinding examples until the patterns name themselves. Experts aren’t mainly smarter; they’ve seen enough instances to chunk reality. You get there by doing many small reps, not by reading one long explanation. Read one worked example, then do three similar ones from scratch. In chess, drill forks and pins until you stop counting pieces and start seeing motifs. In programming, you want “race condition,” “off-by-one,” “state leak,” “cache invalidation” to become immediate hypotheses, not postmortem discoveries. Practice isn’t repetition for discipline’s sake; it’s training your brain to compress recurring structure. 3) Learn with falsifiable predictions, not passive recognition. If you can only nod along, you don’t have the abstraction. Force yourself to predict outcomes before checking. If you’re learning statistics, predict how changing sample size affects variance. If you’re learning sales, predict which segment will churn and why. If you’re learning systems, predict the failure mode under load. This converts knowledge from "a story I can repeat" into "a model that constrains reality." 4) Control commitment: go from broad to narrow. When something breaks or surprises you, generate hypotheses ranked by how much they commit. Start with coarse categories (“measurement issue,” “traffic shift,” “pricing edge case,” “product regression”) before picking a single narrative. Then test to eliminate. This is how experts stay accurate, they don’t jump to the cleanest story; they keep the hypothesis space alive until evidence collapses it. The question “what does this rule out?” becomes your guardrail. 5) Upgrade your vocabulary deliberately. When you encounter a recurring cluster of details, name it. Give yourself a handle. The handle can be a formal term from the field or your own shorthand, but it must point to a repeatable pattern you can recognize and use. This is how you compound. Each new concept is a new compression tool; it makes future learning cheaper. If you do this well, "complex topics" start to feel different. Not because the world got simpler, but because you stopped paying unnecessary translation costs. The deepest form of intelligence isn’t producing the shortest answer. It’s finding the abstraction level where the real structure becomes easy to express, and then refusing to overcommit beyond the evidence. So is complexity an illusion? idk you tell me. The kind of complexities people complain about are “hard to describe, hard to predict, hard to compress”, this is often a signal that your vocabulary is misaligned with the structure of the thing. The tax is rarely levied by the territory. It’s paid at the currency exchange between reality and the symbols you’re using. And the highest-leverage move, more often than people admit, is to upgrade the map.

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ava's blog 5 days ago

bringing back trisanet

My wife is a historian, and sometimes, she likes to look up really old German recipes. One of those recipes was for strawberry soup from 1752. “Durchklaube die Erdbeer, und wasche sie schön, zuckers nach Genügen; gieß gemeinen oder, so du willst, süßen Wein daran, treibs durch und lass es nur einen Sud aufsieden: alsdenn rößte weißtes und würflicht-geschnittenes Brod im Schmalz, richte die Erdbeere darüber. Wenn man will, kan man ein wenig Trisanet drauf streuen.” Modern translation: “Sort through the strawberries and wash them thoroughly. Add sugar to taste, then pour over some ordinary wine—or, if you prefer, sweet wine. Pass the mixture through a sieve and let it come briefly to a boil. Meanwhile, fry cubes of white bread in lard until browned, then arrange the strawberries over the bread. If desired, sprinkle a little trisanet on top.” She was interested in making it, but it needed one ingredient she hadn't ever heard of: Trisanet. So she researched a bit further, and found out it's a specific spice mix, sometimes also referred to as ' tresenei ' or ' trisenet '. It used to be very popular in Germany, but faded away in favor of just using Zimtzucker (a mix of cinnamon and sugar), which is cheaper. There are different recipes for it as it seems to have regional variants and predates the metric units, but thankfully a kind soul online has shared these two. It mainly needs ginger, mace, cinnamon, sugar, and galangal, with some variations adding other spices like cardamom or pepper, too. My wife chose the original first listed recipe, which says: In metric units, half a pound of sugar is 255g, a Lot ginger is 16g, and a Quintlein is 4g. A modern version of Quintlein is Quäntchen and would translate to a pinch (a pinch of salt, etc.). Instead of the bark, use cinnamon powder of your choice, preferably Ceylon. Galangal was more frequently used here back then, but now is hardly available anywhere except asian grocery stores. We tried our best finding powdered galangal, but ended up buying fresh roots and drying and mixing it ourselves. My wife cut it into thin slices, and put it in the oven at 100 degrees Celsius for 3-4 hours, then let it cool down and used an electric spice grinder to turn it into fine powder. Historically, the powder would be a lot less fine. I have to say, it's been amazing and fits to a lot of different foods, no matter if sweet or salty. Even added it to a red lentil stew. I asked my wife to make a low sugar version next :) My favorite right now is making a hot beverage with it, similar to chai or salep. With a teaspoon of the powder and a bit of hot water and/or milk. We have gifted friends and family a lot of this spice mix for Christmas (we had them try it beforehand on a previous visit) and they were all delighted :) I encourage you to try it out. Reply via email Published 09 Jan, 2026 half a pound of sugar one Lot ginger one cinnamon bark one Quintlein mace one Quintlein galingale (=galangal)

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Sean Goedecke 1 weeks ago

The Dictator's Handbook and the politics of technical competence

The Dictator’s Handbook is an ambitious book. In the introduction, its authors Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith cast themselves as the successors to Sun Tzu and Niccolo Machiavelli: offering unsentimental advice to would-be successful leaders. Given that, I expected this book to be similar to The 48 Laws of Power , which did not impress me. Like many self-help books, The 48 Laws of Power is “empty calories”: a lot of fun to read, but not really useful or edifying 1 . However, The Dictator’s Handbook is a legitimate work of political science, serving as a popular introduction to an actual academic theory of government . Political science is very much not my field, so I’m reluctant to be convinced by (or comment on) the various concrete arguments in the book. I’m mainly interested in whether the book has anything to say about something I do know a little bit about: operating as an engineer inside a large tech company. Let’s first cover the key idea of The Dictator’s Handbook , which can be expressed in three points. Almost every feature of organizations can be explained by the ratio between the size of three groups: For instance, take an autocratic dictator. That dictator depends on a tiny group of people to maintain power: military generals, some powerful administrators, and so on. There is a larger group of people who could be in the inner circle but aren’t: for instance, other generals or administrators who are involved in government but aren’t fully trusted. Then there is the much, much larger group of all residents of the country, who are affected by the leader’s policies but have no ability to control them. This is an example of small-coalition government. Alternatively, take a democratic president. To maintain power, the president depends on every citizen who is willing to vote for them. There’s a larger group of people outside that core coalition: voters who aren’t supporters of the president, but could conceivably be persuaded. Finally, there’s the inhabitants of the country who do not vote: non-citizens, the very young, potentially felons, and so on. This is an example of large-coalition government. Mesquita and Smith argue that the structure of the government is downstream from the coalition sizes. If the coalition is small, it doesn’t matter whether the country is nominally a democracy, it will function like an autocratic dictatorship. Likewise, if the coalition is large, even a dictatorship will act in the best interests of its citizens (and will necessarily democratize). According to them, the structure of government does not change the size of the coalition. Rather, changes in the size of the coalition force changes in the structure of government. For instance, a democratic leader may want to shrink the size of their coalition to make it easier to hold onto power (e.g. by empowering state governors to unilaterally decide the outcome of their state’s elections). If successful, the government will thus become a small-coalition government, and will function more like a dictatorship (even if it’s still nominally democratic). Why are small-coalition governments more prone to autocracy or corruption? Because leaders stay in power by rewarding their coalitions, and if your coalition is a few tens or hundreds of people, you can best reward them by directly handing out cash or treasure, at the expense of everyone else. If your coalition is hundreds of thousands or millions of people (e.g. all the voters in a democracy), you can no longer directly assign rewards to individual people. Instead, it’s more efficient to fund public goods that benefit everybody. That’s why democracies tend to fund many more public goods than dictatorships. Leaders prefer small coalitions, because small coalitions are cheaper to keep happy. This is why dictators rule longer than democratically-elected leaders. Incidentally, it’s also why hegemonic countries like the USA have a practical interest in keeping uneasy allies ruled by dictators: because small-coalition dictatorships are easier to pay off. Leaders also want the set of “interchangeables” - remember, this is the set of people who could be part of the coalition but currently aren’t - to be as large as possible. That way they can easily replace unreliable coalition members. Of course, coalition members want the set of interchangeables to be as small as possible, to maximise their own leverage. What does any of this have to do with tech companies? The Dictator’s Handbook does reference a few tech companies specifically, but always in the context of boardroom disputes. In this framing, the CEO is the leader, and their coalition is the board who can either support them or fire them. I’m sure this is interesting - I’d love to read an account of the 2023 OpenAI boardroom wars from this perspective - but I don’t really know anything first-hand about how boards work, so I don’t want to speculate. It’s unclear how we might apply this theory so that it’s relevant to individual software engineers and the levels of management they might encounter in a large tech company. Directors and VPs are definitely leaders, but they’re not “leaders” in the sense meant in The Dictator’s Handbook . They don’t govern from the strength of their coalitions. Instead, they depend on the formal power they derive from the roles above them: you do what your boss says because they can fire you (or if they can’t, their boss certainly can). However, directors and VPs rarely make genuinely unilateral decisions. Typically they’ll consult with a small group of trusted subordinates, who they depend on for accurate information 3 and to actually execute projects. This sounds a lot like a coalition to me! Could we apply some of the lessons above to this kind of coalition? Let’s consider Mesquita and Smith’s point about the “interchangeables”. According to their theory, if you’re a member of the inner circle, it’s in your interest to be as irreplaceable as possible. You thus want to avoid bringing in other engineers or managers who could potentially fill your role. Meanwhile, your director or VP wants to have as many potential replacements available as possible, so each member of the inner circle’s bargaining power is lower - but they don’t want to bring them into the inner circle, since each extra person they need to rely on drains their political resources. This does not match my experience at all. Every time I’ve been part of a trusted group like this, I’ve been desperate to have a deeper bench. I have never once been in a position where I felt it was to my advantage to be the only person who could fill a particular role, for a few reasons: In other words, The Dictator’s Handbook style of backstabbing and political maneuvering is just not something I’ve observed at the level of software teams or products. Maybe it happens like this at the C-suite/VP or at the boardroom level - I wouldn’t know. But at the level I’m at, the success of individual projects determines your career success , so self-interested people tend to try and surround themselves with competent professionals who can make projects succeed, even if those people pose more of a political threat. I think the main difference here is that technical competence matters a lot in engineering organizations . I want a deep bench because it really matters to me whether projects succeed or fail, and having more technically competent people in the loop drastically increases the chances of success. Mesquita and Smith barely write about competence at all. From what I can tell, they assume that leaders don’t care about it, and assume that their administration will be competent enough (a very low bar) to stay in power, no matter what they do. For tech companies, technical competence is a critical currency for leaders . Leaders who can attract and retain technical competence to their organizations are able to complete projects and notch up easy political wins. Leaders who fail to do this must rely on “pure politics”: claiming credit, making glorious future promises, and so on. Of course, every leader has to do some amount of this. But it’s just easier to also have concrete accomplishments to point to as well. If I were tempted to criticize the political science here, this is probably where I’d start. I find it hard to believe that governments are that different from tech companies in this sense: surely competence makes a big difference to outcomes, and leaders are thus incentivized to keep competent people in their circle, even if that disrupts their coalition or incurs additional political costs 4 . Still, it’s possible to explain the desire for competence in a way that’s consistent with The Dictator’s Handbook . Suppose that competence isn’t more important in tech companies , but is more important for senior management . According to this view, the leader right at the top (the dictator, president, or CEO) doesn’t have the luxury to care about competence, and must focus entirely on solidifying their power base. But the leaders in the middle (the generals, VPs and directors) are obliged to actually get things done, and so need to worry a lot about keeping competent subordinates. Why would VPs be more obliged to get things done than CEOs? One reason might be that CEOs depend on a coalition of all board members (or even all company shareholders). This is a small coalition by The Dictator’s Handbook standards, but it’s still much larger than the VP’s coalition, which is a coalition of one: just their boss. CEOs have tangible ways to reward their coalition. But VPs can only really reward their coalition via accomplishing their boss’s goals, which necessarily requires competence. Mesquita and Smith aren’t particularly interested in mid-level politics. Their focus is on leaders and their direct coalitions. But for most of us who operate in the middle level, maybe the lesson is that coalition politics dominates at the top, but competence politics dominates in the middle. I enjoyed The Dictator’s Handbook , but most of what I took from it was speculation. There weren’t a lot of direct lessons I could draw from my own work politics 5 , and I don’t feel competent to judge the direct political science arguments. For instance, the book devotes a chapter to arguing against foreign aid, claiming roughly (a) that it props up unstable dictatorships by allowing them to reward their small-group coalitions, and (b) that it allows powerful countries to pressure small dictatorships into adopting foreign policies that are not in their citizens’ interest. Sure, that seems plausible! But I’m suspicious of plausible-sounding arguments in areas where I don’t have actual expertise. I could imagine a similarly-plausible argument in favor of foreign aid 6 . The book doesn’t talk about competence at all, but in my experience of navigating work politics, competence is the primary currency - it’s both the instrument and the object of many political battles. I can reconcile this by guessing that competence might matter more at the senior-management level than the very top level of politics , but I’m really just guessing. I don’t have the research background or the C-level experience to be confident about any of this. Still, I did like the core idea. No leader can lead alone, and that therefore the relationship between the ruler and their coalition dictates much of the structure of the organization. I think that’s broadly true about many different kinds of organization, including software companies. Maybe there are people out there who are applying Greene’s Machiavellian power tactics to their daily lives. If so, I hope I don’t meet them. “Organizations” here is understood very broadly: companies, nations, families, book clubs, and so on all fit the definition. I write about this a lot more in How I provide technical clarity to non-technical leaders In an email exchange, a reader suggested that companies face more competition than governments, because the cost of moving countries is much higher than the cost of switching products, which might make competence more important for companies. I think this is also pretty plausible. This is not a criticism of the book. After five years of studying philosophy, I’m convinced you can muster a plausible argument in favor of literally any position, with enough work. When explaining how organizations 2 behave, it is more useful to consider the motivations of individual people (say, the leader) than “the organization” as a whole Every leader must depend upon a coalition of insiders who help them maintain their position Almost every feature of organizations can be explained by the ratio between the size of three groups: The members of the coalition of insiders (i.e. the “inner circle”) The group who could conceivably become members of the coalition (the “outer circle”, or what the book calls the “interchangeables”) The entire population who is subject to the leader Management are suspicious of “irreplaceable” engineers and will actively work to undermine them, for a whole variety of reasons (the most palatable one is to reduce bus factor ) It’s just lonely to be in this position: you don’t really have peers to talk to, it’s hard to take leave, and so on. It feels much nicer to have potential backup Software teams succeed or fail together. Being the strongest engineer in a weak group means your projects will be rocky and you’ll have less successes to point to. But if you’re in a strong team, you’ll often acquire a good reputation just by association (so long as you’re not obviously dragging the side down) Maybe there are people out there who are applying Greene’s Machiavellian power tactics to their daily lives. If so, I hope I don’t meet them. ↩ “Organizations” here is understood very broadly: companies, nations, families, book clubs, and so on all fit the definition. ↩ I write about this a lot more in How I provide technical clarity to non-technical leaders ↩ In an email exchange, a reader suggested that companies face more competition than governments, because the cost of moving countries is much higher than the cost of switching products, which might make competence more important for companies. I think this is also pretty plausible. ↩ This is not a criticism of the book. ↩ After five years of studying philosophy, I’m convinced you can muster a plausible argument in favor of literally any position, with enough work. ↩

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An Algebraic Theory of Music

