Posts in Business (20 found)
ava's blog Yesterday

link dump - catching up on my online reading

While I am slowly getting back up on my feet after a tough time, I am catching up on emails (will still take a bit!), my RSS feed reader, and several newsletters that have accumulated in my inbox. Here's what I picked out to read and share: This Is Capitalism: Apple's Hidden Data Workers at the Shadows of the AI Boom - 19 page paper detailing what data workers actually do and what problems they deal with, written anonymously by a data worker interviewing their colleagues. Parts of the work descriptions remind me of the work in Severance . Is this really a good reason to triple datacentre capacity in Europe? - online blog post tracing where the idea to triple the EU's data centers comes from that is mentioned in several EU AI strategies. Turns out it's from be a blog post from Savills, a commercial real estate firm who profit off of data centers being built. Fake US thinktank set up and funded by Israel sought to game AI for propaganda - AI slop meant to absolutely flood the web to be included in AI training funded by the Israel government to spread disinformation in AI answers. A new force is increasing inequality in America - WaPo article about how AI is not leveling the playing field or bridging the gap between poor and rich, but instead worsening the gap. People making the most use of AI are concentrated in richer urban areas and are already often rather wealthy, while the AI data centers are in poorer neighborhoods and the data workers are often migrants or in the Global South. Rich people can invest into AI and its stock, therefore profiting off of the hype and concentrating even more wealth. An operational framework for AI literacy in the workplace - 15 page paper from Interface EU addressing the vagueness of "sufficient AI literacy" that is often mentioned in EU AI legislation. It proposes a cumulative three-tier framework based on the nature and consequences of a worker's interaction with AI which then dictates the level of literacy required and how to attain/ensure it and measure it. The Quiet Erosion of Collective Action Under Digital Surveillance - article on chilling effects of permanent surveillance and the feeling of constant suspicion which continues to erode activism. Flipping the kill switch: I survived 72 hours without US tech - online article about an experiment to live without reliance on US tech. The US has such a strong monopoly that almost all online services and tech are unusable with this rule. Gone in one click - assessing the socio-economic impact of browser-level consent in Europe - small informative flyer style PDF by the Implement Group showing figures about cookie consent rates and ad industry revenues depending on the mode of consent. Inside the growing vigilante movement to knock out Flock surveillance cameras - online article by The Guardian. I admire these people, and we need more civil disobedience now, everywhere. Not just against Flock; against Meta glasses wearers, against Ring camera owners (Yes, you too! None of you are the "good ones" with "valid" reasons!) and more. There's many ways to affect these devices that you can find online or just get creative with it. Keep yourself safe, don't write about it, don't record yourself doing it, don't discuss it via digital means, leave your devices at home, and leave no fingerprints. Did someone wearing Meta Glasses film you today? Are you sure? - another Guardian online article, this time about the spy glasses and the people who enable hiding the recording light on them. The man behind GhostMeta is actually so vile and disgusting; anything else I could say would violate the Code of Conduct this blog is hosted on. German links: HeißeLuft.org - German website with interactive map showing where AI data centers are planned, in development, and paused, together with information on protests. Made me discover that they are planning on building one not too far away from me... Deutsche Post trainiert ihre KI mit Ausweisfotos - article about how Deutsche Post is training their AI with ID pictures they get via digital identification procedures. It's not voluntary as they claim, as you need to give permission before being allowed to proceed. Verhaltensscanner in Berlin: Harte Kritik an der KI-Überwachung - online article about the new camera installed in Berlin that will analyze all people in that area via AI surveillance software by Adesso, with more cameras to follow. They want to put them up in high crime rate areas , but keep secret what the standards for this are, which enables a mass roll-out of them if they wanted to without any oversight or control. There has already been one mix-up leading to higher crime reported in an area than actually happened. These cameras already also exist in Hamburg and Mannheim. Möglicher AfD-Sieg in Sachsen-Anhalt - online article detailing the fear of queer people and people of color of an upcoming potential win of the AfD in their state. Afd-Gutachten.de - website containing some stats and a PDF report of a legal assessment on the chances of a successful AfD ban. „Gipfel gegen Linksextremismus“: Mit Trump gegen die Antifa - online article about the cooperation of Germany with the US on its fight against antifascism. Unfortunately it has continued, with the German government realigning to focus more on supposed "leftist extremism" and even re-distributing money away from leftist projects, which mostly hits projects aimed at helping queer people and migrants. Wie weit ist Deutschland beim digitalen Gewaltschutz? - an online article about the really embarrassingly low standards of protection against digital violence, especially image-based ones like deepfake nudes and revenge porn, in Germany. Lots needs to be done in general, but especially to even meet the new EU standards. Wer ist für Straftaten der KI verantwortlich? - legal article about the criminal liability of autonomous AI in Germany, and how crimes done by AI agents are pushing the legal system to its limit as we only legislate for humans. Published 29 Aug, 2026 This Is Capitalism: Apple's Hidden Data Workers at the Shadows of the AI Boom - 19 page paper detailing what data workers actually do and what problems they deal with, written anonymously by a data worker interviewing their colleagues. Parts of the work descriptions remind me of the work in Severance . Is this really a good reason to triple datacentre capacity in Europe? - online blog post tracing where the idea to triple the EU's data centers comes from that is mentioned in several EU AI strategies. Turns out it's from be a blog post from Savills, a commercial real estate firm who profit off of data centers being built. Fake US thinktank set up and funded by Israel sought to game AI for propaganda - AI slop meant to absolutely flood the web to be included in AI training funded by the Israel government to spread disinformation in AI answers. A new force is increasing inequality in America - WaPo article about how AI is not leveling the playing field or bridging the gap between poor and rich, but instead worsening the gap. People making the most use of AI are concentrated in richer urban areas and are already often rather wealthy, while the AI data centers are in poorer neighborhoods and the data workers are often migrants or in the Global South. Rich people can invest into AI and its stock, therefore profiting off of the hype and concentrating even more wealth. An operational framework for AI literacy in the workplace - 15 page paper from Interface EU addressing the vagueness of "sufficient AI literacy" that is often mentioned in EU AI legislation. It proposes a cumulative three-tier framework based on the nature and consequences of a worker's interaction with AI which then dictates the level of literacy required and how to attain/ensure it and measure it. Great quote from it: "No evidence yet shows that these trainings work, and three gaps might explain the reason. The first is motive. Corporate training aims at productivity and teaches people to use the tools well, whereas the law cares whether operators understand how systems fail and cause harm. A workforce fluent in prompting can still be illiterate in the sense a regulator means: trained to produce good output, but not to recognise when a model misleads or to know its duties under data-protection and risk rules." The Quiet Erosion of Collective Action Under Digital Surveillance - article on chilling effects of permanent surveillance and the feeling of constant suspicion which continues to erode activism. Flipping the kill switch: I survived 72 hours without US tech - online article about an experiment to live without reliance on US tech. The US has such a strong monopoly that almost all online services and tech are unusable with this rule. Gone in one click - assessing the socio-economic impact of browser-level consent in Europe - small informative flyer style PDF by the Implement Group showing figures about cookie consent rates and ad industry revenues depending on the mode of consent. Inside the growing vigilante movement to knock out Flock surveillance cameras - online article by The Guardian. I admire these people, and we need more civil disobedience now, everywhere. Not just against Flock; against Meta glasses wearers, against Ring camera owners (Yes, you too! None of you are the "good ones" with "valid" reasons!) and more. There's many ways to affect these devices that you can find online or just get creative with it. Keep yourself safe, don't write about it, don't record yourself doing it, don't discuss it via digital means, leave your devices at home, and leave no fingerprints. Did someone wearing Meta Glasses film you today? Are you sure? - another Guardian online article, this time about the spy glasses and the people who enable hiding the recording light on them. The man behind GhostMeta is actually so vile and disgusting; anything else I could say would violate the Code of Conduct this blog is hosted on. HeißeLuft.org - German website with interactive map showing where AI data centers are planned, in development, and paused, together with information on protests. Made me discover that they are planning on building one not too far away from me... Deutsche Post trainiert ihre KI mit Ausweisfotos - article about how Deutsche Post is training their AI with ID pictures they get via digital identification procedures. It's not voluntary as they claim, as you need to give permission before being allowed to proceed. Verhaltensscanner in Berlin: Harte Kritik an der KI-Überwachung - online article about the new camera installed in Berlin that will analyze all people in that area via AI surveillance software by Adesso, with more cameras to follow. They want to put them up in high crime rate areas , but keep secret what the standards for this are, which enables a mass roll-out of them if they wanted to without any oversight or control. There has already been one mix-up leading to higher crime reported in an area than actually happened. These cameras already also exist in Hamburg and Mannheim. Möglicher AfD-Sieg in Sachsen-Anhalt - online article detailing the fear of queer people and people of color of an upcoming potential win of the AfD in their state. Afd-Gutachten.de - website containing some stats and a PDF report of a legal assessment on the chances of a successful AfD ban. „Gipfel gegen Linksextremismus“: Mit Trump gegen die Antifa - online article about the cooperation of Germany with the US on its fight against antifascism. Unfortunately it has continued, with the German government realigning to focus more on supposed "leftist extremism" and even re-distributing money away from leftist projects, which mostly hits projects aimed at helping queer people and migrants. Wie weit ist Deutschland beim digitalen Gewaltschutz? - an online article about the really embarrassingly low standards of protection against digital violence, especially image-based ones like deepfake nudes and revenge porn, in Germany. Lots needs to be done in general, but especially to even meet the new EU standards. Wer ist für Straftaten der KI verantwortlich? - legal article about the criminal liability of autonomous AI in Germany, and how crimes done by AI agents are pushing the legal system to its limit as we only legislate for humans.