In my last post, I was struggling towards an algebraic theory of music. This idea has been burning in my mind ever since, and I wanted to give some updates with where I’ve landed. We begin by modeling a musical voice , which is, roughly speaking, the abstract version of a human voice. The voice can be doing one thing at a time, or can choose to not be doing anything. Voices are modeled by step functions , which are divisions of the real line into discrete chunks. We interpret each discrete chunk as a note being played by the voice for the duration of the chunk. This gives rise to a nice applicative structure that I alluded to in my previous post: where we take the union of the note boundaries in order to form the applicative. If either voice is resting, so too is the applicative. There is also an instance here, which chooses the first non-rest. There is a similar monoidal structure here, where multiplication is given by “play these two things simultaneously,” relying on an underlying instance for the meaning of “play these two things:” If either voice is resting, we treat its value as , and can happily combine the two parts in parallel. All of this gives rise to the following rich structure: Voices, therefore, give us our primitive notion of monophony. But real music usually has many voices doing many things, independently. This was a point in which I got stuck in my previous post. The solution here, is surprisingly easy. Assign a to each voice name: We get an extremely rich structure here completely for free. Our monoid combines all voices in parallel; our applicative combines voices pointwise; etc. However, we also have a new instance, whose characteristic method allows us to trade lines between voices. In addition to the in-parallel monoid instance, we can also define a tile product operator over , which composes things sequentially 1 : The constraint on arises from the fact that the pieces of music might extend off to infinity in either direction (which must do), and we need to deal with that. There are a few other combinators we care about. First, we can lift anonymous voices (colloquially “tunes”) into multi-part : and we can assign the same line to everyone: The primitives for building little tunes are which you can then compose sequentially via , and assign to voices via . One of the better responses to my last blog post was a link to Dmitri Tymoczko ’s FARM 2024 talk . There’s much more in this video than I can possibly due justice to here, but my big takeaway was that this guy is thinking about the same sorts of things that I am. So I dove into his work, and that lead to his quadruple hierarchy : Voices move within chords, which move within scales, which move within macro-harmonies. Tymoczko presents a algebra which is a geometric space for reasoning about voice leadings. He’s got a lot of fun websites for exploring the ideas, but I couldn’t find an actual implementation of the idea anywhere, so I cooked one up myself. The idea here is that we have some which describes a hierarchy of abstract scales moving with respect to one another. For example, the Western traditional of having triads move within the diatonic scale, which moves within the chromatic scale, would be represented as . forms a monoid, and has some simple generators that give rise to smooth voice leadings (chord changes.) Having a model for smooth harmonic transformations means we can use it constructively. I am still working out the exact details here, but the rough shape of the idea is to build an underlying field of key changes (represented as smooth voice leadings in ): We can then make an underlying field of functional harmonic changes (chord changes), modeled as smooth voice leadings in : Our voices responsible for harmony can now be written as values of type and we can use the applicative musical structure to combine the elements together: which we can later out into concrete pitches. The result is that we can completely isolate the following pieces: and the result is guaranteed to compose in a way that the ear can interpret as music. Not necessarily good music, but undeniably as music. The type indices on are purely for my book-keeping, and nothing requires them to be there. Which means we could also use the applicative structure to modulate over different sorts of harmony (eg, move from triads to seventh chords.) I haven’t quite gotten a feel for melody yet; I think it’s probably in , but it would be nice to be able to target chord tones as well. Please let me know in the comments if you have any insight here. However, I have been thinking about contouring, which is the overall “shape” of a musical line. Does it go up, and peak in the middle, and then come down again? Or maybe it smoothly descends down. We can use the discrete intervals intrinsic inside of s to find “reasonable” times to sample them. In essence this assigns a to each segment: and we can then use these times to then sample a function . This then allows us to apply contours (given as regular functions) to arbitrary rhythms. I currently have this typed as where , and the outputted s get rounded to their nearest integer values. I’m not deeply in love with this type, but the rough idea is great—turn arbitrary real-valued functions into musical lines. This generalizes contouring, as well as scale runs. I’m writing all of this up because I go back to work on Monday and life is going to get very busy soon. I’m afraid I won’t be able to finish all of this! The types above I’m pretty certain are relatively close to perfect. They seem to capture everything I could possibly want, and nothing I don’t want. Assuming I’m right about that, they must make up the basis of musical composition. The next step therefore is to build musical combinators on top. One particular combinator I’ve got my eye on is some sort of general “get from here to there” operator: which I imagine would bridge a gap between the end of one piece of music with beginning of another. I think this would be roughly as easy as moving each voice linearly in space from where it was to where it needs to be. This might need to be a ternary operation in order to also associate a rhythmic pattern to use for the bridge. But I imagine would be great for lots of dumb little musical things. Like when applied over the chord dimension, it would generate arpeggios. Over the scale dimension, it would generate runs. And it would make chromatic moves in the chroma dimension. Choosing exactly what moves to make for s consisting of components in multiple axes might just be some bespoke order, or could do something more intelligent. I think the right approach would be to steal ’ idea of an , and attach some relevant metadata to each . We could then write as a function of those envelopes, but I must admit I don’t quite know what this would look like. As usual, I’d love any insight you have! Please leave it in the comments. Although I must admit I appreciate comments of the form “have you tried $X” much more than of the form “music is sublime and you’re an idiot for even trying this.” Happy new year! Strictly speaking, the tile product can also do parallel composition, as well as sychronizing composition, but that’s not super important right now. ↩︎ key changes chord changes how voices express the current harmony the rhythms of all of the above Strictly speaking, the tile product can also do parallel composition, as well as sychronizing composition, but that’s not super important right now. ↩︎

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Manuel Moreale 1 weeks ago

V.H. Belvadi

This week on the People and Blogs series we have an interview with V.H. Belvadi, whose blog can be found at vhbelvadi.com . Tired of RSS? Read this in your browser or sign up for the newsletter . The People and Blogs series is supported by Flamed and the other 130 members of my "One a Month" club. If you enjoy P&B, consider becoming one for as little as 1 dollar a month. I’m currently a Trinity–Cambridge researcher at the University of Cambridge, pursuing my PhD on the development of climate models. I’m also a researcher on the Cambridge ThinkLab group examining the credibility of AI models. My background is in condensed matter physics, which previously led to my research in astrophysics studying a type of eruptive variable star, and that in turn helped broaden my interests in the fascinating field of the history of science, about which I remain very passionate today. I’ve enjoyed writing for as long as I can remember and I write on my website about a wide range of topics, but mostly centred around science, technology, history and society. I also run an infrequently despatched newsletter that discusses similar themes. In my spare time I make photographs and engage with my local photography club, read a lot, punt on the Cam, ride my Brompton, take long walks or participate in the Cambridge Union, which happens to be the world’s oldest debating society. To be honest, it’s quite unremarkable. I first came across the idea of a weblog through an explainer in a physical magazine. My earliest website was a bunch of hard-coded html pages uploaded to my ISP’s free subdomain. I eventually moved to LiveJournal and then to Vox, which had just been launched (and about which I still have fond memories). In 2008 I moved to Wordpress, because that’s where seemingly everyone was, and I stayed there for about eight years. Between 2016 and 2018, in search of better alternatives because I had started to feel Wordpress was bloated, I tried Kirby and then Hugo and finally Statamic. Over the years my blog has had many names, all of which are best forgotten. Today it’s eponymous. My perennial motivation has been the joy of seeing my thoughts printed on screen. The general structure I have on my website now, besides my ‘notes’, has been the structure I’ve had since the early 2000s. (My notes were on Tumblr.) Besides all that, I like that in my website I have a safe space in which to engage with a multitude of ideas and sharpen my thinking through my writing. I’m starting to get the feeling all my answers are going to be unremarkable. I don’t really have a creative process mostly because I don’t force myself to write at specific intervals for my website and because I find I do not work well with ‘knowledge gathering’ disconnected from a purpose for that knowledge. What this means is that ideas incubate in my head as I read things, and over time one, or a set of ideas, will reach critical density, prompting me to write something. Consequently, by this point I usually know what I want to say, so I just sit down and write it. I already do a lot of writing as an academic and deal with plenty of deadlines, so the last thing I want is to replicate that environment on my personal website. As a result some things I do tend to be polar opposites: I keep no schedule, I give myself no deadlines, and I publish my first drafts – warts and all – with little proofreading, or throw away entire essays at times. This is not to say I never refine my writing, but I generally try not let a sense of perfection get in my way. I also, therefore, permit myself plenty of addenda and errata. I write in BBEdit and publish from BBEdit using SFTP. I have a bunch of scripts, clippings etc. on that wonderful programme and am yet to find an equal. If I am on my mobile I use the dashboard built into my site, but usually only for fixing typos and not for typing entire essays. I may type entire notes this way, however, because notes on my website are usually quite brief. And if I ever want to make note of something for later or return to a webpage, I either save it to my Safari reading list or make a note on Apple Notes. However, I rarely make separate, atomic notes anymore (I did try to at one point), choosing instead to write a few lines summarising a source and saving the source itself. In case of my RSS subscriptions (I use NetNewsWire) I star posts for later reference but prefer to read on the actual website, as the writer intended. I can write anywhere but there certainly are some things that make writing a more pleasant experience. Good music has no equal and I prefer classical music (which varies widely from Mozart to George Winston) or ambient works like those of Roger Eno and Enya; if push comes to shove, anything without words will do. I prefer quiet places, places from where I can see the natural world around me and a warm cup of coffee, none of which are absolute necessities. The environment on my computer is probably a bit more controlled: I like to write on BBEdit, as I said before, and in full screen with, perhaps, Safari on a neighbouring workspace. My website is hosted on a VPS with Hetzner, which I also use to self-host a few other things like a budgeting software , a reference manager , Plausible and Sendy. It runs on Statamic and is version-controlled with Git. My domain is registered with Cloudflare. In the past I used mostly shared hosting. I also maintain an updated list of stuff I use daily on my website for some inexplicable reason. It costs me about £5 a month to run my website, including daily automated backups. I neither generate revenue through it now nor plan to in the future. I do not have thoughts on people monetising their personal blogs. However, if their attempts at doing so involve ruining their writing, presenting misleading content or plastering ads all over their page, I might not be inclined to return to their site or recommend it to others. I know how wonderful it felt when people showed support for my website through small donations so I like to give similarly when I can afford to do so. Amongst those who have not already been interviewed on People & Blogs, here are four people who are far more interesting than I am: Juha-Matti Santala , Pete Moore , Melanie Richards and Anthony Nelzin-Santos . (This in no way means there isn’t a fifth person more interesting than me.) I feel a strong urge to apologise for my responses but I’ll instead take a moment to nudge people to subscribe to my newsletter if that’s something they’d like, or visit my website and start a conversation with me about something either they found interesting or with which they disagree. If you have 30 min to spare, head over to ncase.me/trust/ for an interactive website designed to illustrate the evolution of trust according to game theory. But if you have less than 30 min, here’s a ‘tediously accurate scale model’ of the solar system that is the internet edition of Carl Sagan’s pale blue dot. Besides all this, I’d encourage people to help build a better, more inclusive and kinder world for everyone by engaging meaningfully both online and offline (although not at the cost of your own mental health). Slow down, read more books and please don’t lose your attention span. Now that you're done reading the interview, go check the blog and subscribe to the RSS feed . If you're looking for more content, go read one of the previous 122 interviews . Make sure to also say thank you to Paolo Ruggeri and the other 130 supporters for making this series possible. I would not waste my time on targeting niches and optimising for search engines, given my intentions with my website. I thought they were intended to grow traffic – as they are – but I came to realise that was not the sort of traffic I valued. I would prioritise platform agnosticism so I can move to better platforms in the future, should I choose to, without losing any of my work. I have lost much of my writings when jumping platforms in the past because I had to move my content over manually and chose to move select writings to save time. (Or was it because I was a bit lazy?) I would probably not delete my old work as I outgrow them, choosing instead to keep them private. I have, peculiarly and thoughtlessly, deleted my work at regular intervals multiple times in the past.