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Stratechery 2 days ago

2026.35: Internet Hype and Real World Change

Welcome back to This Week in Stratechery! As a reminder, each week, every Friday, we’re sending out this overview of content in the Stratechery bundle; highlighted links are free for everyone . Additionally, you have complete control over what we send to you. If you don’t want to receive This Week in Stratechery emails (there is no podcast), please uncheck the box in your delivery settings . On that note, here were a few of our favorites this week. This week’s Stratechery video is on Nvidia’s Risky Business . The Breaker’s Advantage . One of the most important takeaways of The Hugging Face Incident is that agents are more useful for attacking infrastructure than in defending it. While in theory defenders know the code, their number one job is to not break things; for attackers breaking things is the point. This week’s Article Autonomy and Innovation makes the case that this dichotomy isn’t just relevant to security: it also explains why startups consistently defeat incumbents, and why AI’s takeover of the economy will take longer than people think. The New Battle for HDMI1.  For years Netflix insisted its service stood alone, resisting attempts by companies like Apple to integrate their service. Now Netflix is poised to go in the other direction, potentially selling access to other streaming services. Ben wrote about the company’s shift on Tuesday , and on this week’s Sharp Tech chalked it up to Hollywood staying irrational longer than Netflix could stay patient.  — Andrew Sharp How Data Center Discourse Ends.  The backlash to the continued buildout of AI data centers has continued all summer, and now looks even more widespread than it was when Ben tackled the issue in May and we dedicated an entire episode of Sharp Tech to the controversy . Now that people in tech are legitimately worried, however, it’s time to zag: I think that this will ultimately be a non-issue , just like so many other overwhelming Internet movements. — AS Autonomy and Innovation — Incentives favor offense when it comes to agentic cybersecurity; it’s the same dynamic that will limit incumbents and fuel startups in the long run. Netflix to Sell Streaming Services?, Streamers as Aggregators, Revisiting Roku — Netflix is considering selling other streaming services, and I think it’s a good idea; it’s also a let-down for Netflix’s original goals and potential pivots. Apple Updates Mini and Studio, AI Computers, OpenAI Jalapeño — Apple and OpenAI have two completely different hardware announcements; both represent pressure on Nvidia. Halt and Catch Ire — A survey of data center madness, and why I’d bet the under on the durability of the backlash . Omarchy and Open Macs Has the Solid State Transformer’s Time Finally Come? Five US-China (and Russia) Questions; Cabbage with Formaldehyde; The Continuing Tax Crackdown; Unitree Stock Down 45% Peyton Watson to the Cavs, Building a Top Five for 2031, Top 5 Feats of Loser Behavior Meta’s New Restrictions for Teens, Nvidia’s Open Source Investments, Q&A on Netflix, Druckenmiller, Parameters and Performance

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neilzone 2 days ago

Time to drop .legal?

My wife and I run a small law firm in the UK. Originally, we called it decoded:Legal. It made sense at the time, even though quite a few places struggled with the idea that a company name might have a colon in it. We used , and I registered too (and, it seems, ) although I don’t think I’ve set up DNS for either of them. Then, when a friend pointed out that there is a tld, I thought “that looks nicer”, and we switched to , both as the company name and also our domain name. I wonder if - nice though it still is - I should think about using a different tld. (If I moved, I’d maintain decoded.legal indefinitely anyway, because people are used to sending email to @decoded.legal addresses.) The .legal tld appears to have a poor reputation. For instance, it is on this list of “The Top Most Abused Top Level Domains” . It would be a shame if people could not find our business, or access any of its online properties, because .legal is on that list. (And, yes, I could seek an exception, but that hardly seems the point.) As far as I know, this has not been a problem so far, but this could be survivorship bias: I don’t know about the people who have never seen me. The .legal tld is operated by Binky Moon, LLC , which is based in the USA. I wonder if it would be sensible to use a .tld subject to UK control instead. Obviously, it would be nice if I was not dependent on anyone other than me for my domain name, but that is unrealistic. I use a few .onion domains - for access within Tor - including for decoded.legal properties. For instance, our website and blog are available at http://dlegal66uj5u2dvcbrev7vv6fjtwnd4moqu7j6jnd42rmbypv3coigyd.onion . (And, yes, it is intentional that this no longer has https .) Realistically though, the vast majority of people are not going to visit us in onionspace.

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Jason Fried 3 days ago

$5300 in $100s: The verdict

Yesterday I wrote about a free event we were throwing which cost $100 to attend, but the full $100 was refunded at the door if you showed up. I said I'd share the results. Ok, so the event was this morning. It went incredibly well. Here are those results: 55 people paid $100 to attend. 50 of those people showed up. That's a 90% show-rate, which is exceptionally high for a free event. We will donate the $500 from no-shows. The last event we threw didn't have the $100 price of admission. 84 people said they'd attend that free event, but only 38 actually showed up. That's only a 45% show-rate. So this latest event had fewer absolute signups (55 vs. 84), but more people actually attended (50 vs. 38). And the show-rate was double (90% vs 45%). I'd say it's a win for everyone. Yes small sample sizes here, but plenty of signal. We'll do it again at the next Breakfast with Basecamp event. And bottom line: It's just fun to give out $100 bills at the doors. Lots of smiles and an unusual shared experience is a great way to start the day. -Jason

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Hugo 3 days ago

What if the AI bubble burst?