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Rodney Brooks 1 weeks ago

Predictions Scorecard, 2026 January 01

Nothing is ever as good as it first seems and nothing is ever as bad as it first seems. — A best memory paraphrase of advice given to me by Vice Admiral Joe Dyer, former chief test pilot of the US Navy and former Commander of NAVAIR. [You can follow me on social media: @rodneyabrooks.bsky.social and see my publications etc., at https://people.csail.mit.edu/brooks ] This is my eighth annual update on how my dated predictions from January 1 st , 2018 concerning (1) self driving cars , (2) robotics, AI , and machine learning , and (3) human space travel , have held up. I promised then to review them at the start of the year every year until 2050 (right after my 95 th birthday), thirty two years in total. The idea was to hold myself accountable for those predictions. How right or wrong was I? The summary is that my predictions held up pretty well, though overall I was a little too optimistic. That is a little ironic, as I think that many people who read my predictions back on  January 1 st , 2018 thought that I was very pessimistic compared to the then zeitgeist. I prefer to think of myself as being a realist. And did I see LLMs coming? No and yes. Yes, I did say that something new and big that everyone accepted as the new and big thing in AI would come along no earlier than 2023, and that the key paper for it’s success had already been written by before I made my first predictions. And indeed LLMs were generally accepted as the next big thing in 2023 (I was lucky on that date), and the key paper, Attention Is All You Need , was indeed already written, and had first appeared in June of 2017. I wrote about this extensively in last year’s scorecard . But no, I had no idea it would be LLMs at the time of my correct prediction that something big would appear. And that lack of specificity on the details of exactly what will be invented and when is the case with all my predictions from the first day of 2018. I did not claim to be clairvoyant about exactly what would happen, rather I was making predictions about the speed of new research ideas, the speed of hype generation, the speed of large scale deployments of new technologies, and the speed of fundamental changes propagating through the world’s economy. Those speeds are very different and driven by very different realities. I think that many people get confused by that and make the mistake of jumping between those domains of reality, thinking all the speeds will be the same.  In my case my estimates of those speeds are informed by watching AI and robotics professionally, for 42 years at the time of my predictions. I became a graduate student in Artificial Intelligence in January of 1976, just shy of 20 years after the initial public outing of the term Artificial Intelligence at the summer workshop in 1956 at Dartmouth. And now as of today I have been in that field for 50 years. I promised to track my predictions made eight years ago today for 32 years. So I am one quarter of the way there. But the density of specific years of events or marking percentages of adoption that I predicted start to fall off right around now. Sometime during 2026 I will bundle up all my comments over the eight years specifically mentioning years that have now passed, and put them in an archival mid-year post. Then I will get rid of the three big long tables that dominate the body of this annual post, and have short updates on the sparse dates for the next 24 years. I will continue to summarize what has happened in self-driving cars generally, including electrification progress and the forever promised flying cars, along with AI and robotics, and human space flight. But early in 2025 I made five new predictions for the coming ten years, without specific dates, but which summarize what I think will happen.  I will track these predictions too. What I Nearly Got Wrong The day before my original prediction post in 2018 the price of Bitcoin had opened at $12,897.70 and topped out at $14,377.40 and 2017 had been the first year it had ever traded at over $1,000. The price seemed insane to me as Bitcoin wasn’t being used for the task for which it had been designed. The price seemed to me then, and now, to be purely about speculation. I almost predicted when it would be priced at $200, on the way down. But, fortunately, I checked myself as I realized that the then current state of the market made no sense to me and so any future state may not either. Besides, I had no experience or expertise in crypto pricing. So I left that prediction out. I had no basis to make a prediction. That was a wise decision, and I revisit that reasoning as I make new predictions now, and implore myself to only make predictions in fields where I know something. What Has Surprised Me, And That I Missed 8 Years Ago I made some predictions about the future of SpaceX although I didn’t always label them as being about SpaceX. A number of my predictions were in response to pronouncements by the CEO of SpaceX. My predictions were much more measured and some might say even pessimistic. Those predictions so far have turned out to be more optimistic than how reality has unfolded. I had made no specific predictions about Falcon 9, though I did make predictions about the subsequent SpaceX launch family, now called Starship, but then known as BFR, which eight years later has not gotten into orbit. In the meantime SpaceX has scaled the Falcon 9 launch rate at a phenomenal speed, and the magnitude of the growth is very surprising. Eight years ago, Falcon 9 had been launched 46 times, all successful, over the previous eight years, and it had recently had a long run of successful landings of the booster whenever attempted. At that time five launches had been on a previously used booster, but there had been no attempts to launch Falcon Heavy with its three boosters strapped together. Now we are eight years on from those first eight years of Falcon 9 launches. The scale and success rate of the launches has made each individual launch an unremarkable event, with humans being launched a handful of times per year. Now the Falcon 9 score card stands at 582 launches with only one failed booster, and there have been 11 launches of the three booster Falcon Heavy, all successful. That is a sustained growth rate of 38% year over year for eight years. And that it is a very high sustained deployment growth rate for any complex technology. There is no other modern rocket with such a volume of launches that comes even close to the Falcon 9 record.  And I certainly did not foresee this volume of launches. About half the launches have had SpaceX itself as the customer, starting in February 2018, launching an enormous satellite constellation (about two thirds of all satellites ever orbited) to support Starlink bringing internet to everywhere on the surface of Earth. But… there is one historical rocket, a suborbital one which has a much higher record of use than Falcon 9 over a much briefer period. The German V-2 was the first rocket to fly above the atmosphere and the first ballistic missile to be used to deliver bombs. It was fueled with ethanol and liquid oxygen, and was steered by an analog computer that also received inputs from radio guide signals–it was the first operational liquid fueled rocket. It was developed in Germany in the early 1940’s and after more than a thousand test launches was first put into operation on September 7 th , 1944, landing a bomb on Paris less than two weeks after the Allied liberation of that city. In the remaining 8 months of the war 3,172 armed V-2 rockets were launched at targets in five countries — 1,358 were targeted at London alone. My Color Scheme and Past Analysis The acronyms I used for predictions in my original post were as follows. NET year means it will not happen before that year (No Earlier Than) BY year means I predict that it will happen by that year. NIML , Not In My Lifetime, i.e., not before 2050. As time passes mentioned years I color then as accurate , too pessimistic , or  too optimistic . Last year I added hemming and hawing . This is for when something looks just like what I said would take a lot longer has happened, but the underlying achievement is not what everyone expected, and is not what was delivered. This is mostly for things that were talked about as being likely to happen with no human intervention and it now appears to happen that way, but in reality there are humans in the loop that the companies never disclose. So the technology that was promised to be delivered hasn’t actually been delivered but everyone thinks it has been. When I quote myself I do so in orange , and when I quote others I do so in blue . I have not changed any of the text of the first three columns of the prediction tables since their publication on the first day of 2018. I only change the text in the fourth column to say what actually happened.  This meant that by four years ago that fourth column was getting very long and skinny, so I removed them and started with fresh comments two years ago. I have kept the last two year’s comments and added new ones, with yellow backgrounds, for this year, removing the yellow backgrounds from 2025 comments that were there last year. If you want to see the previous five years of comments you can go back to   the 2023 scorecard . On March 26 th I skeeted out five technology predictions, talking about developments over the next ten years through January 1st, 2036. Three weeks later I included them in a blog post . Here they are again. 1. Quantum Computers . The successful ones will emulate physical systems directly for specialized classes of problems rather than translating conventional general computation into quantum hardware. Think of them as 21st century analog computers. Impact will be on materials and physics computations. 2. Self Driving Cars . In the US the players that will determine whether self driving cars are successful or abandoned are #1 Waymo (Google) and #2 Zoox (Amazon). No one else matters. The key metric will be human intervention rate as that will determine profitability. 3. Humanoid Robots . Deployable dexterity will remain pathetic compared to human hands beyond 2036. Without new types of mechanical systems walking humanoids will remain too unsafe to be in close proximity to real humans. 4. Neural Computation . There will be small and impactful academic forays into neuralish systems that are well beyond the linear threshold systems, developed by 1960, that are the foundation of recent successes. Clear winners will not yet emerge by 2036 but there will be multiple candidates. 5. LLMs . LLMs that can explain which data led to what outputs will be key to non annoying/dangerous/stupid deployments. They will be surrounded by lots of mechanism to keep them boxed in, and those mechanisms, not yet invented for most applications, will be where the arms races occur. These five predictions are specifically about what will happen in these five fields during the ten years from 2026 through 2035, inclusive. They are not saying when particular things will happen, rather they are saying whether or not  certain things will happen in that decade. I will do my initial analysis of these five new predictions immediately below. For the next ten years I will expand on each of these reviews in this annual scorecard, along with reviews of my earlier predictions. The ten years for these predictions are up on January 1 st , 2036. I will have just turned 81 years old then, so let’s see if I am still coherent enough to do this. Quantum Computers The successful ones will emulate physical systems directly for specialized classes of problems rather than translating conventional general computation into quantum hardware. Think of them as 21st century analog computers. Impact will be on materials and physics computations. The original excitement about quantum computers was stimulated by a paper by Peter Shor in 1994 which gave a digital quantum algorithm to factor large integers much faster than a conventional digital computer. Factoring integers is often referred to as “the IFP” for the integer factorization problem . So what? The excitement around this was based on how modern cryptography, which provides our basic security for on-line commerce, works under the hood. Much of the internet’s security is based on it being hard to factor a large number. For instance in the RSA algorithm Alice tells everyone a large number (in different practical versions it has 1024, 2048, or 4096 bits) for which she knows its prime factors. But she tells people only the number not its factors. In fact she chose that number by multiplying together some very large prime numbers — very large prime numbers are fairly easy to generate (using the Miller-Rabin test). Anyone, usually known as Bob, can then use that number to encrypt a message intended for Alice. No one, neither Tom, Dick, nor Harry, can decrypt that message unless they can find the prime factors of Alice’s public number. But Alice knows them and can read the message intended only for her eyes. So… if you could find prime factors of large numbers easily then the backbone of digital security would be broken. Much excitement! Shor produced his algorithm in 1994. By the year 2001 a group at IBM had managed to find the prime factors of the number 15 using a digital quantum computer as published in Nature . All the prime factors. Both 3 and 5. Notice that 15 has only four bits, which is a lot smaller than the number of bits used in commercial RSA implementations, namely 1024, 2048, or 4096. Surely things got better fast.  By late 2024 the biggest numbers that had been factored by an actual digital quantum computer had 35 bits which allows for numbers no bigger than 34,359,738,367. That is way smaller than the size of the smallest numbers used in RSA applications. Nevertheless it does represent 31 doublings in magnitude of numbers factored in 23 years, so progress has been quite exponential. But it could take another 500 years of that particular version of exponential growth rate to get to conquering today’s smallest version of RSA digital security. In the same report the authors say that a conventional, but very large computer (2,000 GPUs along with a JUWELS booster , which itself has 936 compute nodes each consisting of four NVIDIA A100 Tensor Core GPUs themselves each hosted by 48 dual threaded AMD EPYC Rome cores–that is quite a box of computing) simulating a quantum computer running Shor’s algorithm had factored a 39 bit number finding that 549,755,813,701 = 712,321 × 771,781, the product of two 20 bit prime numbers. That was its limit. Nevertheless, an actual digital quantum computer can still be outclassed by one simulated on conventional digital hardware. The other early big excitement for digital quantum computers was Grover’s search algorithm, but work on that has not been as successful as for Shor’s IFP solution. Digital quantum computation nirvana has not yet been demonstrated. Digital quantum computers work a little like regular digital computers in that there is a control mechanism which drives the computer through a series of discrete steps. But today’s digital quantum computers suffer from accumulating errors in quantum bits. Shor’s algorithm assumes no such errors. There are techniques for correcting those errors but they slow things down and cause other problems. One way that digital quantum computers may get better is if new methods of error correction emerge. I am doubtful that something new will emerge, get fully tested, and then make it into production at scale all within the next ten years. So we may not see a quantum (ahem) leap in performance of quantum digital computers in the next decade. Analog quantum computers are another matter. They are not switched, but instead are configured to directly simulate some physical system and the quantum evolution and interactions of components of that system. They are an embodied quantum model of that system. And they are ideally suited to solving these sorts of problems and cannot be emulated by conventional digital systems as they can be in the 39 bit number case above. I find people working on quantum computers are often a little squirrelly about whether their computer acts more like a digital or analog computer, as they like to say they are “quantum” only.  The winners over the next 10 years will be ones solving real problems in materials science and other aspects of chemistry and physics. Self Driving Cars In the US the players that will determine whether self driving cars are successful or abandoned are #1 Waymo (Google) and #2 Zoox (Amazon). No one else matters. The key metric will be human intervention rate as that will determine profitability. Originally the term “self driving car” was about any sort of car that could operate without a driver on board, and without a remote driver offering control inputs. Originally they were envisioned as an option for privately owned vehicles used by individuals, a family car where no person needed to drive, but simply communicated to the car where it should take them. That conception is no longer what people think of when self driving cars are mentioned. Self driving cars today refer to taxi-services that feel like Uber or Lyft, but for which there is not a  human driver, just paying passengers. In the US the companies that have led in this endeavor have changed over time. The first leader was Cruise, owned by GM. They were the first to have a regular service in the downtown area of a major city (San Francisco), and then in a number of other cities, where there was an app that anyone could download and then use their service. They were not entirely forthcoming with operational and safety problems, including when they dragged a person, who had just been hit by a conventionally driven car, for tens of feet under one of their vehicles. GM suspended operations in late 2023 and completely disbanded it in December 2024. Since then Waymo (owned by Google) has been the indisputable leading deployed service. Zoox (owned by Amazon) has been a very distant, but operational, second place. Tesla (owned by Tesla) has put on a facade of being operational, but it is not operational in the sense of the other two services, and faces regulatory headwinds that both Waymo and Zoox have long been able to satisfy. They are not on a path to becoming a real service. See my traditional section on self driving cars below, as it explains in great detail the rationale for these evaluations. In short, Waymo looks to have a shot at succeeding and it is unlikely they will lose first place in this race. Zoox may also cross the finish line, and it is very unlikely that anyone will beat them.  So if both of Waymo and Zoox fail, for whatever reason, the whole endeavor will grind to a halt in the US. But what might go wrong that makes one of these companies fail. We got a little insight into that in the last two weeks of 2025. On Saturday December 20 th of 2025 there was an extended power outage in San Francisco that started small in the late morning but by nightfall had spread to large swaths of the city.  And lots and lots of normally busy intersections were by that time blocked by many stationary Waymos. Traffic regulations in San Francisco are that when there is an intersection which has traffic lights that are all dark, that intersection should be treated as though it has stop signs at every entrance. Human drivers who don’t know the actual regulation tend to fall back to that behavior in any case. It seemed that Waymos were waiting indefinitely for green lights that never came, and at intersections through which many Waymos were routed there were soon enough waiting Waymos that the intersections were blocked.  Three days later, on December 23 rd , Waymo issued an explanation on their blog site , which includes the following: Navigating an event of this magnitude presented a unique challenge for autonomous technology. While the Waymo Driver is designed to handle dark traffic signals as four-way stops, it may occasionally request a confirmation check to ensure it makes the safest choice. While we successfully traversed more than 7,000 dark signals on Saturday, the outage created a concentrated spike in these requests. This created a backlog that, in some cases, led to response delays contributing to congestion on already-overwhelmed streets. We established these confirmation protocols out of an abundance of caution during our early deployment, and we are now refining them to match our current scale. While this strategy was effective during smaller outages, we are now implementing fleet-wide updates that provide the Driver with specific power outage context, allowing it to navigate more decisively. As the outage persisted and City officials urged residents to stay off the streets to prioritize first responders, we temporarily paused our service in the area. We directed our fleet to pull over and park appropriately so we could return vehicles to our depots in waves. This ensured we did not further add to the congestion or obstruct emergency vehicles during the peak of the recovery effort. The key phrase is that Waymos “request a confirmation check” at dark signals. This means that the cars were asking for a human to look at images from their cameras and manually tell them how to behave. With 7,000 dark signals and perhaps a 1,000 vehicles on the road, Waymo clearly did not have enough humans on duty to handle the volume of requests that were coming in. Waymo does not disclose whether any human noticed a rise in these incidents early in the day and more human staff were called in, or whether they simply did not have enough employees to make handling them all possible. At a deeper level it looks like they had a debugging feature in their code, and not enough people to supply real time support to handle the implications of that debugging feature. And it looks like Waymo is going to remove that debugging safety feature as a way of solving the problem.  This is not an uncommon sort of engineering failure during early testing. Normally one would hope that the need for that debugging feature had been resolved before large scale deployment. But, who are these human staff?  Besides those in Waymo control centers, it turns out there is a gig-work operation with an app named Honk  (the headline of the story is When robot taxis get stuck, a secret army of humans comes to the rescue ) whereby Waymo pays people around $20 to do minor fixups to stuck Waymos by, for instance, going and physically closing a door that q customer left open. Tow truck operators use the same app to find Waymos that need towing because of some more serious problem. It is not clear whether it was a shortage of those gig workers, or a shortage of people in the Waymo remote operations center that caused the large scale failures.  But it is worth noting that current generation Waymos need a lot of human help to operate as they do, from people in the remote operations center to intervene and provide human advice for when something goes wrong, to Honk gig-workers scampering around the city physically fixed problems with the vehicles, to people to clean the cars and plug them in to recharge when they return to their home base. For human operated ride services, traditional taxi companies or gig services such as Uber and Lyft, do not need these external services. There is a human with the car at all times who takes care of these things. The large scale failure on the 20 th did get people riled up about these robots causing large scale traffic snarls, and made them wonder about whether the same thing will happen when the next big earthquake hits San Francisco. Will the human support worker strategy be stymied by both other infrastructure failures (e.g., the cellular network necessary for Honk workers to communicate) or the self preservation needs of the human workers themselves? The Waymo blog post revealed another piece of strategy. This is one of three things they said that they would do to alleviate the problems: Expanding our first responder engagement: To date, we’ve trained more than 25,000 first responders in the U.S. and around the world on how to interact with Waymo. As we discover learnings from this and other widespread events, we’ll continue updating our first responder training. The idea is to add more responsibility to police and fire fighters to fix the inadequacies of the partial-only autonomy strategy for Waymo’s business model. Those same first responders will have more than enough on their plates during any natural disasters. Will it become a political issue where the self-driving taxi companies are taxed enough to provide more first responders? Will those costs ruin their business model? Will residents just get so angry that they take political action to shut down such ride services? Humanoid Robots Deployable dexterity will remain pathetic compared to human hands beyond 2036. Without new types of mechanical systems walking humanoids will remain too unsafe to be in close proximity to real humans. Despite this prediction it is worth noting that there is a long distance between current deployed dexterity and dexterity that is still pathetic. In the next ten years deployable dexterity may improve markedly, but not in the way the current hype for humanoid robots suggests.  I talk about his below in my annual section scoring my 2018 predictions on robotics, AI, and machine learning, in a section titled Dexterous Hands . Towards the end of 2025 I published a long blog post summarizing the status of, and problems remaining for  humanoid robots . I started building humanoid robots in my research group at MIT in 1992. My previous company, Rethink Robotics, founded in 2008, delivered thousands of upper body Baxter and Sawyer humanoid robots (built in the US) to factories between 2012 and 2018.  At the top of this blog page you can see a whole row of Baxter robots in China. A Sawyer robot that had operated in a factory in Oregon just  got shut down in late 2025 with 35,236 hours on its operations clock. You can still find many of Rethink’s humanoids in use in teaching and research labs around the world. Here is the cover of Science Robotics from November 2025, showing a Sawyer used in the research for   this article  out of Imperial College, London. Here is a slide from a 1998 powerpoint deck that I was using in my talks, six years after my graduate students and I had started building our first humanoid robot, Cog. It is pretty much the sales pitch that today’s humanoid companies use.  You are seeing here my version from almost twenty eight years ago. I point this out to demonstrate that I am not at all new to humanoid robotics and have worked on them for decades in both academia and in producing and selling humanoid robots that were deployed at scale (which no one else has done) doing real work. My blog post from September, details why the current learning based approaches to getting dexterous manipulation will not get there anytime soon. I argue that the players are (a) collecting the wrong data and (b) trying to learn the wrong thing. I also give an argument (c) for why learning might not be the right approach. My argument for (c) may not hold up, but I am confident that I am right on both (a) and (b), at least for the next ten years. I also outline in that blog post why the current (and indeed pretty much the only, for the last forty years) method of building bipeds and controlling them will remain unsafe for humans to be nearby. I pointed out that the danger is roughly cubicly proportional to the weight of the robot. Many humanoid robot manufacturers are introducing lightweight robots, so I think they have come to the same conclusion. But the side effect is that the robots can not carry much payload, and certainly can’t provide physical support to elderly humans, which is a thing that human carers do constantly — these small robots are just not strong enough. And elder care and in home care is one of the main arguments for having human shaped robots, adapted to the messy living environments of actual humans. Given that careful analysis from September I do not share the hype that surrounds humanoid robotics today. Some of it is downright delusional across many different levels. To believe the promises of many CEOs of humanoid companies you have to accept the following conjunction. The declarations being made about humanoid robots are just not plausible. We’ll see what actually happens over the next ten years, but it does seem that the fever is starting to crack at the edges. Here are two news stories from the last few days of 2025. From The Information on December 22 nd there is a story about how humanoid robot companies are wrestling with safety standards . All industrial and warehouse robots, whether stationary of mobile have a big red safety stop button, in order to comply with regulatory safety standards. The button cuts the power to the motors. But cutting power to the motors of a balancing robot might make them fall over and cause more danger and damage to people nearby.  For the upper torso humanoid robots Baxter and Sawyer from my company Rethink Robotics we too had a safety stop button that cut power to all the motors in the arms. It was a collaborative robot and often a person, or part of their limbs or body could be under an arm and it would have been dangerous for the arms to fall quickly on cutoff of power. To counter this we developed a unique circuit that required no active power, which made it so that the back current generated by a motor when powered off acted as a very strong brake. Perhaps there are similar possible solutions for humanoid robots and falling, but they need to be invented yet. On December 25 th the Wall Street Journal had a story headlined “Even the Companies Making Humanoid Robots Think They’re Overhyped” , with a lede of “Despite billions in investment, startups say their androids mostly aren’t useful for industrial or domestic work yet” . Here are the first two paragraphs of the story: Billions of dollars are flowing into humanoid robot startups, as investors bet that the industry will soon put humanlike machines in warehouses, factories and our living rooms. Many leaders of those companies would like to temper those expectations. For all the recent advances in the field, humanoid robots, they say, have been overhyped and face daunting technical challenges before they move from science experiments to a replacement for human workers. And then they go on to quote various company leaders: “We’ve been trying to figure out how do we not just make a humanoid robot, but also make a humanoid robot that does useful work,” said Pras Velagapudi, chief technology officer at Agility Robotics. Then talking about a recent humanoid robotics industry event the story says: On stage at the summit, one startup founder after another sought to tamp down the hype around humanoid robots. “There’s a lot of great technological work happening, a lot of great talent working on these, but they are not yet well defined products,” said Kaan Dogrusoz, a former Apple engineer and CEO of Weave Robotics. Today’s humanoid robots are the right idea, but the technology isn’t up to the premise, Dogrusoz said. He compared it to Apple’s most infamous product failure, the Newton hand-held computer. There are more quotes from other company leaders all pointing out the difficulties in making real products that do useful work. Reality seems to be setting in as promised delivery dates come and go by. Meanwhile here is what I said at the end of my September blog post about humanoid robots and teaching them dexterity.  I am not at all negative about a great future for robots, and in the nearish term. It is just that I completely disagree with the hype arguing that building robots with humanoid form magically will make robots useful and deployable. These particular paragraphs followed where I had described there, as I do again in this blog post, how the meaning of self driving cars has drifted over time. Following that pattern, what it means to be a humanoid robot  will change over time. Before too long (and we already start to see this) humanoid robots will get wheels for feet, at first two, and later maybe more, with nothing that any longer really resembles human legs in gross form.  But they will still be called humanoid robots . Then there will be versions which variously have one, two, and three arms. Some of those arms will have five fingered hands, but a lot will have two fingered parallel jaw grippers. Some may have suction cups. But they will still be called humanoid robots . Then there will be versions which have a lot of sensors that are not passive cameras, and so they will have eyes that see with active light, or in non-human frequency ranges, and they may have eyes in their hands, and even eyes looking down from near their crotch to see the ground so that they can locomote better over uneven surfaces. But they will still be called humanoid robots . There will be many, many robots with different forms for different specialized jobs that humans can do. But they will all still be called humanoid robots . As with self driving cars, most of the early players in humanoid robots, will quietly shut up shop and disappear. Those that remain will pivot and redefine what they are doing, without renaming it, to something more achievable and with, finally, plausible business cases. The world will slowly shift, but never fast enough to need a change of name from humanoid robots. But make no mistake, the successful humanoid robots of tomorrow will be very different from those being hyped today. Neural Computation There will be small and impactful academic forays into neuralish systems that are well beyond the linear threshold systems, developed by 1960, that are the foundation of recent successes. Clear winners will not yet emerge by 2036 but there will be multiple candidates. Current machine learning techniques are largely based on having millions, and more recently tens (to hundreds?) of billions, of linear threshold units. They look like this. Each of these units have a fixed number of inputs, where some numerical value comes in, and it is multiplied by a weight, usually a floating point number, and the results of all of the multiplications are summed, along with an adjustable threshold , which is usually negative, and then the sum goes through some sort of squishing function to produce a number between zero and one, or in this case minus one and plus one, as the output. In this diagram, which, by the way is taken from Bernie Widrow’s technical report from 1960, the output value is either minus one or plus one, but in modern systems it is often a number from anywhere in that, or another, continuous interval. This was based on previous work, including that of Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts’ 1943 formal model of a neuron, Marvin Minsky’s 1954 Ph.D. dissertation  on using reinforcement for learning in a machine based on model neurons, and Frank Rosenblatt’s 1957  use of weights  (see page 10) in an analog implementation of a neural model. These are what current learning mechanisms have at their core. These! A model of  biological neurons that was developed in a brief moment of time from 83 to 65 years ago.  We use these today.  They are extraordinarily primitive models of neurons compared to what neuroscience has learned in the subsequent sixty five years. Since the 1960s higher levels of organization have been wrapped around these units. In 1979 Kunihiko Fukushima published (at the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, IJCAI 1979, Tokyo — coincidentally the first place where I published in an international venue) his first English language description of convolutional neural networks ( CNN s), which allowed for position invariant recognition of shapes (in his case, hand written digits), without having to learn about those shapes in every position within images. Then came backpropagation , a method where a network can be told the correct output it should have produced, and by propagating the error backwards through the derivative of the quantizer in the diagram above (note that the quantizer shown there is not differentiable–a continuous differentiable quantizer function is needed to make the algorithm work), a network can be trained on examples of what it should produce. The details of this algorithm, are rooted in the chain rule of Gottfried Leibniz in 1676 through a series of modern workers from around 1970 through about 1982. Frank Rosenblatt (see above) had talked about a “back-propagating error correction” in 1962, but did not know how to implement it. In any case, the linear threshold neurons, CNNs, and backpropagation are the basis of modern neural networks. After an additional 30 years of slow but steady progress they burst upon the scene as deep learning , and unexpectedly crushed many other approaches to computer vision — the research field of getting computers to interpret the contents of an image. Note that “deep” learning refers to there being lots of layers (around 12 layers in 2012) of linear threshold neurons rather than the smaller number of layers (typically two or three) that had been used previously. Now LLMs are built on top of these sorts of networks with many more layers, and many subnetworks.  This is what got everyone excited about Artificial Intelligence, after 65 years of constant development of the field. Despite their successes with language, LLMs come with some serious problems of a purely implementation nature. First , the amount of examples that need to be shown to a network to learn to be facile in language takes up enormous amounts of computation, so the that costs of training new versions of such networks is now measured in the billions of dollars, consuming an amount of electrical power that requires major new investments in electrical generation, and the building of massive data centers full of millions of the most expensive CPU/GPU chips available. Second , the number of adjustable weights shown in the figure are counted in the hundreds of billions meaning they occupy over a terabyte of storage. RAM that is that big is incredibly expensive, so the models can not be used on phones or even lower cost embedded chips in edge devices, such as point of sale terminals or robots. These two drawbacks mean there is an incredible financial incentive to invent replacements for each of (1) our humble single neuron models that are close to seventy  years old, (2) the way they are organized into networks, and (3) the learning methods that are used. That is why I predict that there will be lots of explorations of new methods to replace our current neural computing mechanisms. They have already started and next year I will summarize some of them. The economic argument for them is compelling. How long they will take to move from initial laboratory explorations to viable scalable solutions is much longer than everyone assumes. My prediction is there will be lots of interesting demonstrations but that ten years is too small a time period for a clear winner to emerge. And it will take much much longer for the current approaches to be displaced. But plenty of researchers will be hungry to do so. LLMs that can explain which data led to what outputs will be key to non annoying/dangerous/stupid deployments. They will be surrounded by lots of mechanism to keep them boxed in, and those mechanisms, not yet invented for most applications, will be where the arms races occur. The one thing we have all learned, or should have learned, is that the underlying mechanism for Large Language Models does not answer questions directly. Instead, it gives something that sounds like an answer to the question. That is very different from saying something that is accurate. What they have learned is not facts about the world but instead a probability distribution of what word is most likely to come next given the question and the words so far produced in response. Thus the results of using them, uncaged, is lots and lots of confabulations that sound like real things, whether they are or not. We have seen all sorts of stories about lawyers using LLMs to write their briefs, judges using them to write their opinions, where the LLMs have simply made up precedents and fake citations (that sound plausible) for those precedents. And there are lesser offenses that are still annoying but time consuming. The first time I used ChatGPT was when I was retargeting the backend of a dynamic compiler that I had used on half a dozen architectures and operating systems over a thirty year period, and wanted to move it to the then new Apple M1 chips. The old methods of changing a chunk of freshly compiled binary from data as it was spit out by the compiler, into executable program, no longer worked, deliberately so as part of Apple’s improved security measures. ChatGPT gave me detailed instructions on what library calls to use, what their arguments were, etc. The names looked completely consistent with other calls I knew within the Apple OS interfaces. When I tried to use them from C, the C linker complained they didn’t exist. And then when I asked ChatGPT to show me the documentation it groveled that indeed they did not exist and apologized. So we all know we need guard rails around LLMs to make them useful, and that is where there will be lot of action over the next ten years. They can not be simply released into the wild as they come straight from training. This is where the real action is now. More training doesn’t make things better necessarily. Boxing things in does. Already we see companies trying to add explainability to what LLMs say. Google’s Gemini now gives real citations with links, so that human users can oversee what they are being fed. Likewise, many companies are trying to box in what their LLMs can say and do. Those that can control their LLMs will be able to deliver useable product. A great example of this is the rapid evolution of coding assistants over the last year or so. These are specialized LLMs that do not give the same sort of grief to coders that I experienced when I first tried to use generic ChatGPT to help me. Peter Norvig, former chief scientist of Google, has recently produced a great report on his explorations of the new offerings. Real progress has been made in this high impact, but narrow use field. New companies will become specialists in providing this sort of boxing in and control of LLMs. I had seen an ad on a Muni bus in San Francisco for one such company, but it was too fleeting to get a photo. Then I stumbled upon  this tweet that has three such photos of different ads from the same company, and here is one of them: The four slogans on the three buses in the tweet are:  Get your AI to behave, When your AI goes off leash ,  Get your AI to work , and  Evaluate, monitor, and guardrail your AI . And “the AI” is depicted as a little devil of sorts that needs to be made to behave. This is one of my three traditional sections where I update one of my three initial tables of prediction from   my predictions  exactly eight years ago today. In this section I talk about self driving cars, driverless taxi services, and what that means, my own use of driverless taxi services in the previous year, adoption of electric vehicles in the US, and flying cars and taxis, and what those terms mean. No entries in the table specifically involve 2025 or 2026, and the status of  predictions that are further out in time remain the same. I have only put in one new comment, about how many cities in the US will have self-driving (sort of) taxi services in 2026 and that comment is highlighted, A Brief Recap of what “Self Driving” Cars Means and Meant This is a much abridged and updated version of what I wrote exactly one year ago today. The definition, or common understanding, of what self driving cars  really means has changed since my post on predictions eight years ago.  At that time self driving cars meant that the cars would drive themselves to wherever they were told to go with no further human control inputs. It was implicit that it meant level 4 driving. Note that there is also a higher level of autonomy, level 5, that is defined. Note that in the second row of content, it says that there will be no need for a human to take over for either level 4 or level 5. For level 4 there may be pre-conditions on weather and within a supported geographic area. Level 5 eliminates pre-conditions and geographic constraints. So far no one is claiming to have level 5. However the robot taxi services such as Cruise (now defunct), Waymo, currently operating in five US cities, and Zoox, currently operating in two cities with limited service (Las Vegas and San Francisco), all relied, or rely, on having remote humans who the car can call on to help get them out of situations they cannot handle. That is not what level 4 promises. To an outside observer it looks like level 4, but it is somewhat less than that in reality. This is not the same as a driver putting their hands back on the steering wheel in real time, but it does mean that there is sometimes a remote human giving high level commands to the car. The companies do not advertise how often this happens, but it is believed to be every few miles of driving. The Tesla self driving taxis in Austin have a human in the passenger seat to intervene when there is a safety concern. One of the motivations for self driving cars was that the economics of taxis, cars that people hire at any time for a short ride of a few miles from where they are to somewhere else of their choosing, would be radically different as there would be no driver. Systems which do require remote operations assistance to get full reliability cut into that economic advantage and have a higher burden on their ROI calculations to make a business case for their adoption and therefore their time horizon to scaling across geographies. Actual self-driving is now generally accepted to be much harder than every one believed . As a reminder of how strong the hype was and the certainty of promises that it was just around the corner here is a snapshot of a whole bunch of predictions by major executives from 2017. I have shown this many times before but there are three new annotations here for 2025 in the lines marked by a little red car. The years in parentheses are when the predictions were made. The years in blue are the predicted years of achievement. When a blue year is shaded pink it means that it did not come to pass by then. The predictions with orange arrows are those that I had noticed had later been retracted. It is important to note that every prediction that said something would happen by a year up to and including 2025 did not come to pass by that year.  In fact none of those have even come to pass by today. NONE . Eighteen of the twenty predictions were about things that were supposed to have happened by now, some as long as seven years ago. NONE of them have happened yet. My Own Experiences with Waymo in 2025 I took two dozen rides with Waymo in San Francisco this year. There is still a longer wait than for an Uber at most times, at least for where I want to go. My continued gripe with Waymo is that it selects where to pick me up, and it rarely drops me right at my house — but without any indication of when it is going to choose some other drop off location for me. The other interaction I had was in early November when I felt like I was playing bull fighter, on foot, to a Waymo vehicle.  My house is on a very steep hill in San Francisco, with parallel parking on one side and ninety degree parking on the other side. It is rare that two cars can pass each other traveling in opposite directions without one having to pull over into some empty space somewhere. In this incident I was having a multi-hundred pound pallet of material deliverd to my home. There was a very big Fedex truck parked right in front of my house, facing uphill, and the driver/operator was using a manual pallet jack to get it onto the back lift gate, but the load was nine feet long so it hung out past the boundary of the truck. An unoccupied Waymo came down the hill and was about to try to squeeze past the truck on that side. Perhaps it would have made it through if there was no hanging load. So I ran up to just above the truck on the slope and tried to get the Waymo to back up by walking straight at it. Eventually it backed up and pulled in a little bit and sat still. Within a minute it tried again. I pushed it back with my presence again. Then a third time. Let’s be clear it would have been a dangerous situation if it had done what it was trying to do and could have injured the Fedex driver who it had not seen at all. But any human driver would have figured out what was going on and that the Fedex truck would never go down the hill backwards but would eventually drive up the hill. Any human driver would have replanned and turned around. After the third encounter the Waymo stayed still for a while. Then it came to life and turned towards the upwards direction, and when it was at about a 45 degree angle to the upward line of travel it stopped for a few seconds. Then it started again and headed up and away.  I infer that eventually the car had called for human help, and when the human got to it, they directed it where on the road to go to (probably with a mouse click interface) and once it got there it paused and replanned and then headed in the appropriate direction that the human had made it already face. Self Driving Taxi Services There have been three self driving taxi services in the US in various stages of play over the last handful of years, though it turns out, as pointed out above that all of them have remote operators. They are Waymo, Cruise, and Zoox. Cruise died in both 2023 and 2024, and is now dead, deceased, an ex self driving taxi service. Gone. I see its old cars driving around the SF Bay Area, with their orange paint removed, and with humans in the driver seat. On the left below are two photos I took on May 30th at a recharge station. “Birdie” looked just like an old Cruise self driving taxi, but without an orange paint. I hunted around around in online stories about Cruise and soon found another “Birdie”, with orange paint, and the same license plate. So GM are using them to gather data, perhaps for training their level 3 driving systems. Tesla announced to much hoopla that they were starting a self driving taxi service this year, in Austin.  It  requires a safety person to be sitting in the front passenger seat  at all times. Under the certification with which they operate, on occasion that front seat person is required to move to the driver’s seat. Then it just becomes a regular Tesla with a person driving it and FSD enabled. The original fleet was just 30 vehicles, with at least seven accidents reported by Tesla by October, even with the front seat Tesla person. In October the CEO announced that the service would expand to 500 vehicles in Austin in 2025. By November he had changed to saying they would double the fleet.  That makes 60 vehicles. I have no information that it actually happened. He also said he wanted to expand the “Robotaxi” service to Phoenix, San Francisco, Miami, Las Vegas, Dallas, and Houston by the end of 2025. It appears that Tesla can not get permits to run even supervised (mirroring the Austin deployment) in any of those cities. And no, they are not operating in any of those cities and now 2025 has reached its end. In mid-December there were confusing reports saying that Tesla now had Model Y’s driving in Austin without a human safety monitor on board  but that the Robotaxi service for paying customers (who are still people vetted by Tesla) resumed their human safety monitors. So that is about three or four years behind Waymo in San Francisco, and not at all at scale. The CEO of Tesla has also announced (there are lots of announcements and they are often very inconsistent…) that actually the self driving taxis will be a new model with no steering wheel nor other driver controls. So they are years away from any realistic deployment. I will not be surprised if it never happens as the lure of humanoids completely distracts the CEO.  If driving with three controls, (1) steering angle of the front wheels, (2) engine torque (on a plus minus continuum), and (3) brake pedal pressure, are too hard to make actually work safely for real, how hard can it be to have a program control a heavy unstable balancing platform with around 80 joints in hips and waist, two legs, two arms and five articulated fingers on each hand? Meanwhile Waymo had  raised $5.6B to expand to new cities in 2025 . It already operated in parts of San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Phoenix. During 2025 it expanded to Austin and Atlanta, the cities it had promised. It also increased its geographic reach in its existing cities and surrounding metropolitan areas.  In the original three cities users have a Waymo app on their phone and specifically summon a Waymo. In the new cities however they used a slightly different playbook. In both Austin and Atlanta people use their standard Uber app.  They can update their preference to say that they prefer to get a Waymo rather than a human driven car, but there is no guarantee that a Waymo is what they will get. And any regular user of the Uber app in those cities may be offered a Waymo, but they do get an option to decline and to continue to wait for a human driven offer. In the San Francisco area, beyond the city itself, Waymo first expanded by operating in Palo Alto, in a geographically separate area. Throughout the year one could see human operated Waymos driving in locations all along the peninsula from San Francisco to Palo Alto and further south to San Jose. By November Waymo had announced driverless operations throughout that complete corridor,  an area of 260 square miles, but not quite yet on the freeways–the Waymos are operating on specific stretches of both 101 and 280, but only for customers who have specifically signed up for that possibility. Waymo is now also promising to operate at the two airports, San Jose and San Francisco. The San Jose airport came first, and San Francisco airport is operating in an experimental mode with a human in the front seat. Waymo has announced that it will expand to five more cities in the US during 2026; Miami, Dallas, Houston, San Antonio, and Orlando. It seems likely, given their step by step process, and their track record of meeting their promises that Waymo has a good shot at getting operations running in these five cities, doubling their total number of US cities to 10. Note that although it does very occasionally snow in five of these ten cities (Atlanta, Austin, Houston, San Antonio, and Orlando) it is usually only a dusting. It is not yet clear whether Waymo will operate when it does snow. It does not snow in the other five cities, and in San Francisco Waymo is building to be a critical part of the transportation infrastructure. How well that would work if a self driving taxi service was subject to tighter restrictions than human driven services due to weather could turn into a logistical nightmare for the cities themselves. In the early days of Cruise they did shut down whenever there was a hint of fog in San Francisco, and that is a common occurrence. It was annoying for me, but Cruise never reached the footprint size in San Francisco that Waymo now enjoys. No promises yet from Waymo about when it might start operating in cities that do commonly have significant snow accumulations. In May of 2025 Waymo announced a bunch of things in one press release . First, that they had 1,500 Jaguar-based vehicles at that time, operating in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Austin. Second, that they were no longer taking deliveries of any more Jaguars from Jaguar, but that they were now building two thousand  of their own Jaguars in conjunction with Magna (a tier one auto supplier that also builds small run models of big brands — e.g., they build all the Mini Coopers that BMW sells) in Mesa, Arizona. Third, that they would also start building, in late 2025, versions of the Zeekr RT, a vehicle that they co-designed with Chinese company Geely, that can be built with no steering wheel or other controls for humans, but with sensor systems that are self-cleaning. It is hard to track exactly how many Waymos are deployed, but in August 2025, this website , citing various public disclosures by Waymo, put together the following estimates for the five cities in which Waymo was operating. No doubt those numbers have increased by now.  Meanwhile Waymo has annualized revenues of about $350M and is considering an IPO with a valuation of around $100B.  