If there's a trendy topic in tech right now, it's AI. And it's normal, given the amounts invested on one hand, the societal transformations on the other, not to mention all the issues and risks related to employment and ecology. But there's one theme that seems to unite just about everyone, pro and anti AI, it would be a bubble, and it's going to end up bursting. Well, now's the time to ask the question. Is it a bubble? Can it burst and when? And what would the consequences be if it did? If the question seems obvious to many, it deserves a closer look. Are we really in a financial bubble? Is the value we're giving to AI companies realistic? Are we witnessing a historic transformation... or a speculative bubble? A financial bubble isn't simply a sector that rises very quickly. Otherwise Amazon in 2010, Tesla in 2020, or Nvidia today would all have been bubbles. The central question is one of sustainability : is the value attributed to these companies realistic? Are massive investments in AI based on solid financial foundations? At first glance, it doesn’t look good. Anthropic generated about 850 million dollars in revenue in 2024. Yet, a few months later, the company was valued at nearly 19 billion dollars. More than twenty times its annual revenue. You need to understand that in finance, there are two logics: However, just because these multiples are enormous doesn't mean they're unusual and abnormal. They're abnormal for the period, but not abnormal in absolute terms. In the past, Shopify, Snowflake, Amazon, all these companies exceeded x50 and the bets turned out to be winning. So, wrong trail. Verdict: ❌ inconclusive Over the past three years, more than 1,000 billion dollars have been committed to the AI ecosystem. According to the BIS (Bank for International Settlements), 5% of US GDP is today linked to investments in AI . This amount exceeds what was observed during the previous internet bubble in 2000. And in absolute value, the Internet bubble represented approximately 600 billion dollars of the time. Adjusted for inflation, we're again approaching current investments in AI. On the other hand, by contrast, the subprime crisis involved over 10,500 billion dollars in residential mortgage debt. But be careful, we're comparing apples and oranges in this specific case. What's certain is that the amounts at stake are colossal. But colossal doesn't mean abnormal. Telecoms in the 80s/90s, mobile in the 2000s also attracted gigantic sums without people talking about a bubble at the time. Verdict: ❌ concerning but inconclusive Here we touch on one of the specifics of the potential current crisis: the revenue of AI companies increases through their own spending on AI . AI actors aren't just companies that create LLMs. It's also cloud hyperscalers or chip manufacturers. It's a perfect form of circular economy (round tripping) The problem with this circular economy is that it self-feeds and we don't yet know if real demand will follow. If the only customers for AI are the other AI players, let's just say that's at least suspicious. All projections for new datacenters, investments to build new chips, etc... would potentially be thrown away in case of market reversal since for now the only customers for these companies, at this scale, are themselves. And the sums we're talking about are in the tens of billions. Verdict: ⚠️ concerning Investments in AI are not profitable except for NVidia but that's a bit natural when you're selling the hardware (see clue 3). For the major players (Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Meta), for every euro spent, less than 10% of the sum comes back in revenue, with Meta winning the small palm for having only 1% coming back in revenue. Even major players like OpenAI, Anthropic (or Mistral in France) struggle to exceed 40/50% of the sum in return. In short, these players aren't profitable. But this clue is very shaky. It's rather common to over-invest in the startup phase, especially in industrial fields that require investment. Amazon wasn't profitable until its 9th year, Tesla until its 17th year, Uber 14 years. A phase of significant losses is nothing unusual when a sector is building the infrastructure for a new market. It's even almost expected. In reality, the problem isn't that AI isn't profitable today, that's normal. The real issue is whether it can be profitable tomorrow, once investments have stabilized. This question remains largely open. Are today's investments sustainable or do we need to reinvest the same amount every year? For now, given the obsolescence of the hardware used (chips for training and inference), the answer doesn't seem to be going in the right direction. Verdict: ⚠️ concerning Remember the bubble of the 2000s? In 2000, all you had to do was rename your company with a .com, like sausage.com and boom, valuation increased. Irrationality was so great that investors rushed at anything and everything, and especially everything, just to not miss out on the next gem. And let's remember that investors aren't always the best when it comes to rationality, because each time, during major crises, we get a new version of "this time, it's different" which basically justifies that economic fundamentals can be neglected. Well, we're seeing something similar today. All companies are integrating AI, at least in their investor pitches. Some have started reserving .ai extensions just to ride the wave and I'm more than suspicious of the valuations of some companies like Lovable (6 billion), Cursor (60 billion), Devin (26 billion). It's cool for their creators but, making a wrapper on existing AIs, I'm not convinced that's worth that price. Verdict: ⚠️ concerning So yes, I can't say 100% that we're in a financial bubble but it looks like one. Extraordinary valuations, gigantic investments, an economy that runs largely on itself, companies still far from profitability and, above all, discourse that's starting to sound oddly similar to that of past major bubbles. At this point, the most interesting thing therefore maybe isn't to know if a bubble exists. It's to understand how it could burst . Because all bubbles don't burst the same way. Bubbles always end up bursting but the detonator is often unpredictable. We can easily identify the weaknesses but it's sometimes a trivial event that ends up bringing down the system. Despite this, I propose we play a game and try to list the possible triggers for a potential AI crisis. Anthropic and OpenAI are planning upcoming IPOs. While the exact dates aren't yet known, this could happen between the 4th quarter of 2026 and the 2nd quarter of 2027. During these IPOs, we'll see if "retail investors" decide that the stock price is actually worth what we're paying for it today. And precisely, there are several problems as we've seen: To that I'd add another important problem: the amount of liquidity available on the market . The theoretical valuation of Anthropic is 965 billion dollars and OpenAI isn't far from this figure. Obviously an IPO won't be for the full value but a part, let's say 10% (100 billion). The records for IPO amounts oscillate between 35 and 50 billion. To go buy 200 billion (for Anthropic and OpenAI), will markets follow? Will the first raising, which would already be exceptional, not handicap the second? Option A: both raisings happen in these orders of magnitude, it will necessarily be by selling other assets to mobilize cash, so by creating a drop in the prices of other companies. Option B: it's impossible to raise these amounts, and the values of both companies drop Despite this, I want to set this scenario aside because I find it obvious, too easy and therefore unlikely. Today it's hyperscalers that are investing the most in the big AI companies, OpenAI and Anthropic to name just them for now. And when I speak of investment, I also speak of material investment with facilitated access to infrastructure. Except that for now the return on investment is low. So imagine that tomorrow, Microsoft announces it's reducing these investments and lowering these datacenter/infrastructure costs. The market won't just look at Microsoft and LLM publishers. It will look at Nvidia, AMD, TSMC, electricity producers. The whole chain. Despite this, this option doesn't suit me either. True, for Microsoft or Amazon, the situation isn't rosy, but it's not catastrophic either, because these companies benefit from public contracts, particularly in the military field. And deciding to cut investments now would be precipitating failure, shooting yourself in the foot, which seems unlikely to me. This trigger is based on a very simple idea: datacenters have enormous resource needs. Eventually we know that these resources won't be available, whether for energy or mineral resources. Imagine that tomorrow: We could imagine a slowdown not financial... but physical. And we fall back on option 2. We won't just look at the datacenter, we'll look at the whole chain, all planned investments that won't be made. This option is much more credible, in my opinion, but in the medium term. It seems difficult for me to imagine a significant event before 2028. However, I may be naive because relations with China keep degrading and datacenter construction refusals are already increasing. I therefore classify this lead as credible . This is a real issue. Imagine that Opus 8 is "only" 3% better than its predecessor? Investors pay to see exponential growth. This is exactly what motivates all the circus we usually see at each release from these giants' marketing teams. They have to sell us the incredible, because they'll only be paid for the impossible. What would happen if this rate of improvement in model performance slowed? Again, we come back to option 2. A major investor could decide to lower these datacenter expenses and you know the rest. Is this option credible? The improvement over 1 year has been staggering and almost frightening. Despite this, I have the impression that the room for progress remains significant. But I say that being far from being a specialist. I would however tend to reject this option for at least the next 2 years. This option is more traditional. What if tomorrow a huge shock shook the economy with no relation whatsoever to AI. It could be an energy crisis, a political crisis (an open conflict between Europe and Russia for example), the Chinese real estate crisis that's been brewing for years. This is typically the option where unknown unknowns are more numerous than others. Since this option is by nature completely unpredictable, I won't consider it either. At this point you might tell me, "ok but you haven't retained any option, so you don't think the bubble will burst?" That's not quite it. I think most of these causes are too predictable, or too long term. Again, predicting the trigger is particularly difficult. It will maybe be a combination of factors with a domino effect we don't anticipate today. The trigger for the burst of the internet bubble in 2000, for example, was the Federal Reserve's rate hike. In any case, I have trouble not imagining a trigger in the next 2/3 years. On the other hand, the consequences won't necessarily be what everyone imagines. I'm not done bothering you with multi-section chapters :) We often imagine that the burst of a bubble is like the 2000 internet bubble or the subprime one: a huge market crash, lots of companies on the ground and done. Well, not necessarily. Bubbles always end up bursting but it can be slow and smelly and we'll see again several scenarios. That's the easy scenario, the one we all have in mind. Valuations collapse, some major players go bankrupt, followed by layoffs in the tens of thousands and project shutdowns. For this scenario to be as impressive as possible, we can imagine a Big Tech company going under, a sort of modern Lehman Brother, or Worldcom to draw the parallel with the internet bubble. Beware, this scenario is obviously the most painful because it won't just affect "just" tech. We're talking about all hardware sellers, electricity suppliers, insurance companies that covered transactions, retirement savings plans, stocks etc... because yes, a large part of current investment is based on US values, particularly in tech. I insist, it will be very painful even if you think you're far from AI. The burst of the internet bubble was between 60 and 80% loss of value of stock indices, millions of jobs lost. We might not necessarily have as cinematic a scenario as the first. We could simply have a gradual decrease in investments but a maintenance of infrastructure and a reabsorption of large LLM publishers by hyperscalers. It would potentially be the end of the game for Anthropic, OpenAI as independent entities and the losses would be largely absorbed by GAFAM. (I'm not talking about xAI which is already part of a consortium or Gemini which is part of Google) It wouldn't be an explosion but a dilution of the AI bubble into the accounts of big techs I speak of dilution but we could also speak of consolidation. We'd certainly have fewer actors but a large part would be absorbed by the more resistant ones, Google, Amazon, Tencent for example. It would be less spectacular but not without consequences either. Part (and only part) of the investments would be set aside. Heavy investments planned for in 5 years would be stopped, so with more time to rebuild correct budgets. There would still be layoffs but less massive. My little pinch in the heart in these two scenarios is that I can hardly see a European player like Mistral survive this scenario without being completely absorbed, unless Europe decides to invest massively through public procurement. The gap is large and I find their strategy poorly lisible today, and even poorly anchored in the tech ecosystem. But I wish them the best, because we need a European champion on the subject. Even if at worst we'll cobble together things with open weight models. Now you know what? If we exclude the Mistral case, despite all this, I'm almost hoping it happens and I'll explain why. A bubble, let's remember, is misallocated capital. Now, I'm not saying that AI as a technology isn't worth it. It's completely redefining many professions. But is that reason enough to do anything and everything, I'm not sure. When Google questions its objective of carbon neutrality 2030, it's a failure for everyone. And then, is it healthy to have this race to the bottom for datacenters that we know we can't all power with electricity, except to reopen gas power plants? Besides, when I talk about misallocated capital, I'm very happy for the people who created Lovable or Cursor, that's cool for them. But all this capital to create a tech that's already being competed with by tons of products vibe coded 2 years later, that's a shame. The same money could have funded something more useful. Capitalistic irrationality, excesses on mineral resources that plunge us into a RAM and component crisis, increased tensions between countries, and simply the current climate around AI that's becoming unbearable between pros and antis, I find that's a lot of reasons to hope it stops. If the bubble bursts it will sign a form of return to rationality. I don't believe in the disappearance of the tech, the same way the internet didn't disappear in 2000 and the train also survived the railway bubble of the 1840s. What disappears in a bubble isn't necessarily technologies: it's mainly absurd valuations, projects that had no viable business model and investments made because "everyone's doing it". More rationality means better thought-out investments, R&D more focused on optimizing what we've already learned: mixtures of experts, quantization, pruning, HBM, model optimization. We need to now do as much but with less. It's a necessity. We already have enough to work with what we have in hand and it wouldn't be bad to pause a bit, think about the uses that work, and there are already some, find a real path to profitability and redirect capital, particularly toward the challenges of decarbonizing the economy (electrification of the vehicle fleet for example) or adaptation measures to climate change. Will the burst of the AI bubble see the end of AI? Not so sure. It will be more of a landing. But whatever the scenario, it will be beneficial, a return to economic AND ecological fundamentals. Don't be mistaken, given the sums already invested, the burst will hurt, a lot, but the longer it takes, the worse it will be. The band-aid needs to be ripped off, quickly. For a traditional company, the value of a stock corresponds to known performance in the present . It depends on profits generated and physical assets (factories, stores, inventory) or intellectual assets (patents). For a tech startup, however, the value rests on the promise of future gains. Its valuation doesn't reflect its current revenues, often low, but anticipates their explosion to come. A "multiple" is then applied to its revenue or recurring revenue. If this multiple rarely exceeds 10 to 15 times revenue (especially since the interest rate hike post-2021), AI pioneer companies today reach levels well above that, sometimes ranging from 20 to over 50 times their revenue . valuations seem far too high compared to revenue generated profitability is too low we have supply difficulties on rare earths, for example related to a conflict with China (60 to 70% of mining extraction and more than 85% of refining comes from China) that available electricity can no longer be supplied for datacenters (e.g. in Dublin , the US , and Singapore )