With numbers like those it can probably raise significant growth capital independently from its parent company. The other self driving taxi system deployed in the US is Zoox  which is currently operating only in small geographical locations within Las Vegas and San Francisco. Their deployment vehicles have no steering wheel or other driver controls–they have been in production for many years. I do notice, by direct observation as I drive and walk around San Francisco, that Zoox has recently enlarged the geographic areas where its driverful vehicles operate, collecting data across all neighborhoods. So far the rides are free on Zoox, but only for people who have gone through an application process with the company. Zoox is following a pattern established by both Cruise and Waymo. It is roughly four years behind Cruise and two years behind Waymo, though it is not clear that it has the capital available to scale as quickly as either of them. All three companies that have deployed actual uncrewed self driving taxi services in the US have been partially or fully owned by large corporations. GM owned Cruise, Waymo is partially spun out of Google/Alphabet, and Zoox is owned by Amazon. Cruise failed. If any other company wants to compete with Waymo or Zoox, even in cities where they do not operate, it is going to need a lot of capital. Waymo and Zoox are out in front. If one or both of them fail, or lose traction and fail to grow, and grow very fast, it will be near to impossible for other companies to raise the necessary capital. So it is up to Waymo and Zoox.  Otherwise, no matter how well the technology works, the dream of  driverless taxis is going to be shelved for many years. Electric Cars In my original predictions I said that electric car (and I meant battery electric, not hybrids) sales would reach 30% of the US total no earlier than 2027.  A bunch of people on twitter claimed I was a pessimist. Now it looks like I was an extreme optimist as it is going to take a real growth spurt to reach even 10% in 2026, i.e., earlier than 2027. Here is  the report   that I use to track EV sales — it is updated every few weeks. In this table I have collected the quarterly numbers that are finalized. The bottom row is the percentage of new car sales that were battery electric. Although late in 2024 EV sales were pushing up into the high eight percentage points they have dropped back into the sevens this year in the first half of the year. Then they picked up to 10.5% in the third quarter of 2025, but that jump was expected as the Federal electric vehicle (EV) tax credits ended for all new and used vehicles purchased after  September 30, 2025 , as part of the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act”.   People bought earlier than they might have in order to get that tax credit, so the industry is expecting quite a slump in the fourth quarter, but it will be a couple more months before the sales figures are all in.  YTD 2025 is still under 8.5%, and is likely to end at under 8%. The trends just do not look like we will get to EVs reaching 12% of US cars being sold in 2027, even with a huge uptick. 30% is just not going to happen. As for which brands are doing better than others, Tesla’s sales dropped a lot more than the rest of the market. Brand winners were GM, Hyundai, and Volkswagen. The US experience is not necessarily the experience across the world. For instance Norway reached 89% fully electric vehicles of all sold in 2024, largely due to taxes on gasoline powered car purchases. But that is a social choice of the people of Norway, not at all driven by oil availability. With a population of 5.6 million compared to the US with 348 million, and domestic oil production of 2.1 million barrels per day, compared to the US with 13.4 million b/d, Norway has a per capita advantage of almost ten times as much oil per person (9.7 to be more precise). Electrification levels of cars is a choice that a country makes. Flying Cars The next two paragraphs are reproduced from last’s years scorecard. Flying cars are another category where the definitions have changed. Back when I made my predictions it meant a vehicle that could both drive on roads and fly through the air.  Now it has come to mean an electric multi-rotor helicopter than can operate like a taxi between various fixed landing locations. Often touted are versions that have no human pilot. These are known as eVTOLs, for “electric vertical take off & landing”. Large valuations have been given to start ups who make nice videos of their electric air taxis flying about. But on inspection one sees that they don’t have people in them. Often, you might notice, even those flights are completely over water rather than land. I wrote about the lack of videos of viable prototypes back in November 2022. The 2022 post referred to in the last sentence was trying to make sense of a story about a German company, Volocoptor, receiving a $352M Series E investment. The report from pitchbook predicted world wide $1.5B in revenue in the eVTOL taxi service market for 2025.  I was bewildered as I could not find a single video, as of the end of 2022, of a demo of an actual flight profile with actual people in an actual eVTOL of the sort of flights that the story claimed would be generating that revenue in just 3 years. I still can’t find such a video. And the actual revenue for actual flights in 2025 turned out to be $0.0B (and there are no rounding errors there — it was $0) and Volocoptor has gone into receivership , with a “reorganization success” in March 2025. In my November 2022 blog post above I talked about another company, Lilium, which came the closest to having a video of a real flight, but it was far short of carrying people and it did not fly as high as is needed for air taxi service. At the time Lilium had 800 employees.  Since then Lilium has declared bankruptcy not once  (December 2024), but twice  (February 2025), after the employees had been working for some time without pay. But do not fear. There are other companies on the very edge of succeeding. Oh, and an edge means that sometimes you might fall off of it. Here is an interesting report on the two leading US eVTOL companies, Archer and Joby Aviation, both aiming at the uncrewed taxi service market; both with valuations in the billions, and both missing just one thing. A for real live working prototype. The story focuses on a pivotal point, the moment when an eVTOL craft has risen vertically, and now needs to transition to forward motion. In particular it points out that Archer has never demonstrated that transition, even with a pilot onboard, and during 2025 they cancelled three scheduled demonstrations at three different air shows. They did get some revenue in 2025 by selling a service forward to the city of Abu Dhabi, but zero revenue for actual operations–they have no actual operations.  They promise that for this year, 2026, with revenue producing flights in the second half of the year. Joby Aviation did manage to demonstrate the transition maneuver in April of 2025. And in November they made a point to point flight in Dubai, i.e., their test vehicle managed to take off somewhere and land at a different place. The fact that there were press releases for these two human piloted pretty basic capabilities for an air taxi service suggests to me that they are still years away from doing anything that is an actual taxi service (and with three announced designated place to land and take off from it seems more like a rail network with three stations rather than a taxi service–again slippery definitions do indeed slip and slide). And many more years away from a profitable service. But perhaps it is naive of me to think that a profitable business is the goal. As with many such technology demonstrators the actual business model seems to be getting cities to spend lots of money on a Kabuki theater technology show, to give credit to the city as being technology forward. Investors, meanwhile invest in the air taxi company thinking it is going to be a real transportation business. But what about personal transport that you own, not an eVTOL taxi service at all,but an eVTOL that you can individually own, hop into whenever you want and fly it anywhere? In October there was a story in the Wall Street Journal: “ I Test Drove a Flying Car. Get Ready, They’re Here. ” The author of the story spent three days training to be the safety person in a one seat Pivotal Helix (taking orders at  $190,000 a piece, though not yet actually delivering them; also take a look at how the vehicles lurch as they go through the pilot commanded transition maneuver). It is a one seater so the only person in the vehicle has to be the safety person in case something fails. He reports: After three hellish days in a drooling, Dramamine-induced coma, I failed my check ride. The next month he tried again. This time he had  a prescription for the anti-emetic Zofran and a surplus-store flight suit . The flight suit was to collect his vomit and save his clothes.  After four more days of training (that is seven total days of training), he qualified and finally took his first flight, and mercifully did not live up to his call sign of “Upchuck Yeager”.  $\190,000 to buy the plane, train for seven days, vomit wildly, have to dress in a flight suit, and be restricted to take off and landing and only fly over privately owned agricultural land or water. This is not a consumer product, and this is not a flying car that is here, despite the true believer headline. Two years ago I ended my review of flying cars with: Don’t hold your breath. They are not here. They are not coming soon. Last year I ended my review with: Nothing has changed. Billions of dollars have been spent on this fantasy of personal flying cars.  It is just that, a fantasy, largely fueled by spending by billionaires. There are a lot of people spending money from all the investments in these companies, and it is a real dream that they want to succeed for many of them. But it is not happening, even at a tiny scale, anytime soon. We are peak popular hype in all of robotics, AI, and machine learning. In January 1976, exactly fifty years ago, I started work on a Masters in machine learning. I have seen a lot of hype and crash cycles in all aspects of AI and robotics, but this time around is the craziest.  Perhaps it is the algorithms themselves that are running all our social media that have contributed to this. But it does not mean that the hype is justified, or that the results over the next decade will pay back the massive investments that are going in to AI and robotics right now. The current hype is about two particular technologies, with the assumption that these particular technologies are going to deliver on all the competencies we might ever want.  This has been the mode of all the hype cycles that I have witnessed in these last fifty years. One of the current darling technologies is large X models for many values of X (including VLMs and VLAs), largely, at the moment, using massive data sets, and transformers as their context and sequencing method. The other, isn’t even really a technology, but just a dream of a form of a technology and that  is robots with humanoid form. I have now put these two things in my five topics of my new predictions shared at the beginning of this post and will talk about them explicitly for each of the next ten years. Back in 2018 I did not talk about either of these technologies in my predictions, but rather talked about competences and capabilities.  I fear that I may have been overly optimistic about many of these and in the table below I point out that my predicted time of arrival has now come, but the capabilities or competencies have not.  I’m sure that many true believers in the two technologies mentioned above will have very short time scales on when they say this will be achieved. I pre-emptively disagree with them. Capabilities and Competences The predictions that are commented upon in the table above are all about when we would see robots and AI systems doing some things that simple creatures can do and others that any child of age nine or perhaps less can do without any difficulty. Even children aged three or four can navigate around cluttered houses without damaging them (that is different from when they may  want to damage them). They can get up and down single stairs, and even full stair cases on two legs without stumbling (or resorting to four limb walking as a two year old might). By age four they can open doors with door handles and mechanisms they have never seen before, and safely close those doors behind them. They can do this when they enter a particular house for the first time. They can wander around and up and down and find their way. One of the many promises about humanoid robots is that they too will be able to do this. But that is not what they can do today. But wait, you say, “I’ve seem them dance and somersault, and even bounce off walls.” Yes, you have seen humanoid robot theater. All those things are done on hard surfaces, and anything specific beyond walking has been practiced and optimized by reinforcement learning, for exactly the situation of the floors and walls as they are. There is no real-time sensing and no ability to wander in previously unseen environments, especially not those with slipping hazards such as towels or sheets of cardboard on the floor.  Children can do so easily.  While four legged robots are much better at it than humanoid robots, they are wider than people, and still have significant foot slipping problems, and cannot open random doors themselves as children can. A nine year old child can pretty much do any task (but with less weighty packages) than any delivery driver can do.  That includes climbing out of a van, walking up and down slopes, going up and down previously unseen external staircases, sometimes ending in a dark porch or vestibule area, then putting the package on the ground, or putting it into a drop bin after grasping and pulling on the handle — again never having encountered that particular design of bin and handle. All this can be done immediately upon seeing the scene for the first time. We have not seen anything remotely like that in a lab demo for robots, despite my hope from eight years ago that by now such would have been demonstrated. And again, here a four legged robot might be able to do the walking and stair climbing, but it won’t be able to manipulate the package. Also note that humans doing these tasks don’t just carry single packages out in front of them with two outstretched arms, but often use their elbows, their hips, and their bellies to support multiple packages as they locomote. Elder care is a commonly quote target market for robots, and with good reason given the current and growing demographic inversions in much of the world. There are far fewer younger people relative to the number of older people than there have been historically, and so less people to provide elder care.  In providing care to the very elderly, there is a need to support those people physically, both passively, providing compliant support for them to lean on, and actively, getting people into and out of bed, into and out of bathtubs or shower enclosures, and getting people onto and off of toilets. And sometimes wiping their bums. There are no force sensing and control capabilities on any of today’s robots which are remotely capable of doing any of these sorts of things safely and comfortably. And machine learning is not going to provide those capabilities. There are many fundamental design, materials, and engineering problems to solve to make these things possible.  A bitter lesson, perhaps, for those who think that more data will solve everything. But the other unresolved capability that I have in my predictions table above is an agent that understands the world in an ongoing way as we all understand it.  That includes knowing what to expect to be the same as it was yesterday, and will be tomorrow, and what has changed about the world since yesterday or is likely to change today or tomorrow. Such an understanding of the world will be important for any deployable systems that can take care of real and vulnerable humans, including the elderly. And the young. And the rest of us. In summary, I thought that more progress would be made on many of these problems than has been achieved over the last eight years. That lack of progress is going to have real, and negative, impact on the quality of life of the newly elderly for the next couple of decades. Ouch! VCs, please take note: there are real pulls on having technologies that can help the elderly, and being in there first with something that can actually deliver value in the next three to five years will be a come with a very large upside. World Models Lots of people are talking about world models and their importance, as add ons to LLMs, as mechanisms for agentic AI to exploit, and for allowing robots to do real tasks. These aspirations are probably reasonable to have, and successfully working on them can have real impacts. Unfortunately the talkers are not the doers, and not the deployers, and not the people who have to solve real problems. And so they all have different, and convenient for themselves, understandings of what world models are.  That, along with the worship of big data and the belief that machine learning will solve all problems means we have a big mess, with people jumping to “solutions” before they understand the problems. Some people are even claiming that they will build world models by learning them from having agents play video games.  But how do those video games work? They have a coded geometry-based world model, with a little physics engine. It is already built!  Using machine learning (and tens of millions of dollars) to extract it rather than just looking at the source code (and perhaps buying or licensing that code) is just wacky. Expect more confusion and lots and lots of reinvention. This fever has quite a ways to go before today’s memes and slogans get replaced by the next generation of memes and slogans, with perhaps some good work coming out in a rational interregnum. We can hope. Situatedness vs Embodiment One of the new things that people are getting excited about is Embodied Intelligence .  I agree that it is worth being excited about, as it is what I have spent the last forty years work on.  It is certainly about robots being in the world. But since 1991 I have made a distinction between two concepts where a machine, or creature can be either, neither, or both situated and embodied . Here are the exact definitions that I wrote for these back then: [Situatedness] The robots are situated in the world—they do not deal with abstract descriptions, but with the here and now of the world directly in-fluencing the behavior of the system. [Embodiment] The robots have bodies and experience the world directly—their actions are part of a dynamic with the world and have immediate feed-back on their own sensations. At first glance they might seem very similar.  And they are, but they are also importantly different. And, spoiler alert, I think much of the work at companies, large and small, right now, is trying abstract out the embodiment of a robot, turning it into a machine that is merely situated. An algorithm, written as code, to find the greatest common divisor of two numbers, when running, is neither situated nor embodied. A robot that is thrown into the air with just an inertial measurement unit (IMU) as its sensor that moves its limbs about to zero out rotations and then is caught by a net is embodied but not situated. A robot that has a physical face that can make expressions with it, a voice synthesizer, cameras, and microphones and that can talk to a person giving appropriate responses both with its choice of words and with appropriate prosody and facial expressions, to some purpose and in response to how the person talks and moves, is situated but not really embodied. Embodied in its presence yes, but not embodied in any physical interactions with its environment. A robot that can roll around without hitting stationary objects, wherever they are, nor hitting moving people or other vehicles, that can go to a location specified by a warehouse management system, that responds safely to people grabbing it anywhere, and can give a person who grabs its control handle agency over it going wherever the person pushes it with a light touch no matter how much weight it is currently carrying, is both embodied and situated. [And yes, this is what our Carter robots do at Robust.AI .] These are just point examples of the four classes of entities that come from having or not having the two properties of situatedness and embodiment. Real robots that do real work in dynamic human occupied environments must be both situated and embodied. For instance, a robot that is to help with in home elder care needs to be aware of the situation in the world in order to know what to do to help the person.  It needs to be able to open doors with different handles and latching mechanisms, and then control the inertia of the closing door so that the environment is both safe and quiet for the person. The robot needs to be able to accommodate the person reaching for it dynamically, looking for support that so that they don’t fall. The robot needs to able to take things handed to it by the person, and pass things to the person in a way which is both safe and makes it easy for the person to grasp. Etc., etc. In short the robot needs to control forces and inertias in the world and to be responsive to them, at that same time as it is acting in a way that can be understood as sentient. Being both situated and embodied is still a challenge to robots in the world.   [[Now here is the most important sentence of this whole blog post.]] I think the training regimes that being used for both locomotion and dexterity are either ignoring or trying to zero out the embodiment of physical robots, their inertias and forces, reducing them to merely being situated, just apps with legs and arms, characters in video games, not the reality of real physical beings that the tasks we want them to do requires. Dexterous Hands I talked about the challenges for dexterity earlier this year. In the table above I have a new comment this year saying that there has been improvement in the dexterity of suction based grippers but not for articulated grippers. Suction grippers have plastic suction cups which themselves are compliant. Under the force of the suction they can change shape, to a degree, to accommodate unknown shapes in the thing being grasped (sucked up to).  They also allow for a little bit of torsional rotation about the axis of sucking and a bit of rocking of the suction cup in the two degrees of freedom in the plane orthogonal to the suction axis. While suction cups have evolved to better pick things up and so are common for handling packaged goods, the companies that package materials to be shipped through automated systems choose versions of plastics for bags that won’t be sheared open by the suction pulling against outer parts of such cups. The result is that the control of the embodied action of grasping can become much more a simply situated action. Once the pick orientation and vacuum gripper selection has been made it is really an open loop as all the work is done by the indiscriminate force of suction and the mutual compliance of the gripper and the grippee. Above I had argued against do this with a general purpose humanoid hand. It makes no sense there as the adaptability of the hand is its most precious attribute. But here in a special purpose hand, a suction gripper, it actually simplifies things within the specialization of task, and here a purely situated hand may make sense. And it may be possible to train it with purely visual data. So what does this tell us?  It says that there is plenty of room for mechanical design, and simpler computational embodied control for all sorts of grippers and things in the world that need to be gripped. The end of Moore’s Law, at least the version that said we could reduce feature size on silicon by a factor two every year, opened up a new golden era of chip design. The winners (through early luck and then dogged determination), matched untraditional designs to new problems (machine learning) and achieved speedups (and corporate valuations) that were unheard of. In the last 10 years we have moved from general purpose silicon to special purpose silicon for our most high volume computations.  That was not on most people’s expectation list twenty years ago. So too today, with stalled capabilities from full human hand emulation efforts through machine learning from visual observation, there is a rich array of more specialized manipulation tasks where special purpose grippers, clever interplay of materials and force applications, geometric planning, specialized sensing, and maybe even some machine learning may lead to enormous application markets. For instance, a specialized robot body, hands (of some sort), arms, and support limbs or wheels that can safely manipulate an elderly human could have enormous impact on elder care around the world. A single human care-giver along with one human-manipulator robot could provide a lot more care for a frail elderly person than the care-giver alone could do. Special purpose manipulators for fruits, or for some range of small mechanical parts, or clothing, could each open enormous markets for automation in particular handling tasks for each of them. And countless other specialities. Economic pull is out there.  Being the smart academic researcher, entrepreneur, or technology investor, may lead to enormous new types of deployable automation. The new dexterity may turn out to be special purpose. And eventually we may come to understand that just because the hands we know best happen to be our own, does not mean that our own hands are the best for the majority of tasks in our human world. Humanoid romanticism may not be our future after all. Looking at the missions and numbers over the last three years it appears that human spaceflight is at a steady plateau, with, by the way, far fewer people going into orbit that in the time of the Space Shuttle.  Underneath though, there is a lot of churn, a likely new player, and the return of humans to lunar distances for the first time in 54 years. Below is the updated scoring of my 2018 predictions for human spaceflight. There are six new comments in this table, but no new specific calling of predicted dates as right or wrong. It is now clear to me that I was way too optimistic in regard to my predictions for Mars, even though I was wildly out of step and much more pessimistic then the predictions coming out of SpaceX eight years ago. Given how slow things have turned out trying to land people on the Moon, the hoped for crewed colony on the Moon (think of it as ISS (International Space Station) on the lunar surface) may well slip to what I had predicted for Mars.  Mars is going to take much longer than the Moon. Following the table there are the detailed numbers and trends on both orbital crewed flights, and suborbital crewed flights. Things will change from stasis in 2026.  A crewed flight to the Moon is scheduled to happen in a matter of weeks, with the vehicle already stacked, now.  And suborbital crewed flights may possibly have quite an uptick in 2026.  Following those two sections I have more on Boeing’s Starliner, SpaceX’ Starship, and Blue Origin’s New Glenn, NASA and the Moon, and what is going to happen with space stations given the scheduled end of life of the ISS in 2030. Orbital Crewed Flights In both 2024 and 2025 the US put 16 people into orbit and Russian and China put 6 people each into orbit; 28 people total went to orbit in each year. We have gone from a historical low of only eight people going to orbit in 2020 to a steady-ish state of roughly 28 people per year now. That may jump up to over 30 people in 2026 because of the additional Artemis II flight to the Moon, following checkout in LEO (Low Earth Orbit).  But even with that bump there may be other pressures which keep it from rising above the high twenties for 2026 We are certainly not seeing steady growth in the number of humans getting launched to orbit, and the numbers are significantly lower than the hey days of Shuttle launches in the nineties and early two thousands. There is no growth trend visible, and the long promised exponential growth of people going to orbital space has not even made a brief guest appearance. Here is a more detailed history for the last six years where the first line in each box says how many crewed launches of the particular vehicle there were, and the second line, in square brackets says how many people, total, were onboard those flights. Wherever there are three numbers separated by forward slashes you have to sum the numbers to get the total. The three countries with current crewed orbital launch capabilities are the US, Russia, and China. All Chinese flights are state astronauts (or taikonauts) and all of them go to the Chinese space station. And there are no tourists, so far, on Chinese flights, so we just have single numbers for both launches and people. All the state astronauts for both the US and Russia go to the International Space Station (ISS), but a state player (in Russia) and a non-state player in the US (SpaceX) have also launched tourist flights in the last six years. So for those two countries we have three numbers separated by slashes for both launches and people. The first of the three numbers refers to purely state launches to the ISS (note that the US and Russia both launch each others state astronauts to the ISS so that both countries have astronauts up-to-date trained on the other’s launch systems, in case of emergencies arising at some point). The second number in the triples is space tourists whose destinations have also been the ISS, while the third number (for both launches and people) is for tourist flights that have been independent of going to the ISS — there have been a total of three of these, all launched by SpaceX. Two of those three flights were purchased personally by Jared Issacman, who has now been sworn in as the NASA administrator just two weeks ago. The one year in the last six where Russia has launched space tourists (after being the leaders in this endeavor early in the century) was 2021, where two flights of Soyuz to the ISS had one regular state cosmonaut and two space tourists. And, there was one slightly wobbly other launch of a Soyuz in 2024, not called out in the table, where a flight attendant from the state airline of Belarus was sent as a cosmonaut from that country to the ISS on a Russian Soyuz. That was most likely an event orchestrated by Russia to keep support from Belarus for their war against Ukraine. Ugly. The term tourist needs some explanation. The people (as with suborbital Blue Origin flights) are a mixture of private people paying the experience (or having some other individual pay for them) or they are astronauts from countries that do not have their own launch capability. In the case of the three tourist flights to the ISS on a SpaceX Dragon, all have been paid for by the company Axiom, with a former NASA astronaut in command. The three others on each of those flights are people in the fledgling astronaut program of other countries who have paid Axiom for the seats. Axiom has commercial relationships with both SpaceX and NASA for the use of the Flacon 9 launch vehicle, the Dragon craft and use fee of the ISS. Suborbital Crewed Flights Virgin Galactic is on a multi-year hiatus on flights as they develop new flight vehicles, but they may well fly again in 2026. Thus, for the last year, only Blue Origin has been launching  tourists (again a mixture of private individuals and astronauts from other countries that have not yet developed their own crewed launch capability, but may be aiming at doing so) suborbital flights. Blue Origin also sells uncrewed launches for experiments that need to be exposed to the environment of space and/or operation in microgravity, if only for a few minutes. In 2025 Blue Origin had seven launches each with six people on board. Previously they had had three crewed launches in each of 2021, 2022, and 2024, each with six people on board, with a hiatus in 2023. Blue Origin has been quite careful with forward projections for both suborbital and orbital flights, so when they say what they intend to do and when, they are likely to come close to achieving that promise. Recently they said that they are going to introduce three new flight vehicles starting in 2026 to run their suborbital flights, that they are looking at developing a second launch site, somewhere else than Texas, and that they believe they have the customer demand to support one flight per week. They do not disclose what they charge for the flights. Nor did they give any firm dates for reaching these goals. But I think it is likely that we will see a jump in the number of flights in 2026, In December of 2025 I was at an event centered on solar system orbital dynamics and met a sub-orbital tourist there. He has already paid for and flown above the Kármán line on Virgin Galactic. Now he has paid for a Blue Origin sub-orbital flight and is waiting for a launch assignment. There is definitely a market for these flights, it remains to be seen whether the prices and demand combine in a way that makes it profitable for seat suppliers to keep doing it. Boeing’s Starliner (not to be confused with the SpaceX Starship) When it was first announced, in 2010, Boeing’s Starliner was originally scheduled to fly a human test crew in 2018. It was supposed send the crew to the ISS, then it would be under contract to launch six crews to the ISS, much as SpaceX has already launched 11 regular crews to the ISS. In mid 2024 it delivered a human test crew to ISS,  Barry Wilmore and Sunita Williams, but after much analysis of anomalies it returned to Earth without them. NASA bumped two crew members from the next crew going on a SpaceX flight to the ISS to provide room for their return, on that SpaceX Dragon, which they did after an unexpected extra nine months on top of their originally scheduled week at the ISS. Last year in my yearly update I said: We do not know at this point, but I think it would not be a huge surprise if Starliner never flies again. It turns out it is going to fly again ! Including potentially twice in 2026. But there are some changes. The six missions which were contracted to take astronauts on regular assignment to the ISS were called Starliner-1 through Starliner-6 . The contract with NASA has been modified to make the last two flights future options rather than sure things. And Starliner-1 scheduled for the first half of 2026 will be un-crewed again. Then the three remaining flights in the modified contract would each take four astronauts on regular rotations to the ISS. There is one little hiccup. Sunita Williams is the only active astronaut, not committed to other current or upcoming missions, who has trained to fly on Starliner. She now has over 600 days in space and another six month mission to the ISS would take her over radiation exposure limits. SpaceX Falcon 9 I gave the statistics for Falcon 9 in the introduction, talking about what has surprised me in the last 8 years. When I made my predictions Falcon 9 had been launched 46 times over 8 years. Only five of those launches re-used a previously flown first stage, and only in the previous year had successful landings of the first stage become reliable. Now Falcon 9s are getting launched at a sustained rate of more than three per week, all attempts at landing boosters are successful, and typically each booster flies over 20 times. Just phenomenal unmatched reliability and performance. NASA, Artemis, and Returning to the Moon I am jumping ahead of Starship (SpaceX) and New Glenn (Blue Origin) to talk about NASA’s plan to get people back to the lunar surface, and perhaps setting up a more or less permanent outpost there. This is how the ISS has been continuously occupied for 25 years, rotating crew members in and out twice a year. (China’s space station follows the same model, but with only 3 occupants compared to 7 for ISS). 2026 promises to be a big year for humanity and the Moon. No one has been beyond low Earth orbit (LEO) since the Apollo 17 mission had three people go to lunar orbit and two of them landed in December 1972, fifty three years ago. In November 2022 the first launch of NASA’s SLS (Space Launch System) occurred taking its uncreewed Orion capsule in a looping orbit past the Moon and back. It approached the surface of the Moon in each direction, and then came back to Earth and splashed down. Note that this was the FIRST flight of both the multi-stage rocket, and the habitable capsule. It all worked FIRST time.  Everything was built by contractors, but it underwent NASA’s methodology to make sure things worked rather than failed. The first stage consists of a liquid fueled rocket using four RS-25 engines, the same as the three engines on the Space Shuttle. It also has two solid fuel boosters strapped on, larger versions of the Space Shuttle solid fuel boosters. The second stage is essentially an off the shelf stage from the past Delta program. There will be a third stage added for the fourth and subsequent flights.  This is a derivative vehicle, with a long history of successful use of its components. When Vice President Mike Pence announced the details of the program in 2019 the landing of people on the Moon was supposed to happen in 2024.  Things have slipped a little since then. The first crewed mission to the vicinity of the Moon (no landing) Artemis II had slipped to April 2026, but now it has been pulled forward to February 2026 (next month!), when a crew of four will spend over ten days in space on Artemis II in a flight to the Moon approaching to within 4,600 miles, then in a free return manner (no need to have working engines) they will head back towards Earth.  All their energy will be removed by heat shields hitting the Earth’s atmosphere and then by the use of 11 parachutes, finally splashing down in the ocean. Note that on all 9 flights to the Moon of the Apollo program, the spacecraft came much closer to the Moon than this, and 8 of the flights went into orbit at around 60 to 70 miles above the surface. So this is a more conservative mission than those of Apollo. Things at this stage are looking good for Artemis to fly in February 2026. The next step of the Artemis is where things get wobbly. Rather than 2024, the first landing of astronauts on the Moon is currently scheduled for 2027. But that is not going to happen. Here is what the architecture of the mission currently looks like: Here we see the problem with the schedule, even with it currently slipped to landing two astronauts on the Moon in 2027. The architecture uses the SLS and Orion to get the astronauts to lunar orbit. Given there is a lunar flyby with astronauts onboard, scheduled for just two months from now (and the rocket is already stacked for that mission) that looks like a reasonable interpolation from existing progress. The problem with the new plan is the landing vehicle and getting it to lunar orbit.  It is all based on SpaceX’s Starship. So far, Starship has had 11 flights, six of which have been successful in reaching their own goals, and 5 of which have been failures.  But there has not yet, in eleven flights, been a goal of getting anything into orbit. And just in 2025 two vehicles have been destroyed by failures on the ground when the tanks have been pressure tested. In the section on Starship below I will talk more about what I see as conflicting product requirements which together doom Starship to a very long development process. For comparison, the Saturn V which took astronauts to the Moon nine times had a total of 13 flights , every one of which got payloads to Earth orbit. Two were uncrewed tests (and there were problems with the second and third stages on the second of these test flights). Its very first crewed flight (Apollo 8) took people to the Moon. and a total of 9 launches got people to the Moon. The other two flights were (Apollo 9) a crewed flight to test the Lunar Lander and orbital rendezvous in Earth orbit, and the uncrewed launch of the first space station, Skylab. Now look again at the plan for the Artemis III mission.  It requires multiple (reported numbers range from 14 to somewhere into the twenties) launches of the Starship to orbit. One of those launches uses the Super Heavy Booster and a special version of the second stage actual Starship, known as Starship HLS (Human Landing System).  That special version is expendable after it lands astronauts on the Moon, hosts them for perhaps two weeks, then brings them back to lunar orbit where they transfer to NASA’s Orion. Then it sends itself off into heliocentric orbit for all eternity. The HLS version is special in two ways. First it does not have to get back to Earth and so doesn’t need heat shields and does not need the three in-atmosphere Raptors for soft landing on Earth (see the section on Starship below).  That is good for all the mass equations. But it does, or might, have a second set of engines for landing on the Moon that are attached halfway up its body so that they cause less lunar dust to fly around as it lands. We have not yet seen a prototype of that version, not even a public rendering as far as I can tell. I have talked to people who are in regular communication with people inside SpaceX.  They report not a peep about what work has been done to design or build the lander.  That is not good for the current public schedule. BUT the really, really bad thing is that the lunar lander stage will use up most its fuel getting into Earth orbit — it is the second stage of the rocket after all. So it cannot get to the Moon unless it is refueled.  That will be done by sending up regular versions of the Starship second stage, all on reusable Super Heavy Boosters. They too will use up most of their fuel getting to orbit, and will need to keep some to get back to Earth to be reused on another flight. But it will have a little margin and its extra fuel will be transferred to the lunar landing Starship in orbit. No one has ever demonstrated transfer of liquid fuel in space. Because of the way the numbers work out it takes somewhere in the teens of these refueling operations, and depending on how quickly certified higher performance engines can be developed and tested for both the Super Heavy Booster and Starship itself, that number of refueling flights might range into the twenties. As an engineer this architecture looks to me like trouble, and with an impossible future. I am sure it will not happen in 2027, and I have doubts that it ever will. The acting administrator of NASA, Sean Duffy who is also the head of the US Department of Transportation, was worried about this too, and in October of 2025 he reopened bidding on the contract for a crewed lander for the Moon that collects and returns its crew from Orion in lunar orbit. The day after this announcement SpaceX said they were working on a simplified architecture to land people in the Moon. They have given no details of what this architecture looks like, but here are some options proposed by the technical press. A couple of weeks later the President announced the renomination of Jared Isaacman to be the NASA administrator, having withdrawn his nomination a few months before. Isaacman is a private citizen who personally paid for, and flew on, two of the three SpaceX crewed missions which have not flown to the ISS. He was confirmed to the NASA position on December 17 th , 2025, just two weeks ago. At the very least expect turbulence, both political and technical, in getting astronauts landed on the Moon. And see a possible surprise development below. SpaceX Starship (not to be confused with Boeing’s Starliner) Starship is SpaceX’s superheavy two stage rocket, designed to put 150(?) tons of payload into orbit, with components having been under development since 2012, going through extensive redesigns along the way. There have also been three major designs, builds, and tests of the Raptor engines that power both stages. This is how Wikipedia currently introduces them: Raptor is a family of rocket engines developed and manufactured by SpaceX. It is the third rocket engine in history designed with a full-flow staged combustion fuel cycle, and the first such engine to power a vehicle in flight. The engine is powered by cryogenic liquid methane and liquid oxygen, a combination known as methalox. SpaceX’s super-heavy-lift Starship uses Raptor engines in its Super Heavy booster and in the Starship second stage. Starship missions include lifting payloads to Earth orbit and is also planned for missions to the Moon and Mars. The engines are being designed for reuse with little maintenance. Currently the Raptor 3 version is expected to be used for operational Starship launches, and it comes in two versions. There are 33 Raptors in the first stage designed to operate optimally in the atmosphere, along with three such engines in the second stage, which also houses three vacuum optimized Raptors. The first stage engines and the second stage vacuum engines are designed to get payloads to orbit. The vacuum engines on the second stage would also be used for further operations on the way to the Moon and descending towards the surface there. And for non-expendable second stages they would be used for the initial de-orbit burn for landing the second stage Starship back on Earth. After using the heat shields to burn off some more energy  as it enters the atmosphere the second set of engines, the atmosphere optimized Raptors, are used to slow it down to a soft landing. Other systems for returning to Earth have used different tradeoffs. The Space Shuttle used its wings to slow down to very high horizontal landing speed, and then a combination of a drag parachute after touchdown and brakes on the wheels to get down to zero velocity. US capsules, such as Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Orion, and Dragon have all used heat shields followed by parachutes during vertical fall, and lastly dropped into the sea for dampening the final residual velocity. (Soyuz, Starliner, and New Shepard all use last second retro rockets before hitting the ground, rather than water.) This means that unlike all the other solutions Starship has to carry a complete set of engines into orbit just for use during landing, along with enough fuel and oxidant to land. This is a high performance price for the thing that flies in space, mostly. The engines on the Starship first stage, like those on Falcon 9 and Blue Origin’s New Glenn, do get to space but never get to more than a small fraction of orbital speed, so returning them to Earth is a much, much, lower performance price than Starship’s second stage return of engines and fuel. The 2025 flights of Starship were, on average, better than the 2024 flights, but two vehicles destroyed themselves before getting to the flight stage, and still nothing got into orbit. How close is it to working?  I don’t know.  But I do keep tabs on promises that have been made. In November of 2024 the President of SpaceX  said “I would not be surprised if we fly 400 Starship launches in the next four years” .  A year ago today I said in response: “Looking at the success of Falcon 9 it is certainly plausible that I may live to see 400 Starship launches in a four year period, but I am quite confident that it will not happen in the next four years (2025 through 2028)” . We are a quarter of the way through her predicted time frame and we have gone from being 400 orbital launches away from her goal down to being a mere 400 away. Blue Origin Gets to Orbit The suborbital tourist flights that Blue Origin operates are not its main business. It has ambitions to compete head to head with SpaceX. But it is almost 600 launches behind, how can it be competitive? In 2025 Blue Origin made clear that it is not to be dismissed. From zero orbital launches at the start of 2025 to having two orbiters on their way to Mars (SpaceX has not yet done that) and showing that it can land a booster that has very very close to the performance of Falcon Heavy’s three booster configuration when landing all three boosters. And it may well do a soft landing on the Moon in 2026 (SpaceX won’t come close to that goal for a number of years). In February Blue Origin launched its first New Glenn rocket. It’s first stage is powered by seven BE-4 engines (“Blue Engine 4”), a methane burning engine that is more powerful than the Raptor 3 which will power new versions of SpaceX’s Starship. New Glenn reached orbit on its first attempt, and delivered a Blue Origin payload to space (a test version of their Blue Ring for in-space communications). The first stage attempted to land on Blue Origin’s Jacklyn landing platform at sea but failed. The BE-4 had previously powered two United Launch Alliance Vulcan rockets to orbit under a deal where Blue Origin sells engines to ULA. The second stage of New Glenn is powered by two BE-3 engines, which are a variant of the single engine used on Blue Origin’s New Shepard. In their second launch, in November, Blue Origin not only delivered three paid payloads to orbit (two of which are headed to Mars, where they will orbit the planet and carry out science experiments for UC Berkeley  on what happened to Mars’ atmosphere), but then the first stage (much larger than the first stage of a Falcon 9) landed on Jacklyn with an unrivaled level of precise control. Blue Origin plans to reduce the time spent hovering in future landings to reduce preserved fuel needs now that it has mastered return from orbit vertical landing. (Recall that they have landed dozens of New Shepard vertical landings on return from non-orbital flights.) Soon after this impressive second outing for New Glenn, Blue Origin announced a number of upgrades. They renamed the base vehicle that has now flown twice to be “New Glenn 7×2” where 7 and 2 refer to the number of first stage and second stage engines respectively.  They also announced that those flight engines would be upgraded to levels of thrust and duration that had already been demonstrated in ground tests. These are the new total thrust numbers, in pounds force. Additionally New Origin announced a new heavier, taller, and with larger payload faring, version, the “New Glenn 9×4” with two extra engines on each stage. Looking up from below the first stage the engine arrangement goes from the one on the left to the one on the right. And here is who the two variants look compared to the Saturn V which took humans to the Moon in 1969. The kicker to these successes is that the New Glenn 7×2 with a reusable first stage is very nearly equivalent to the Falcon Heavy when its three first stage boosters are reused. The reusable New Glenn 9×4 beats Falcon Heavy on all measures even when all three of Falcon Heavy are sacrificed and not recovered.  I can’t quite get all the numbers but this table makes the comparisons with the numbers I can find. Note that a “tonne” is the British spelling for a metric ton, which is 1,000Kg. That is approximately 2,206 lbs, which is 206 lbs more than a US ton, and 34 lbs less than a British ton. Meanwhile expectations are high for another launch of a New Glenn, the 7×2 version, sometime early in the new year. There has been no announcement from Blue Origin, nor any indication of the payload. But there is a general feeling that it may actually be a launch of Blue Origin’s Blue Moon Mark 1, an all up single launch mission to soft land on the Moon.  It was announced almost a year ago that Blue Origin has a deal to deliver a NASA payload to the Moon in the Blue Moon Pathfinder mission no earlier than 2026. The Mark 1 uses a BE-7 engine to soft land. Here is where things get interesting for a re-appraisal of how NASA astronauts might first land on the Moon again. Blue Origin is already under contract with NASA to land two astronauts on the Moon for a 30 day stay in 2030 using their much larger Blue Moon Mark 2.  The Mark 2 and Mark 1 share control systems and avionics, so a successful landing of Mark 1 will boost confidence in the Mark 2.  The architecture for the 2030 mission involves multiple launches. A NASA SLS launches a crewed Orion capsule to the vicinity of the Moon. A New Glenn gets a Mark 2 Blue Moon to an orbit that approaches the Moon. A “ Cislunar Transporter ” is launched separately and it gets fueled in LEO. Then it heads off to the same orbit as the Mark 2 and refuels it. The Mark 2 and the transporter both use three Blue Origin BE-7 engines  which are now fully operational . Then the astronauts transfer to the Mark 2 to land on the Moon.  Note that this architecture uses in flight refueling as does the SpaceX version, though with far fewer launches involved. BUT, soon after then NASA administrator Sean Duffy announced the re-opening of the contract for the lander for Artemis III, it appeared  that he was considering having Blue Origin use their Mark 1 version for the crewed mission. Whether that enthusiasm survives the changing of the guard to Jared Isaacman, the new and current NASA administrator, remains to be seen.  And whether Blue Origin can pull off a rendezvous in lunar orbit, to pick up and return the crew members going to the lunar surface, from an orbiting Orion capsule is also an open question.  I think the key idea with this option is to remove the need for any in flight refueling for the first crewed landing. There is going to be some stiff competition between SpaceX and Blue Origin. Either might win. New space stations The International Space Station will be at end of life in 2030 after continuous human habitation for almost thirty years. The other space station currently in orbit is the Chinese Tiangong station. Expect to see a real pick up in the building of space stations over the next few years, in anticipation of the end of the ISS. The Russian Orbital Service Station (ROS) is scheduled to begin construction, by Roscosmos, in orbit in 2027.  There is risk to this plan from the deterioration of the Russian economy. India plans to start building their  Bharatiya Antariksh Station (BAS) in 2028 and for it to be fully operational in 2035. India has had uncrewed orbital capability since 1980, and sent its first uncrewed mission to Mars in 2013. For BAS it is developing crewed launch capability. In 2025 India sent one of its own astronauts to the ISS on a SpaceX Dragon under an agreement with the company Axiom. A consortium of countries (US, Canada, Japan, European Union, and the United Arab Emirates) are collaborating on building the Lunar Gateway , a space station orbiting the Moon. Launch of the first module is scheduled for 2027 on a SpaceX Falcon Heavy. Blue Origin is competing for additional components and launches for the Gateway. A host of private companies plan on launching smaller private space stations in the near term, with one claiming it will do so in May 2026. This is going to be an active frontier, and may lead to more humans going on orbital flights than the current status quo of about 28 per year. Their robots have not demonstrated any practical work (I don’t count dancing in a static environment doing exactly the same set of moves each time as practical work). The demonstrated grasping, usually just a pinch grasp,  in the videos they show is at a rate which is painfully slow and not something that will be useful in practice. They claim that their robots will learn human-like dexterity but they have not shown any videos of multi-fingered dexterity where humans can and do grasp things that are unseen, and grasp and simultaneously manipulate multiple small objects with one hand. And no demonstrations of using the body with the hands which is how humans routinely carry many small things or one or two heavy things. They show videos of non tele-operated manipulation, but all in person demonstrations of manipulation are tele-operated. Their current plans for robots working in customer homes all involve a remote person tele-operating the robot. Their robots are currently unsafe for humans to be close to when they are walking. Their robots have no recovery from falling and need human intervention to get back up. Their robots have a battery life measured in minutes rather than hours. Their robots cannot currently recharge themselves. Unlike human carers for the elderly, humanoids are not able to provide any physical assistance to people that provides stabilizing support for the person walking, getting into and out of bed physical assistance, getting on to and off of a toilet, physical assistance, or indeed any touch based assistance at all. The CEOs claim that there robots will be able to do everything, or many things, or a lot of things, that a human can do in just a few short years. They currently do none. The CEOs claim a rate of adoption of these humanoid robots into homes and industries at a rate that is multiple orders of magnitude faster than any other technology in human history, including mainframe computers, and home computers and the mobile phones, and the internet. Many orders of magnitude faster. Here is a CEO of a humanoid robot company saying that they will be in 10% of US households by 2030. Absolutely no technology (even without the problems above) has ever come close to scaling at that rate.