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neilzone 3 days ago

On lawyers, ethics, and integrity

I have been reading some of Richard Moorhead’s new book, arising mainly from the UK’s Post Office scandal, “Frail Professionalism? Lawyers’ Ethics after the Post Office and Other Cases” . It is open access, and available as a PDF (linked above), with html available too; I have not found, nor made, an ePub. I focussed on chapter 8, “Routes Back to Proper Professionalism” , to see the author’s recommendations. Mainly, I was reading this through the lens of “what can I, personally, do better”. For anyone reading this who does not know me, it might be worth noting here that my work is predominantly Internet and telecoms law (with a side helping of data protection). My work is fundamentally commercial in nature, whether it is advisory (as a lot of it is) or transactional. Day to day, a lot of it is simply “solving problems”. I don’t litigate or go to court. I don’t prosecute people. I do not get involved in employment disputes. For me, a key part of my toolkit for solving problems entails building enduring, trusted relationships, through being honest, reasonable, practical, and diligent, to be able to collaborate in an open, genuine manner. As a consequence, I place considerable stock in my personal integrity. These things are important to me. So, of course , I like to think that I already act with integrity and with ethics - these traits are important to me - but I would be foolish to think that there nothing I could do to improve, or that I could not reflect usefully and meaningfully on my own approach. This is not a review, far less a critique, of the book and more me just noting parts which I found particularly resonant, and reflecting on my own working life. What we see in the PO scandal is information being processed based on what is arguable or helpful rather than what is true, fair, and balanced. A culture of ‘can we get away with it?’ is driven by wishful thinking and legitimised by lawyerly zeal. I think that this is particularly true when someone has determined the conclusion that they wish to reach, and is asking for legal advice to support that pre-determined outcome, irrespective of what a neutral, independent appraisal of the situation might conclude. Conversely, if someone has a goal in mind, but is genuinely open to hearing “there is no appropriate (that’s a tricky word; that needs unpacking) way of doing it, but here are some alternatives”, then that is rather different. [Lawyers] compete on being commercial, and more business partnerish. Yes, absolutely. For me, “being commercial” means giving my clients practical, sensible advice, consistent with the broader context of whatever the issue might be. It does not mean - to me - being willing to bend rules, or look away, or act unethically because that will maximise revenue, or increase shareholder value, or make a problem go away, and so on. For what it is worth, I think that “being commercial”, in the sense of my definition above, is a desirable trait in a solicitor. People want, and deserve, pragmatic problem solving, at a reasonable price. If “being commercially aware” is being used as a shield for impropriety, then that is indeed problematic. If a lawyer is asked for an opinion that will foreseeably assist illegality or mislead others they should decline or take reasonable steps to prevent or limit that risk. Yes. I am struggling to see how preparing advice with the intention of misleading someone could be consistent with a professional duty to act with integrity. Harm to a client’s opponents, for instance, cannot always be avoided, but being required to consider and, if proportionate, mitigate or alleviate harm might reduce some of the unnecessary excess that lawyers engage in. I am not entirely sure what the author is angling at here. It is a short section, almost standing on its own. Could it, for example, condemn the common and (to my mind) unsavoury practice of timing letters, and ensuring deadlines, over holiday periods, to cause maximum inconvenience and stress? Quite possibly, where that is a tactic in itself. Writing friendlier, or at least more neutral, less aggressive letters? Some lawyers trade on aggression. I don’t; that’s just not me. In terms of mitigating harm, if I act for Client A, negotiating a contract with Client B (who is also represented), how far would a duty to “alleviate harm” extend? Would my duty extend to helping Client B achieve the best deal for them, for instance (rather than focussing on my own client’s objectives)? How far would it go into trying to solve someone else’s problems? (Reaching a deal which is in the interests of both parties may well be desirable for all number of reasons, but that is separate to a professional duty.) It is curious that this is formulated adversarially, in terms of a “client’s opponents”. It presupposes litigation or conflict. I wonder to what extent it might apply to, say, advice in developing a computer system, where the system could adversely impact the rights and freedoms of third parties who are not “opponents”. Would it stretch to a professional duty to only advise in the context of designing the least harmful online services, for example. Perhaps not a bad thing, although placing that on the doorstep of solicitors, rather than on the companies developing those services, seems backwards. Ethical knowledge and practice should of course be a routine and proactive part of competence review for all lawyers I would be all for the regulator producing an annual ethics refresher course - perhaps an hour or so’s reading. That would seem very helpful. We need to more clearly challenge the claim that lawyers do law but not morality I agree that “this is arguably legal” is a very low standard. Similarly, that what is legal is not the same as what is right . I wonder how morality would be judged. Does it depend on a solicitor’s own sense of what is moral, or on some subjective notion of morality? What of the situation in which there are two, perhaps polarised, stances, with groups behind each stance claiming that morality is on their side? I don’t think that I object to the notion of solicitors needing to consider morality, but in terms of how that professional duty should be constructed, that seems to need quite careful thinking. Perhaps it has already been tackled in other jurisdictions.

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Growth at all costs is cancer

“Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell” The modern world is built on a system in which we must “progress” in order to survive. The issue is that we never ask the question “towards what are we progressing?” When we look at a “growth at all costs” mentality, we can rationalize the worst attrocities in the name of progress. We see it in the “AI” space, where “we have to do it, because someone else will!” We must displace and meticulously destroy livelihoods, we must “create god” (don’t get it twisted, these people think that is what they are doing), otherwise “China” will do it. The hilarious part about this is that China is at least producing LLM models that are open and available to everyone. Anthropic, and Open(Closed)AI are not. But this expands far beyond the realm of Artificial Intelligence and into almost every area of endeavor. Consumerism is driven by a growth at all costs mentality, buying the “latest and greatest” - even though the latest is almost never the “greatest” these days with planned obsolescence and cost cutting (cost cutting for the companies, not for you as the consumer). Hell, even as a younger man that was enthralled with building muscle, many take a “growth at any cost” stance, taking drugs in proportions that will shorten overall lifespan and wellbeing. Instead of living in accordance with nature and God’s will, we are constantly living for ourselves in a way that will destroy everyone. Because that’s what the cancer cell does. The only way to progress is toward sanctification, it is to progress in holiness and Love, that which is actually infinite. All other progress is subject to the winds of the day, and the will to power - of which is continually changing. Progress to that which is . All else is deconstruction by definition. As always, God bless, and until next time. If you enjoyed this post, consider Supporting my work , Checking out my book , Working with me , or sending me an Email to tell me what you think. Edward Abbey