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Maurycy 2 weeks ago

Mineral Moon:

Just a normal moon photo, but with the saturation cranked up to show slight differences in rock composition. Some color is visible through the eyepiece, although it gets lost in most images… although I’ve hugely overcompensated in this one. The colors are caused by the Fe/Ti ratio: Titanium make the rock slightly bluish, and iron makes it yellowish. (The moon looks best in person. Color aside, there simply isn’t enough dynamic range available properly show it on a screen. If you have a chance, I highly recommend taking a look at a partial moon through a large aperture scope: It’s an amazing view) Raw stacks: TIF Color: 30 seconds (1 millisecond frames) Equipment: C9.25, ASI533 MC (IMX533 OSC), EQ6-R mount.

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Jeff Geerling 3 weeks ago

NIST was 5 μs off UTC after last week's power cut

If you were 5 microseconds late today, blame it on NIST. Their facility in Boulder Colorado just had its power cut for multiple days. After a backup generator failed, their main ensemble clock lost track of UTC, or Universal Time Coordinated. But even if you used the NTP timing servers they run , they were never off by more than 5 microseconds. 5 μs might seem insignificant. But it is significant for scientists and universities who rely on NIST's more specialized timing signals . But no, you don't need to panic. And yes, they have it under control now. But I thought I'd go over what happened, what it means, and what we can learn from NIST's near-outage. This blog post is a lightly-edited transcript of my most recent YouTube video:

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ava's blog 3 weeks ago

goodbye infliximab, hello adalimumab

Since September, my health has been declining again. I had a flare up in my spondyloarthritis mostly, causing inflammation in specific joints, especially the sacroiliac joints, and parts of my upper spine that feel like a knife in my back whenever I breathe. I was able to keep it at bay with NSAIDs and, when very bad, short bursts of Prednisone (that I try to avoid) until further appointments and test results. I kept myself busy, I pushed through, I had stuff to do. Still, I struggled a lot with intense pain and severe fatigue, and even had to lie down on the office floor at times while I was working because the pain was too bad to sit in my chair. Sometimes I had to ask my wife to come pick me up after work because I felt awful. I had pretty bad general pain (burning sensation) especially at night, causing lots of bad sleep, and also brain fog, issues with finding or remembering words. The inflammation affects my cycle as well, and it rose back up to 75 days, when it used to finally be a healthy 28-30 days at the start of my infliximab journey. Now my ileocecal valve hurts a lot again (from my Crohn’s disease), my rashes are back, and I have more eye issues. I had blood tests and an MRI recently, and while there are no infliximab antibodies and the levels in my blood are good, the MRI showed the inflammation, especially my ongoing sacroiliitis. That means unfortunately, I have failed another medication, and there’s no lab result that can explain why or how. I have already failed shortterm steroids, budesonide, and azathioprine in 2024. I still have leukopenia and neutropenia from the azathioprine over a year later, which sucks. Infliximab helped for a while and finally made me experience what a healthy body feels like… I wish it would have lasted longer. I don’t want to run out of treatment options within 10 years. For now, another TNF blocker until we exhausted those options. It sucks. I have basically been crashing and rotting the past few weeks after such an eventful year. I feel like the life got sucked out of me. I have good days in-between that I try to use, but most really suck. I barely get to do anything I want or need to do. There’s so much I want to write about, so much I wanna read, I want to make more pixel art again and draw fanart and code stuff, and I want to continue building muscle and reach new fitness goals, and I need to continue my job search. But I struggle hard and am mostly unable to do the things that make me happy. I sleep a lot, I lie around playing games, scrolling, chatting because that’s all I’m capable of most days. My mental health has been suffering, I’ve been moody and withdrawn, and I’ve struggled with suicidal thoughts. I don’t want to talk most of the time, I often hate to be touched, and I wish I wouldn’t have to be conscious. I had a good day recently where I made it to a café for a change, but it really exhausted me. Today my wife and I baked some cookies; she helps me a lot. Hopefully, things will get better soon, as I get to start my new treatment tomorrow - two Hulio autopens back to back, urgh. It can take another 2-3 months to work, if it even does. I hope it does, because I don’t know how long I can last like this, and I have exams in March. I’m really not in a Christmas mood this year at all. Fittingly, my wife just showed me this art by Tumblr user the-knife-consumer: Reply via email Published 21 Dec, 2025

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Rik Huijzer 3 weeks ago

The Norway Spiral

On December 9, 2009, a spiral appeared into the sky in Norway, ![norway-spiral/norway-spiral-26.jpg](/files/b7808beb97f5335f) ![norway-spiral/norway-spiral.webp](/files/80f7e12ff688fad0) The official explanation is that a Baluva missle test had failed. They say that the missile went into a spin. This theory makes no sense. How would a rocket spin around to create this and especially that blue trail going towards the circles? More likely is that it was created by EISCAT, a powerful High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program (HAARP) facility located where the blue beam emanates from.

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Maurycy 1 months ago

A sea of sparks: Seeing atoms decay

Atoms are very small Citation Needed , and even with the help of a microscope, it takes trillions of atoms to be visible. However, there is one atomic process that is violent enough to be directly observed: Radioactive decay. The alpha particle (helium nucleus) ejected when at atom decays carries around a picojoule of kinetic energy, which isn’t much, but is enough to produce a just about perceivable amount of light. For my alpha source, I used a 37 kBq amerercium source from a smoke detector (glued to a stick for easier handling). Other options are old radium paint or pieces of uranium ore with surface mineralization. My scintillator is a square of plastic coated in ZnS(Ag) that came out of a broken alpha scintillation probe. The white coating is zinc sulfide, which glows when hit by high-energy particles. There’s no power source: All the energy comes from the radiation itself. If you don’t have one sitting around, similar zinc sulfide screens can be bought new on eBay. (search for “spinthariscope”) The magnifying glass helps by directing more light into the eye, which is important as each alpha particle will only produce a couple thousand photons. To see the scintillation, I put the alpha source few millimeters away from the screen, and turned off the lights. Because the light is very faint, I had to let my eyes adapt to perfect darkness for several minutes. After a while, I was able to see a dim glow around the alpha source. With the magnifying glass, this glow resolved into thousands of brief flashes of light, like a roiling sea of sparks. Each of the “sparks” is light carrying the energy released from the decay of a single atom. Unfortunately, this effect is absolutely impossible to photograph: If you want to see it, you’ll have to do the experiment yourself. If you don’t want to mess around with three different things in a perfectly dark room, you can by a pre-assembled spinthariscope for around $60.