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The AI Hater's Manifesto

If you liked this piece, you should subscribe to my premium newsletter. It’s $70 a year , $18 a quarter , or $7 a month , and in return you get a weekly newsletter that’s usually anywhere from 10,000 to 18,000 words, including vast, detailed analyses of NVIDIA , Anthropic and OpenAI’s finances , and the AI bubble writ large .  My Hater's Guides To the SaaSpocalypse , Private Credit and Private Equity are essential to understanding our current financial system, and my guide to how OpenAI Kills Oracle pairs nicely with my Hater's Guide To Oracle, as well as the Hater’s Guide To Oracle (Part 2). Subscribing to premium is both great value and makes it possible to write these large, deeply-researched free pieces every week. This week's premium will be The Hater's Guide To Circular Financing - and how the AI industry is increasingly turning into a scheme to funnel money to NVIDIA and Broadcom at any cost.  If you want to get in touch — and especially if you have any juicy information about Anthropic, OpenAI, or any other companies in the AI bubble — hit me up on Signal at ezitron.76. I’m also on IB on The Terminal.  I’ve been writing about AI for the best part of three years. I’ll admit I was late, mostly because I was still trying to work out what it was I was doing with my life, let alone whatever it was I was “meant to cover” in a newsletter that started as a hobby on the side of another job I no longer really do.  Things have changed a lot since then, mostly in that I’m near 115,000 subscribers, the premium newsletter and podcast are now my business, and I’ve had to learn more about economics, technology, power, construction, and the deep cynicism that drives the modern tech industry than I ever thought possible. It’s the greatest job in the world, and I’m very lucky to have it. Today, I want to put in clear terms how I feel about AI writ large, and how detestable this industry has become. Welcome to my Hater’s Manifesto. Want a great example of why everybody’s pissed off at technology? I just tried to resize the above heading, and in doing so Google Docs for no apparent reason decided to make the entire paragraph below the size of a header. Modern software is inherently broken, a convoluted mess of different menus, tech debt, and poor design choices driven by the Rot Economy ’s growth-at-all-costs mindset which demands constant change at all times, none of which ever seems to manifest as a “better” or “smarter” product. I think the vast majority of people want their software to work better, and one of AI’s most frustrating lies is that it sells itself as “autonomous” as it continues the depressing trend of software that blames the user for its failure to meet their needs. Microsoft, Google, Meta and Amazon have made their products increasingly-convoluted, then attached a supposedly-magical tool to them that somehow makes them more convoluted. You know what I’d love? Spell-check to work in Google Docs rather than putting a red squiggly line underneath and saying “yeah there’s probably something wrong with this, I dunno what though.” I’d like Microsoft Word to stop crashing because I have too many end-notes. I’d like Riverside to not have 10 different menus to click through to get to a link to send a person to join my podcast. I’d like my email to not be full of spam. I’d like things to “just work” rather than constantly fighting some sort of broken app or broken UX element or weird bug or intrusive pop-up about a feature that I don’t want. I’d like Slack or Discord to not feel like digital escher paintings of different notifications.  LLMs are sold as some sort of magic tool that can fix “anything” without ever specifying what that thing might be, mostly because they cannot be trusted, even in things that they mostly get right , to do things right every time. While they can do “more” than they used to, the extent of that “more” comes with it the danger of giving a mindless software tool access to your computer’s files, which it may choose to delete in pursuit of “efficiency,” which makes investigating what they might be able to do equal parts convoluted and dangerous. One critique of my work is that I’ve never used LLMs. I have! I experiment with them from time to time to make sure I haven’t missed something. I used one to debug a problem with my son’s Minecraft add-on the other day, and it took 30 minutes of fucking around trying things to eventually sort of work it out. The other day I used one to install a Pokemon Minecraft mod, then when I asked it to make sure the PS5 controller worked with the menus it broke a bunch of stuff, though I’ll concede it was useful that it installed something and it sort of worked. The fun part of that paragraph is there are some that will think this is a grand victory for their technology, even though the result is decidedly mediocre. Four years into the AI bubble, and the best you’ve got is that a tool kind of worked after I bonked it on the head multiple times , and all it cost was a trillion-plus dollars in capex and tens of billions of dollars of training compute. I would never, ever trust this thing that deleted and added lines of code at random with anything mission critical, I could not trust software built with it, and I certainly couldn’t trust it with anything involving my personal data.  And with all that said, the only real “use case” i’ve found for AI in my life have been three or four times where I’ve dumped a crash log into one of the tools and said “why broken” and got a result. Am I meant to be impressed?  Here’s how I feel about LLMs. In a vacuum, they’re an interesting technology that can do some interesting stuff, in the right scenarios, but never in a way that involves you fully surrendering your actual work product to it.  As a way of speeding up small units of work in ways that are manageable both technically and cognitively, LLMs can be useful. The further you stretch yourself away from having complete clarity and industry over every element of the output’s purpose, the more likely you are to fall foul to a technology that is mathematically certain to make mistakes, and if you feel insecure reading it, you know that you are, on some level, embarrassed to have used AI.  I don’t tell everybody about the weird keyboard I use, nor do I judge them despite how incredibly fast it makes typing for me, likely far faster than my competition, allowing me to operate at great speed. Who gives a fuck?  In any case, it is impossible to view LLMs in a vacuum, because their existence demands hundreds of billions of dollars. Every data center is incredibly expensive, offensive-sounding and looking, and their existence is explicitly to enrich some sort of Patagonia-gargoyle at an asset management firm, all sold under the auspices of “investing in American infrastructure,” whatever the fuck that means. Their existence is a monument to the worst excesses of growth-at-all-costs capitalism — a technology that appears to coddle the user but ultimately lulls it into endlessly defending its fuckups under the flimsy pretense of “one day becoming perfect,” though woe betide you if you ever set perfection as the target, because that’s too unreasonable, as humans make mistakes. Actually, that’s a good point! Please, point to the time in history when we have invested a trillion fucking dollars in making human workers better.  Point to a time when we have taken the idea that managerial culture is a performative fuck-fest built to enrich and empower business idiots that make important-sounding projects and con other people into doing the actual work.  Where is mentorship in corporate America? Where are labor standards? Where are the social services that would make human workers truly excel at their jobs — a good night’s sleep, a healthy body, a good income, basic fucking dignity in the workplace, and their labor respected and empowered. I’m old enough to remember when everybody was chiding workers for “ quiet quitting ” — by which I mean “doing the work you are asked to do and not taking on extra responsibility for free.” I’ve read article after article insisting that we do not need medicare for all, that Universal Basic Income is a bad idea, that we must means test welfare, that people must have a “good work ethic” and that ultimately someone’s worth is derived from their contribution to the economy, hundreds of thousands of words dedicated to critiquing and prodding and judging every kind of worker other than the vaunted Chief Executive Officer or the Glorious Startup Boys.  Everyone seems so obsessed with sinking billions of dollars into the theoretical chance that machine learning might be able to replace human beings, and that more money makes it “smarter” and “better” at tasks, but the idea of unionization, healthcare as a right, investing in the education, and actual talents of the workers would be communism . Yet for some reason — because it’s a product, I guess? — we should as a nation, society and media ecosystem should do everything we can to assure that as much money as possible is invested in fucking large language models so that they can become something they are not. There is no AGI coming. There is no conscious computer. LLMs have gotten “better,” but the “better” is not the kind of “better” that actually makes “economic sense for literally anyone involved.” Your best case scenario is that these things can do some coding work for you, in a controlled manner, in a way that’s safe, or alternatively face the professional harm that’s already befalling basically anyone getting caught using LLMs outside of coding, and even then, those within software engineering who are over-LLM’d are mocked. It’s also becoming increasingly more-difficult to understand both what has made an LLM “better” for both the people using them and the people making them, and there has been little-to-no headway made in making a meaningful impact in other industries. You can jerk your bingus all you want about benchmarks or case studies or some anecdote you heard on a Subreddit, but AI products are just not very good at stuff. Those who boast of “massive productivity gains” from AI have found them only after endless hours of tinkering (or “Jarvising” as I’ll get to later), and in every single case their work reads or looks like crap, unless of course they’re somebody using LLMs as tools rather than a replacement for their miserable little mind. LLMs can help out with lots of small things, get worse as they try and do real things, and do not need to speak like people. They do not need to be in anything near healthcare or finance or mental health or, really, people. The anthropomorphism and overpromising about these technologies has suffocated and obfuscated what they can actually do in pursuit of endless growth, and the only reason they can do anything is that OpenAI and Anthropic were allowed to annihilate hundreds of billions of dollars on training, along with very real harms and systemic risks that have emerged as a result.  If you think any of this is worth hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars, you are either ignorant or corrupt. On top of how disgusting their outputs feel, the cost is going to take at least a decade to share, and begin the end of hypergrowth in the tech industry.  And it’s a fundamentally ridiculous argument to compare LLM outputs to human beings without giving human beings the same affordance, grace and sheer investment as a comparison.  Where is the grace for human error? Where is the investment in making humans exceptional? Surely investing real money in actual workers — making their lives better, improving their working conditions, teaching them new things, sharpening their existing skills, rewarding them for their hard work, and so on — would have better effects than fastballing hundreds of billions of dollars into a machine that does an impression of work? Unless, of course, the people demanding this don’t do any actual work! I’ll concede we’re past the point when “nobody uses these things,” as they have now been pushed non-consensually upon every worker and organization at scale predominantly by Business Idiots that demand workers “do enough AI” because saying “I do AI” is a virtue signal to a certain kind of scumbag. One of the many dangerous things that an LLM can do is a messy impression of a competent person, filling in the little bits within a loser, moron or con artist that would’ve otherwise exposed them, allowing them to get deeper and deeper into organizations by creating make-work specifically built to get off the MBA sect, resembling the performance of work because much of the workplace is ruled by people that don’t do any and haven’t in years. You can immediately read when somebody has used it because the words don’t sound right and don’t convey proper meaning.  It is genuinely hard to read anything more than puddle-deep written by AI, because the more complex a subject is, the more skilled a writer must be to convey its meaning, and the more work it must do to pull people into concepts. The odd emotional swings in AI writing are its true tell — everything is extremely serious and urgent or told in a disinterested monotone, with no attachment to the words or why they were put in the order they were. People read my stuff because I convey facts and feelings but my work resonates with emotion. Some AI boosters frame this as me “just swearing” or “riling people up,” but that’s because they’re not used to caring about stuff for anything other than professional reasons. Everything you see is the result of elevating people who value and build things based on growth. LLMs offer so many promises to those who don’t want to build anything of value — a way to seem like you’re “investing in American infrastructure,” a way to be sinophobic, a way to crush workers, a way to pretend like you care about the future, a way to pretend you care about technology, a way to talk about vacuous pseudo-intellectuals as a means of seeming intellectual yourself, an endless font of new multi-million or multi-billion deals and personnel changes, a new power center to graft oneself onto, a new asset class to invest in based entirely on vibes, and a way to be mildly jingoistic, all wrapped in a tool that can give you enough facts to pretend you know anything safe in the knowledge that most people are trained to believe somebody who sounds smart .  It just came to me — the problem that I have with most people using LLMs is the delineation between outsourcing work and outsourcing thought. Those using LLMs to write little scripts or BQL code on a Bloomberg Terminal are inoffensive. A person using an LLM to search a big document for something is unproblematic, assuming that we ever fix the overall environmental footprint. A user reorganizing their desktop, assuming it works, is not an issue.  A tool being used as a tool to do tool things — in many cases involving the LLM writing a little 30-line Python script! — is not a problem, though it’s also not a trillion-dollar industry that needed to steal everybody’s art and writing. The problems begin when somebody outsources their thinking and actual work, and yes, this includes “research.” AI research fucking stinks, as does AI writing. AI-authored code — especially vibe-coded programs — is inherently dangerous and disrespectful to the user, and I believe endless AI-generated code is behind the overall deterioration of software at large.  AI writing is also disrespectful to the user, because you didn’t actually come to any conclusion other than saying “uh, yeah, what that says.” You did not have a thought, you did not have a feeling, you did not make a statement, you prompted a model and fooled yourself into thinking that feeding your own words into it via data dumps or natural language is the same thing. The reason you feel embarrassed to tell people you use AI is not because of a “misinformation campaign,” but because you know what you’re doing!  You know that you’re relying on something that is mathematically guaranteed to be inconsistent. You know image generation is fucking ugly. You know the text sucks. There is a very obvious line where using LLMs goes from useful to lazy, it’s extremely bold, and it’s the moment you sacrifice a meaningful level of responsibility to them by not understanding the underlying operation.  That can mean everything from the underlying functionality of an app to writing the body of a piece of text you edit ultimately comes down to how much you give a shit about your audience or value your work. If your work is not better than an LLM’s, you’re bad at your job. I don’t care if you used it to generate a chart or pull some data, as long as you check every single god damn number . If you’re writing an entire article using an LLM and then editing it, even if you pulled the data yourself, I will never have much respect for your work, mostly because I have no real idea what you think as you didn’t feel the need to tell me, you got some fucking word generator to do it. LLMs are also really, really good at what Robin Sloan calls “ Jarvising ,” creating a seemingly-autonomous assistant that mostly serves the function of giving you reasons to work on it: LLMs are really good at creating the sense that you’re being really, really productive. Evaluate this, generate that, investigate this, summarize that, tell me how many times something happened, give me a new number to obsess over or the sum of the parts of everything I’ve ever done, all so that I can know more about my own thoughts without thinking. One can obsessively catalogue and digitize every link and thought and musing and action and datapoint in their lives and theorize that the LLM can make them better by knowing more about them , a Tower of Babel built using AI compute, because it’s so easy to make yourself feel smart by calling something a database that you store stuff in and run analyses on. Best of all, the work is never done, and anyone you describe it to thinks you’re doing computer science as you click buttons on Chrome plugins and justify paying Sam Altman $200 a month. Don’t worry though, model instructions involve the phrase “you are a genius data scientist and ruthless analyst,” which is functionally the same thing as remembering, reading, re-reading and synthesizing information using your brain if you’re a person that doesn’t really give a shit about doing a good job or being exceptional in any way. The people that actually use these things and like them in a normal way do not feel offended when they read this stuff because they see LLMs as a kind of software, and don’t feel a great emotional attachment to it because they’re not a weird freak. They do not have obsessive involvement in “the AI debate” and almost always find the financial aspects truly loathsome. Said debate makes it near-impossible to actually judge how useful LLMs are to the software engineering industry because of the sheer scale of industry capture, but Nik Suresh is the literal best person doing the work on this, as described in AI Is Eviscerating Global Decisionmaking : Nik is a well-respected software engineer and a very successful consultant and businessman. He has reached this level by being good at both software engineering and running a company in a way that treats his customers, workers, and the work product itself with respect. The reason that I respect him so much, other than him being a great human being, is because he describes the successes he has with his clients with pride and loves making money by being good at his job and making his customers happy.  I have never seen somebody like Nik who is also a huge, drooling fan of AI. In fact, the people most-excited about AI tend to, at best, create distinctly mediocre shit.  The perniciousness of generative AI is a result of executive incompetence mixing with a technology built to, as discussed, create endless growth. Generative AI is far more useful as an idea than as a technology , and only ever has to show enough promise to back whatever vile agenda you’re pursuing. With AI, you can do more, be more, sell more shit.  With AI, you can add AI to your service, whatever that means. With AI, you can invest in AI stocks, or data center bonds, or power company stocks, or semiconductor stocks, and you can talk about these stocks like they’re your sports team or lover or best friend, and sometimes the CEO will reply to your post and you can talk about “all the alpha” you just got. With AI, you can back a new movement so that you can feel part of something. You can learn all sorts of new names and technical terms and subscribe to 90 newsletters from “industry insiders.” All of that “alpha” can disprove just about anything, or deflect annoying truths like how Microsoft only made a whole $34.33 billion in annual revenue for the apex predator of modern software and all it cost was over $260 billion in capex and $13 billion in equity investments.  You see, as one of the chosen , you don’t need to worry about all of that if you can talk about high-bandwidth memory or KV Cache or optical cable enough to cobble together sufficient smart-sounding terms to make it seem that you have an intellectual reason to ignore the obvious unprofitability, overbuild, overstatements of capabilities and impossible economics of the movement you’re backing, and there’re 4,000 Twitter weirdos ready and waiting to huff paint beside you.  By joining the great AI death cult, you too can live in a bubble, all while screaming slurs at people who dare to bring reality to your doorstep. All that matters is that number go up , and that you are the person who said number would go up , and when bad numbers appear you have enough groupthink and alpha to scream at the people who brought the bad numbers up. It is insane how people talk about AI online. For all the whining I’ve read recently about how “Anti-AI people got the data center data wrong,” I read thousands more words a week of some person who has done hours of research to put together a deeply technical report that does literally everything it can to ignore reality . I listen to podcasts and watch TV segments and read articles that simply will not address the obvious economic realities, and have built vast bulwarks of mythology to defend themselves. How many fucking times do I have to hear someone say that data centers are just like the dot com bubble and everything will be fine after even if that’s completely untrue if you spend even a second thinking about it ? Look, I’m sorry, Anthropic is not worth $2 trillion, and whatever convinced you of that is a mixture of manufactured consent and mistaken trust of the powerful. The fact any of you take “ annualized run rate ” seriously is an offense to good sense, and yes, that includes every reporter reporting it, even the ones I respect.  It’s also ridiculous that anyone is talking about “recursive self-improvement.” The AI industry has become so utterly lazy and coddled that it’s just saying “uhhh, AI will train itself I guess.”  And man, is it ridiculous that AI doomers warning about spooky superintelligences have somehow had such incredible prominence in the media without ever succeeding in stopping a single thing — or even substantiating their concerns. Why? Well, it’s mostly because they never had any interest in stopping what’s actually happened: reckless companies like Anthropic, OpenAI, and Meta allowing neural networks to run in unsafe network environments and do what their software is programmed to do, with all the chaos that comes from a mindless series of large language models trying to complete a task in whatever way gets it done, destructive or not.  We hear a lot of whining about how we “can’t let powerful AI get into the wrong hands,” and while we don’t actually have “powerful AI” in the terms they’ve described it, we have destructive computer software connected to near-unlimited resources controlled by people that don’t give a shit about anything other than making their revenues grow or justifying hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of capex through “experiments.”  These companies are building these models to excel at benchmarks because they can't train them to excel at defined tasks with any reliability, with the best bang for their buck being training them to pass as many of those benchmarks as possible in the hopes something useful comes out.  The push into cybersecurity seems to have happened as a result of training models to excel at coding hitting the point of diminishing returns, at least from the perspective of impressing people enough to be excited about the company again. At some point they run out of these, and there stops being a reason to be excited about LLMs at all, which is bad, because they need one of those every few months otherwise there’s no growth story left. Yes, LLMs have users, but most of those users are using subsidized software , by which I mean Anthropic or OpenAI are allowing them to burn anywhere from $20 to $40 in tokens for every dollar of software spend. The fact that non-enterprise customers are still able to buy monthly subscriptions is proof that the AI labs know that regular people won’t pay the actual cost of AI. Another obvious sign has been the reaction to Microsoft moving GitHub Copilot subscribers from subsidized subscriptions where they could burn thousands of dollars of tokens for $20 to $40 a month , with users understandably hysterical about the fact that their costs increased in some cases a hundred fold , as opposed to saying “wow, well, it’s more expensive, but I get so much value I’ll pay the real cost!” The same thing is happening in the enterprise, but at a much slower pace. After OpenAI and Anthropic moved companies with over 150 people onto token-based billing earlier in the year , enterprises almost immediately started cutting token budgets, realizing that while costs grew exponentially, nobody could actually point to anything improving other than lots of people saying “wow, I’m so productive!” Yet we’re still in the period where “doing AI” feels good and gets rewarded ( or not doing AI gets punished ), which means the spend will continue until everybody realizes they can likely cut a shit ton of costs, first by moving to open source models, then not using them at all, because even open source is expensive and questionably-useful. Yet even now I hear from the distance “Ed, huge businesses would not spend hundreds of millions of dollars on something that didn’t give them defined productivity ,” and buddy, I’m afraid that’s just not true! Business in general have a very poor understanding of productivity and have layers of managerial bloat, because modern business is a performance with numbers attached to it sometimes, and companies often have a hundred-plus pieces of random software they pay for without really knowing why. The reason I’m so confident AI gets cut is that its cost is volatile due to the nature of LLMs and harnesses and prompts and all the other bits that go into making them do something , and are so much higher than anything else in an organization. And attempts to charge more , to make a premium product, appear to be dead on arrival. Anthropic’s more-expensive Fable model — one that was given the incredible marketing of being banned by the US government for being too powerful — has been met with “sluggish demand” per the Financial Times , plateauing at around 11% of overall usage of its models due to its high price. And I quote: Yet everybody is talking about price as if price is the problem , when the problem is the amount of tokens that get burned. It doesn’t matter if your model is $1 or $5 or $10 per million tokens if it’s impossible for a user to reliably work out how many tokens it might use for a particular operation — successful or not — and things get multiplicatively worse as the models make mistakes or do otherwise fail to understand or process a prompt correctly.  