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Maurycy 1 months ago

More uranium ore:

In many places, natural minerals aren’t even regulated as radioactive material (10 CFR § 40.13 b) … but you should check your local laws before collecting any. Radiacode 102: 180 CPS [4 uSv/h]. Ludlum 44-9: 20 kCPM. Carnonite from the Mc Cormic mine near Mi Vida in Utah, USA. It’s quite dusty, I’ll have to put this one in a display case. The biggest hazard isn’t the radiation, but uranium’s chemical toxicity. (similar to lead) Radiacode 102: 1700 CPS [40 uSv/h]. Ludlum 44-9: 70 kCPM. Uraninite in sandstone from around the Mi Vida mine in Utah, USA. This one is quite spicy, the Radiacode measures 50 CPS [1 uSv/h] at 15 cm distance. My prospecting detector detects it from a meter away. Based on gamma dose constants, I estimate a uranium content of 10-20 grams, but take that number with a (large) grain of salt. Radiacode 102: 2 CPS [0.1 uSv/h]. Ludlum 44-9: 350 CPM. Unknown U(IV) mineral (perhaps natrozippeite?) from Yellow Cat (Parco claims) Unlike the Carnonite, these glow the classic “nuclear waste” green under 365 nm: For the record: spent fuel doesn’t glow this color outside of Hollywood. However, many uranium minerals and uranium containing glass will glow green under ultraviolet light. Radiacode 102: background. Ludlum 44-9: background. Jasper from Yellow Cat . Not radioactive, but it looks cool: it’s what most people go to the area for. Radiacode 102: background. Ludlum 44-9: background. Petrified wood from near the McCormic mines. (close to Mi Vida ) Not significantly radioactive despite being close to the uranium deposit.

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Rik Huijzer 1 months ago

China's CO₂ Emissions Per Capita Has Already Surpassed the...

EU According to Our World in Data, China's CO₂ emissions per capita have already passed those of people in the European Union and the UK, and will surpass those of the US and Canada roughly around 2028: ![co-emissions-per-capita.svg](/files/b60da0f2ccbfb9fb)

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Rik Huijzer 1 months ago

The Dutch Nitrogen Regulation Makes No Sense

The Dutch Raad van State in 2019 has argued that a nitrogen deposition of 5.09 mol per acre per year is damaging De Heide (Heath) too much. This is the same as putting down about one one grain of fertilizer the size of a sugar grain per two square meters per week. How ridiculous this may sound, this verdict has blocked thousands of farmers and builders from expanding their business or homes, and even caused many farms to close down. Furthermore, many farmers in the Netherlands, which have often been farmers for many generations, are not sure whether they will be allowed to continue farming.

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Rik Huijzer 1 months ago

Yuval Noah Harari on Science and Truth

Harari in his own words: > Truth was never the highest priority of human society. > It was the highest priority of some individuals, but never of society as a whole because society as a whole does not function on the basis of truth. > And if you take two of the most powerful institutions of humankind, let's think about science and the scientific community, and let's think about religion and churches and so forth. > I think none of them has truth as their chief value. > As individuals yes, but as institutions know, > I think the chief value of science is power and the chief value of religion i...

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Christian Jauvin 1 months ago

Metaphysical Boldness

Digital physics is the body of mathematical and philosophical work treating the universe and the way it works as a giant digital computer. This is often associated with cellular automata, and names like Konrad Zuse, John Von Neumann, Stephen Wolfram, etc. What I find fascinating about this field is that the models it suggests are making very deep metaphysical claims: if they are true, it means that the underlying structure of the world is much different than we think, and radically simpler in a sense. Take the lattice gas automaton for instance. A version of it is an hexagonal cellular automata with very simple collision rules, not more complicated than the famous Rule 30 or 110 , for 1D cellular automata. The impressive thing about it is that a simulation running this rule with many particles can be shown to approximate the Navier-Stokes equations , which are the classical complicated mathematics to describe the dynamics of fluids. Following Wolfram, I find it very appealing to consider the idea that the world is not somehow running “hidden mathematics”, somewhere and somehow, to solve some complicated equations in a seemingly magical way, but rather, that things are radically simpler, in that the world is simply implementing a set of trivially simple rules. The world is not concerned with, or made with mathematics, mathematics just emerges, with inherent and irreducible complexity, from extreme simplicity.

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DYNOMIGHT 1 months ago

Underrated reasons to be thankful V

That your dog, while she appears to love you only because she’s been adapted by evolution to appear to love you, really does love you. That if you’re a life form and you cook up a baby and copy your genes to them, you’ll find that the genes have been degraded due to oxidative stress et al., which isn’t cause for celebration, but if you find some other hopefully-hot person and randomly swap in half of their genes, your baby will still be somewhat less fit compared to you and your hopefully-hot friend on average, but now there is variance, so if you cook up several babies, one of them might be as fit or even fitter than you, and that one will likely have more babies than your other babies have, and thus complex life can persist in a universe with increasing entropy. That if we wanted to, we surely could figure out which of the 300-ish strains of rhinovirus are circulating in a given area at a given time and rapidly vaccinate people to stop it and thereby finally “cure” the common cold, and though this is too annoying to pursue right now, it seems like it’s just a matter of time. That if you look back at history, you see that plagues went from Europe to the Americas but not the other way, which suggests that urbanization and travel are great allies for infectious disease, and these both continue today but are held in check by sanitation and vaccines even while we have lots of tricks like UVC light and high-frequency sound and air filtration and waste monitoring and paying people to stay home that we’ve barely even put in play. That while engineered infectious diseases loom ever-larger as a potential very big problem, we also have lots of crazier tricks we could pull out like panopticon viral screening or toilet monitors or daily individualized saliva sampling or engineered microbe-resistant surfaces or even dividing society into cells with rotating interlocks or having people walk around in little personal spacesuits, and while admittedly most of this doesn’t sound awesome, I see no reason this shouldn’t be a battle that we would win. That clean water, unlimited, almost free. That dentistry. That tongues. That radioactive atoms either release a ton of energy but also quickly stop existing—a gram of Rubidium-90 scattered around your kitchen emits as much energy as ~200,000 incandescent lightbulbs but after an hour only 0.000000113g is left—or don’t put out very much energy but keep existing for a long time—a gram of Carbon-14 only puts out the equivalent of 0.0000212 light bulbs but if you start with a gram, you’ll still have 0.999879g after a year—so it isn’t actually that easy to permanently poison the environment with radiation although Cobalt-60 with its medium energy output and medium half-life is unfortunate, medical applications notwithstanding I still wish Cobalt-60 didn’t exist, screw you Cobalt-60. That while curing all cancer would only increase life expectancy by ~3 years and curing all heart disease would only increase life expectancy by ~3 years, and preventing all accidents would only increase life expectancy by ~1.5 years, if we did all of these at the same time and then a lot of other stuff too, eventually the effects would go nonlinear, so trying to cure cancer isn’t actually a waste of time, thankfully. That the peroxisome, while the mitochondria and their stupid Krebs cycle get all the attention, when a fatty-acid that’s too long for them to catabolize comes along, who you gonna call. That we have preferences, that there’s no agreed ordering of how good different things are, which is neat, and not something that would obviously be true for an alien species, and given our limited resources probably makes us happier on net. That cardamom, it is cheap but tastes expensive, if cardamom cost 1000× more, people would brag about how they flew to Sri Lanka so they could taste chai made with fresh cardamom and swear that it changed their whole life. That Gregory of Nyssa, he was right. That Grandma Moses, it’s not too late. That sleep, that probably evolution first made a low-energy mode so we don’t starve so fast and then layered on some maintenance processes, but the effect is that we live in a cycle and when things aren’t going your way it’s comforting that reality doesn’t stretch out before you indefinitely but instead you can look forward to a reset and a pause that’s somehow neither experienced nor skipped. That, glamorous or not, comfortable or not, cheap or not, carbon emitting or not, air travel is very safe. That, for most of the things you’re worried about, the markets are less worried than you and they have the better track record, though not the issue of your mortality. That sexual attraction to romantic love to economic unit to reproduction, it’s a strange bundle, but who are we to argue with success. That every symbolic expression recursively built from differentiable elementary functions has a derivative that can also be written as a recursive combination of elementary functions, although the latter expression may require vastly more terms. That every expression graph built from differentiable elementary functions and producing a scalar output has a gradient that can itself be written as an expression graph, and furthermore that the latter expression graph is always the same size as the first one and is easy to find, and thus that it’s possible to fit very large expression graphs to data. That, eerily, biological life and biological intelligence does not appear to make use of that property of expression graphs. That if you look at something and move your head around, you observe the entire light field, which is a five-dimensional function of three spatial coordinates and two angles, and yet if you do something fancy with lasers, somehow that entire light field can be stored on a single piece of normal two-dimensional film and then replayed later. That, as far as I can tell, the reason five-dimensional light fields can be stored on two-dimensional film simply cannot be explained without quite a lot of wave mechanics, a vivid example of the strangeness of this place and proof that all those physicists with their diffractions and phase conjugations really are up to something. That disposable plastic, littered or not, harmless when consumed as thousands of small particles or not, is popular for a reason. That disposable plastic, when disposed of correctly, is literally carbon sequestration, and that if/when air-derived plastic replaces dead-plankton-derived plastic, this might be incredibly convenient, although it must be said that currently the carbon in disposable plastic only represents a single-digit percentage of total carbon emissions. That rocks can be broken into pieces and then you can’t un-break the pieces but you can check that they came from the same rock, it’s basically cryptography. That the deal society has made is that if you have kids then everyone you encounter is obligated to chip in a bit to assist you, and this seems to mostly work without the need for constant grimy negotiated transactions as Econ 101 would suggest, although the exact contours of this deal seem to be a bit murky. That of all the humans that have ever lived, the majority lived under some kind of autocracy, with the rest distributed among tribal bands, chiefdoms, failed states, and flawed democracies, and only something like 1% enjoyed free elections and the rule of law and civil liberties and minimal corruption, yet we endured and today that number is closer to 10%, and so if you find yourself outside that set, do not lose heart. That if you were in two dimensions and you tried to eat something then maybe your body would split into two pieces since the whole path from mouth to anus would have to be disconnected, so be thankful you’re in three dimensions, although maybe you could have some kind of jigsaw-shaped digestive tract so your two pieces would only jiggle around or maybe you could use the same orifice for both purposes, remember that if you ever find yourself in two dimensions, I guess. ( previously , previously , previously , previously ) That your dog, while she appears to love you only because she’s been adapted by evolution to appear to love you, really does love you. That if you’re a life form and you cook up a baby and copy your genes to them, you’ll find that the genes have been degraded due to oxidative stress et al., which isn’t cause for celebration, but if you find some other hopefully-hot person and randomly swap in half of their genes, your baby will still be somewhat less fit compared to you and your hopefully-hot friend on average, but now there is variance, so if you cook up several babies, one of them might be as fit or even fitter than you, and that one will likely have more babies than your other babies have, and thus complex life can persist in a universe with increasing entropy. That if we wanted to, we surely could figure out which of the 300-ish strains of rhinovirus are circulating in a given area at a given time and rapidly vaccinate people to stop it and thereby finally “cure” the common cold, and though this is too annoying to pursue right now, it seems like it’s just a matter of time. That if you look back at history, you see that plagues went from Europe to the Americas but not the other way, which suggests that urbanization and travel are great allies for infectious disease, and these both continue today but are held in check by sanitation and vaccines even while we have lots of tricks like UVC light and high-frequency sound and air filtration and waste monitoring and paying people to stay home that we’ve barely even put in play. That while engineered infectious diseases loom ever-larger as a potential very big problem, we also have lots of crazier tricks we could pull out like panopticon viral screening or toilet monitors or daily individualized saliva sampling or engineered microbe-resistant surfaces or even dividing society into cells with rotating interlocks or having people walk around in little personal spacesuits, and while admittedly most of this doesn’t sound awesome, I see no reason this shouldn’t be a battle that we would win. That clean water, unlimited, almost free. That dentistry. That tongues. That radioactive atoms either release a ton of energy but also quickly stop existing—a gram of Rubidium-90 scattered around your kitchen emits as much energy as ~200,000 incandescent lightbulbs but after an hour only 0.000000113g is left—or don’t put out very much energy but keep existing for a long time—a gram of Carbon-14 only puts out the equivalent of 0.0000212 light bulbs but if you start with a gram, you’ll still have 0.999879g after a year—so it isn’t actually that easy to permanently poison the environment with radiation although Cobalt-60 with its medium energy output and medium half-life is unfortunate, medical applications notwithstanding I still wish Cobalt-60 didn’t exist, screw you Cobalt-60. That while curing all cancer would only increase life expectancy by ~3 years and curing all heart disease would only increase life expectancy by ~3 years, and preventing all accidents would only increase life expectancy by ~1.5 years, if we did all of these at the same time and then a lot of other stuff too, eventually the effects would go nonlinear, so trying to cure cancer isn’t actually a waste of time, thankfully. That the peroxisome, while the mitochondria and their stupid Krebs cycle get all the attention, when a fatty-acid that’s too long for them to catabolize comes along, who you gonna call. That we have preferences, that there’s no agreed ordering of how good different things are, which is neat, and not something that would obviously be true for an alien species, and given our limited resources probably makes us happier on net. That cardamom, it is cheap but tastes expensive, if cardamom cost 1000× more, people would brag about how they flew to Sri Lanka so they could taste chai made with fresh cardamom and swear that it changed their whole life. That Gregory of Nyssa, he was right. That Grandma Moses, it’s not too late. That sleep, that probably evolution first made a low-energy mode so we don’t starve so fast and then layered on some maintenance processes, but the effect is that we live in a cycle and when things aren’t going your way it’s comforting that reality doesn’t stretch out before you indefinitely but instead you can look forward to a reset and a pause that’s somehow neither experienced nor skipped. That, glamorous or not, comfortable or not, cheap or not, carbon emitting or not, air travel is very safe. That, for most of the things you’re worried about, the markets are less worried than you and they have the better track record, though not the issue of your mortality. That sexual attraction to romantic love to economic unit to reproduction, it’s a strange bundle, but who are we to argue with success. That every symbolic expression recursively built from differentiable elementary functions has a derivative that can also be written as a recursive combination of elementary functions, although the latter expression may require vastly more terms. That every expression graph built from differentiable elementary functions and producing a scalar output has a gradient that can itself be written as an expression graph, and furthermore that the latter expression graph is always the same size as the first one and is easy to find, and thus that it’s possible to fit very large expression graphs to data. That, eerily, biological life and biological intelligence does not appear to make use of that property of expression graphs. That if you look at something and move your head around, you observe the entire light field, which is a five-dimensional function of three spatial coordinates and two angles, and yet if you do something fancy with lasers, somehow that entire light field can be stored on a single piece of normal two-dimensional film and then replayed later. That, as far as I can tell, the reason five-dimensional light fields can be stored on two-dimensional film simply cannot be explained without quite a lot of wave mechanics, a vivid example of the strangeness of this place and proof that all those physicists with their diffractions and phase conjugations really are up to something. That disposable plastic, littered or not, harmless when consumed as thousands of small particles or not, is popular for a reason. That disposable plastic, when disposed of correctly, is literally carbon sequestration, and that if/when air-derived plastic replaces dead-plankton-derived plastic, this might be incredibly convenient, although it must be said that currently the carbon in disposable plastic only represents a single-digit percentage of total carbon emissions. That rocks can be broken into pieces and then you can’t un-break the pieces but you can check that they came from the same rock, it’s basically cryptography. That the deal society has made is that if you have kids then everyone you encounter is obligated to chip in a bit to assist you, and this seems to mostly work without the need for constant grimy negotiated transactions as Econ 101 would suggest, although the exact contours of this deal seem to be a bit murky. That of all the humans that have ever lived, the majority lived under some kind of autocracy, with the rest distributed among tribal bands, chiefdoms, failed states, and flawed democracies, and only something like 1% enjoyed free elections and the rule of law and civil liberties and minimal corruption, yet we endured and today that number is closer to 10%, and so if you find yourself outside that set, do not lose heart. That if you were in two dimensions and you tried to eat something then maybe your body would split into two pieces since the whole path from mouth to anus would have to be disconnected, so be thankful you’re in three dimensions, although maybe you could have some kind of jigsaw-shaped digestive tract so your two pieces would only jiggle around or maybe you could use the same orifice for both purposes, remember that if you ever find yourself in two dimensions, I guess.

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Tech predictions for 2026 and beyond

We’ve caught glimpses of a future that values autonomy, empathy, and individual expertise. Where interdisciplinary cooperation influences discovery and creation at an unrelenting pace. In the coming year, we will begin the transition into a new era of AI in the human loop, not the other way around. This cycle will create massive opportunities to solve problems that truly matter.

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Christian Jauvin 1 months ago

Manifesto: AI (as a term and field) should subsume CS

In French the term “informatique” feels slightly better, as a label to describe the field, than “Computer Science” feels in English. But this is a rare occurrence for French, because most of the other terms, like “technologie de l’information”, and “science des données”, feel awkward and far from their “real” cultural counterpart, the thing in itself that we do, when we do it.

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