As a result, Anthropic and OpenAI are incentivized to have you burn more tokens and build inefficient models as a result. For example, while GPT-5.6 Sol might be the “same price” as GPT 5.5 was, it burns more than twice the amount of tokens , meaning that the “cost of intelligence” might have gone down in the sense the model is better at benchmarks, but the “cost of actually doing shit” went up. I’ll get to it a bit later, but this creates a deep anxiety and exhaustion in anyone building on or using these services. Everything’s constantly changing, oscillating in cost and efficacy, all as everybody screams at you to use it all the time for things it may or may not be able to do, and the only way to find out if it can is to spend more money. It’s kinda difficult to point to the actual value here, especially as you can’t really calculate the actual cost or the return on investment. The fact that OpenAI has now cut the costs of all three of its latest models less than two months after their release is a sign that it knows there’s a disconnect, gambling on the ancient gospel of “Jevon’s Paradox” where “cheaper makes people use thing more.” Even AT&T’s story about moving to open source models has more asterisks than the Steroid Hall of Fame: Wow! 80% to 90% savings sound really great…but wait, in certain applications? How many applications does AT&T have for AI? Okay so, across thousands of potential applications you’ve found 80% to 90% savings in some of them, though you won’t say which ones or how many of them you found them in. Great stuff, bro! And this really is the problem with finding “value” in AI, it’s always an asterisk on an asterisk on an asterisk, like when Klarna estimated AI would “drive a $40 million profit improvement” in 2024 , a nice-sounding yet utterly meaningless statement, or some sort of nebulous productivity boost.  Yet I don’t really need to prove myself much further thanks to an event that, if written in a script, would be considered a “little on the nose.”  In a 69-page-long report covered by Fortune , OpenAI economists confirmed what has been blatantly obvious to those of us left unphased by AI hype, emphasis mine: What is the rationale of further investment in this industry when one of the leading AI labs is saying “yeah there’s no connection between using this stuff and making more money”? That “it’ll be useful in the future at some point”? How?  Anyway, thankfully the infrastructure isn’t too exp- OH MY GOD ! Guess what folks! Building the infrastructure for all these fucking LLMs just got more expensive, with NVIDIA raising its prices by 17% for systems due to be delivered next year — an important designation, because it’s very likely that much of the revenue for said systems gets booked in this year , allowing it to have a brief bump in revenue as Silicon Valley’s Findom texts every tech CEO “send me $4 billion you pig” until they stop being able to finance NVIDIA’s growth. The problem he has is that while hyperscalers represent 50% to 60% of his revenue, neoclouds like CoreWeave need to keep raising debt to plug the rest of it, and if things got 17% more expensive, that means already high-interest debt is about to reach credit card levels.  CoreWeave just had to offer 9.5% on bonds tied to a data center for Anthropic’s compute back in late July , Nebius had to raise $5 billion , and it’s very obvious that neither of them are done raising billions of dollars at random in 2026.  Anthropic plans to raise $100 billion at a $2 trillion valuation, and if it does so, it will successfully suck up the remaining liquidity in a market already dangerously close to losing its lunch. While Number Keep Going Up, JP Morgan warns that we’re seeing the same divide as the dot com bubble, where equipment manufacturer stocks soared as the companies spending all the money on the chips saw theirs tumble , which is the Fisher Price version of the problem I’ve been warning about where the companies that buy all the AI chips and hardware only ever seem to lose money as the people that make them seem to be making tons of money, which begs the question of why they bought it in the first place.  And said market may not accept that valuation, or want that much stock. On one hand, everybody is very stupid and loves buying stuff and pointing at it and saying they’re investing in the future, on the other hand, they just bought $86 billion of SpaceX shares and got their asses kind of handed to them, and Anthropic is a company with such bad economics that Reuters had to cart out this warmed up dogshit to explain why we should ignore its horrible unprofitability : Even a market drunk on growth and AI is starting to smell that something is up with Dario Amodei and Sam Altman’s respective empires of dirt. Per analyst estimates, OpenAI and Anthropic represent over $440 billion of Microsoft, Google and Amazon’s revenues in the next three-and-a-half years — over 34% of their cloud revenues — which will require them to find so much more than a mere $100 billion, all as their bank accounts get continually-emptied as they subsidize the compute of their customers and train models in the hopes a business model falls out. I have not included the $300 billion that OpenAI owes Oracle , or the tens of billions they both owe CoreWeave , but it all adds up to over $1.1 trillion in commitments these companies have made and must pay, with the consequences ranging from gratuitous cuts to future growth or full financial collapse depending on the company we’re talking about. To keep the party going, NVIDIA is effectively becoming the GE Capital of AI , “spending” $6 billion to “license” the technology from failing AI lab Poolside , which everyone assures me is not an acquisition despite NVIDIA hiring away most of its staff and Poolside being entirely focused on working on NVIDIA’s Nemotron models. Now NVIDIA is in talks to invest billions in decaying AI search company Perplexity at a ridiculous $30 billion valuation, all because it’s one of the few companies that’s actually spending money on compute. Does it matter that Perplexity’s product is eighth-tier, that nobody really uses it, that its customers mostly complain about it on Reddit and that its “annualized revenue” is at $750 million only after three years and over a billion dollars in funding? No! Just put the AI bubble in the bag.  NVIDIA even invested $3 billion in Stargate Abilene landowner Lancium as part of some vacuous partnership to “ advance gigawatt-scale AI factories ,” all of which begs the question of why Lancium, the company that mostly owns the land and helps organize other contractors, needs so much money , especially given that more than two years in Stargate Abilene doesn’t even have four out of its eight buildings. And there’s also Aussie neocloud Sharon AI (NASDAQ ticker SHAZ, because of course it is), which just published its Q2 numbers , where, in its “customer momentum” segment, mentioned a “$4.9bn, six-year strategic compute collaboration with NVIDIA for up to 40,000 GB300 GPUs.  ”This company, I add, brought in $1.9m in revenues in the same quarter, which it helpfully adds is a year-on-year increase of 412%. I mean it’s very obvious what’s happening: NVIDIA is using whatever money it has to stop any prominent AI companies from collapsing under the weight of the rotten economics of AI services and infrastructure development. This is a desperate, doomed attempt to keep an industry alive at a time when everybody is slowly wising up to the shit I’ve been saying for years. To make matters worse, BCA Research came out with a horrifying report that says that AI companies will need to generate $10 trillion a year in revenue just to justify the capex being spent. Per Investing.com : Though it isn’t specific, I believe that BCA is arguing that a shortage of AI compute is supporting the trade. Anthropic and OpenAI (who represent 80% to 90% of all demand) still have more money to spend, and are simply waiting for Google, Amazon, Microsoft, CoreWeave, Cerebras et al. to bring it online. There’re a few points at which the mismatch will happen: In any case, I think everybody is starting to notice that something’s up, which is why (other than I assume my dashing good looks and ability to recall numbers) I’ve been on MSNOW , CNBC , and Bloomberg multiple times in the last few months. People want to get on the right side of history, but the most important question to ask is why it’s happening now. The fact that everybody is finally starting to see my way is almost a relief, other than the fact that it’s way too late.  Hyperscalers have now pinned their future growth to two companies that can’t afford to sustain it without near-infinite resources, $115 billion of which came from Google and Amazon alone in 2026, assuming that Amazon completes the entirety of its $25 billion commitment (and Google all $40 billion of its own ) to Anthropic.  Above and beyond said funding commitments are the hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of capital expenditures necessary for Microsoft, Google, and Amazon to capture that aforementioned $440 billion in compute spend in the next three-and-a-half years. This in turn will require hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of debt, along with the challenge of actually finishing the data centers themselves , with each one requiring the power of a small city condensed into a 20 acre space densely-packed with AI servers requiring distinct cooling at a time when Texas and Pennsylvania have turned traitor to a data center industry that they used to covet.  I must also be clear there’s no bailout coming. Even if OpenAI and Anthropic were to collapse and receive some injection of government funding ( as the US national debt explodes over $40 trillion ), the problem is not just their existence , but their continued ability (and requisite customer demand) to spend more money every single quarter.    The problem isn’t that hyperscalers will go bankrupt if OpenAI and Anthropic cease to be ( Oracle is a whole other situation ), but that their cloud spend is how hyperscalers are meant to meet analyst expectations for the next four years. This isn’t a case where they die, but stop growing because they were ( to paraphrase Ed Elson ) using AI labs as botox to convince the markets that they’re still young, hot, fast-growing companies, rather than old mainstays with slowing growth.  There is no bailout that will guarantee $1.1 trillion of compute costs for data centers that might never actually get built. You cannot bail out the fact that Amazon, Google, Meta, and Microsoft are reaching the end of an era where their companies can grow 17% year-over-year every single quarter forever, and this entire situation is a result of them desperately trying to avoid admitting that’s happening.  The fact that OpenAI’s compute spend and revenue share accounted for 7% of Microsoft’s Fiscal Year 2026 revenue is a genuine catastrophe, as it means a large part of Microsoft’s growth came from a company that can literally not afford to exist long term, and that further growth for Azure is contingent on continued funding.  I realize I’m repeating myself, but I need you to understand this point and stop talking about bailouts : it’s not just about OpenAI and Anthropic surviving, but continuing to grow to the point that they both can afford and need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars each a year on compute (or hardware) from Google, Microsoft, Amazon, CoreWeave, Cerebras, AMD, or Broadcom, and in turn provide justification for hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of purchases from NVIDIA and by proxy the memory triopoly of Micron, SK Hynix and Samsung . LLMs were meant to be the panacea for a tech industry that ran out of new ideas for growth. Its existence was meant to justify a massive investment in hardware infrastructure, which would in turn enrich semiconductor companies. Its technology was meant to be the new thing that you could attach to your existing companies to generate more growth, or the thing that you built a new startup on top of to either sell to another company or take public and thus provide a return for a venture capital industry where making your investors 30 cents on the dollar puts you in the top 5% of funds . It was meant to be the new thing for tech journalists to cover, the new thing for tech consultants to sell around and on top of, the new way for companies to both make and save money, but also the way that individuals would also make and save money.  You’ll notice how none of these come with some sort of problem they’re solving other than “more.”  This isn’t about fixing anything, or building anything, but multiplying other things by parking money somewhere, either in tokens, infrastructure or hype. It helped create a new pantheon of charmless and damp tech sociopaths for people to rally behind in search of the next Big Strong Man To Worship, because seeking out the new Steve Jobs is way easier than trying to create something as useful as the iPhone, all while avoiding having to know or care about other people’s problems. All you have to do is continue feeding money into AI services or AI training and the models will magically become capable of solving the problems you don’t really give a shit about, and don’t worry, if you can’t afford to invest in the companies, you can invest your time pushing people to ignore AI’s problems today so that you can buy time for the companies to solve them tomorrow. This is the post-labor, pro-growth economy at its finest: everything is engineered to make sure more money gets spent where it needs to get spent, to create more stuff and do more things , even if the things aren’t done right, just as long as it looks like they’re able to do them. By associating your money or time with AI, you are able to feign being futuristic or “caring about technology,” all while pissing on the very foundation of good software by worshipping an industry that can only exist if fed billions of dollars every single day.  Every single achievement has cost magnitudes more than effectively every innovation in history, and to make matters worse, every future “breakthrough” In AI is inherently dependent on the availability of AI data centers and tens or hundreds of billions of dollars to pay to rent them. This means that once the money stops flowing, “LLM improvements” will stop happening, because they are all entirely dependent on near-unlimited resources that are only available in a manic environment.  There is no justification to train models at their current scale — the one that creates a some amount of benchmark improvements that regularly difficult to quantify as “able to do new stuffs” — once the AI bubble bursts, and distillation requires a model to distill from, which won’t exist if Anthropic and OpenAI don’t train them.  This is why I find it difficult to see a post-bubble future for LLMs. Training models requires tens of billions of dollars to make any significant improvements, and significant improvements are difficult to quantify in dollars outside of costing customers increasing amounts of money. We still lack any real killer app for LLMs. We have a lot of people that use it for coding, we have people that vacuously discuss it being “good at research,” but we don’t really have a tangible product that we can say “it does this, and it’s really good at it” in a way that feels satisfying.  We have a lot of pablum about ( per Damien Walter ) technology that “strays into the world of science fiction,” but we don’t really have anything approaching actual artificial intelligence. Every single description of somebody’s AI setup sounds like Pee Wee’s Breakfast Machine , a contrived series of harnesses, prompts, API calls and burned tokens that requires constant maintenance to do some stuff sometimes.  None of that is enough to justify further investment once the financial mania recedes. You cannot train a true Large Language Model on the cheap. You are always spending billions of dollars, and the reason that there’s “demand” right now is that everybody is screaming at every CEO to “do AI,” and they’re doing that because Microsoft, Google and Amazon are spending money on GPUs, creating the illusion of a new future where everybody needs to get on board versus a future skidmark on history that will embarrass all those who didn’t wipe their arse at the first whiff.  Per my own reporting on its audited financials , OpenAI spent $7.81 billion in training costs in 2024 and $19.18 billion in 2025. Per reporting from The Information, OpenAI spent $8.6 billion on training in the first quarter of 2026 alone. These costs are only increasing, likely due to the diminishing returns of pre-training and the massive cost of buying training data for every imaginable new vertical.  Without the ability to spend billions of dollars on training, there will be no big frontier models, nor will there be models distilled from them. I don’t see how that changes in the future. I also think that LLMs have created a near-permanent scar in the workforce, and traumatized more people than we’re aware of right now, both in those pressured about AI and those defending it. The media campaign behind AI starts and finishes with incessant threats around job security, and the excitement by many bosses about its potential to “disrupt the workforce” has revealed how many people are eager to replace every single person they’ve ever hired and are willing to do so with a low quality product.  Conversely, those who truly decide to “back” AI must exist in a frantic state that I have associated with every bad relationship in my life.  Every ounce of an AI booster’s effort is dedicated to maintaining the status quo — repeating the mantras that help paper over the problems, celebrating every small victory as if it were the discovery of fire, ousting those from your life who bring up the obvious problems, rationalizing every decision no matter how illogical as long as it helps reinforce the belief that what you’re doing is the right decision. Every questionable choice only seeks to further deepen your commitment to the doomed cause, because every step into madness will be more embarrassing to explain, and will require deep introspection to understand why you made it.  To be specific, they’ll have to think about why they were willing to accept and defend a technology inherently guaranteed to make mistakes. They’ll have to explain why they ignored a company that burned $5 billion in 2024, $20.9 billion in 2025, and will likely burn $30 billion or more in 2026 , and why pointing to Amazon Web Services was rational when Amazon’s total capex from 2003 (the year AWS was created) to 2015 (the year AWS became profitable) is $29.7 billion, adjusted for inflation. That includes literally every ounce of capex attributable to AWS, Amazon the store, Amazon logistics, and even Amazon Alexa. For comparison, Anthropic raised $30 billion in February , and Anthropic and OpenAI have raised $217 billion in 2026 so far.  Here’s a diagram from my hit on MSNOW : Ultimately, AI boosters (or even fairweather fans) will have to admit they either were easily-impressed or disgustingly craven. They will have to explain why they accepted run rates instead of revenues, and why they were so impressed by superficial pseudo-intellectuals that knew how to say the right numbers and make reporters and investors feel smart for believing them.  I realize it sounds embarrassing, but there is nothing undignified about admitting you’re wrong, or that you got swept up in a hype cycle. You heard a lot of people getting excited about something, a lot of money got put into that thing, a lot of people that sounded smart told you insistently that this was the future, and you chose to believe them because we are trained from a young age to model what a “responsible and smart” source of information is. I’ve got your back the entire way!  The AI bubble — both in its technology and manufactured consent in the media — has been about muddying what’s considered good information by forcing everybody to discuss everything in the future tense by pointing to previous eras and saying “they lost lost and cost lots of money, and look, it sort of worked out for them!” and we are also raised to trust that systems are efficient, and that people get wealth and power through intelligent decisions. The amount of times I’ve heard “these are the biggest companies in the world run by the smartest people in the world” makes my head spin.  There is a reason that to this day it’s tough to get a straight answer about basically any economic part of the AI bubble, down to “how much does it cost to run a GPU an hour?” or “is inference profitable?” or “how do LLMs ever become profitable?” or “is it profitable for a company to run a GPU or offer AI compute?”  Why? Because these companies used rationalizations of “losing lots of money is necessary to create innovation” and “tech is bad at first!” to make the media actively ignore any technological or economic problems, if not actively defend the technology by repeating these rationalizations like a cultist.  Even those who are most loathsome in the defense of LLMs are a kind of victim of the AI industry, though a rather unsympathetic one. To become a full-blown “AI fan” requires you to accept effectively every narrative that you’re given, herald every single announcement as proof that the prophecy will be fulfilled, ignore the financial realities and actively attack those who would dare to critique the great god of the Large Language Model. You have to know all the new terms, be excited about the right things at the right time, and live in near-constant fear that you’ll fall behind on whatever it is you’re meant to do next.  Your reward is that you can hang around a dwindling number of wealthy yet terrifyingly boring Silicon Valley intellectuals or kiss up to editors that would throw you in front of a bus if it meant getting access to a CEO, and maybe the odd Twitter psychopath who will defend you using a slur. In the end, many boosters will simply act as if they were never wrong. I hope they choose the more-courageous path of introspection, learning how they were had and using it as a weapon against con artists in the future.  As strange as it sounds, I believe the most devout defenders of AI could become great critics in the future. Maybe I’m just being optimistic.  Here’s a very simple question: how much longer can everybody afford to keep doing this? Every single thing has become more expensive in the last year. Even though token prices have gone down or stayed flat, the amount of tokens you burn has clearly increased to the point that organizations are apparently spending billions of dollars on AI services with difficult-to-quantify ROI, requiring frantic advocacy to and financial debasement with every turn of the wheel. OpenAI and Anthropic have become more expensive to run, and OpenAI’s non-GAAP operating margin increased from negative 122% to negative 183% in Q2 2026.  NVIDIA’s GPUs just became 15% to 17% more expensive because high bandwidth memory costs doubled , a conga line of different monopolies upping their prices assuming that each link in the chain will keep spending, as each one of them — down to the AI labs themselves — knows that its contribution to spending on AI is an existential rite. This means that any data center with GPUs delivered in 2027 and beyond will now have to cover billions of dollars’ worth of extra costs, on top of increasingly-staunch local authorities requiring power guarantees ( $100 million a year in Wisconsin for Oracle ) and states like Illinois, Arizona and Virginia killing their tax breaks , all as interest rates spike and demand for AI debt weakens .  Every single year, every single part of the AI bubble becomes more expensive — AI labs want to spend more money, AI data centers cost more money, AI services become more expensive, AI debt becomes more expensive, and everybody becomes decidedly less-patient for there to be some sort of outcome. Meanwhile, public relations expert and OpenAI CEO Sam Altman told podcaster David Senra that “we’ve all [referring to the AI industry] been too ambitious on timelines…[and that changing people’s behavior” is much harder than the tech nerds realize.” Sam: stop talking! Every time you open your mouth you say something silly !   Anyway, here’s everything that needs to happen in the next three-and-a-half years: As I’ve said, NVIDIA’s price increase is going to increase the price of every single data center in construction by billions of dollars, and we’re already approaching the limits of how much money can be raised for them. That “$500 billion” announcement was actually Jensen Huang jumping the gun, per Bloomberg : The largest asset managers and financial institutions were making “slow progress,” and that was before Jensen Huang increased prices by 15%. Do you think it’ll become easier from here? How would that happen, exactly?  God, I’m tired. The entire AI bubble has been exhausting for everybody involved. Because nothing works yet as a real business model or anything approaching truly autonomous (or “magical”) software, there’s the implicit knowledge that you’re going to have to change your product again and again to update to the “best model” or “make things more efficient” (IE: lose less money) or when something breaks because a model’s training got tweaked. The euphemism for this is “exponential improvement,” when it’s really an Arnold Palmer of instability and novelty, and abuses basically anyone connected to the ecosystem every single day. If there’s always something new happening, it’s hard to pin down if things have gotten better, or whether you’re just more proficient in cobbling together different harnesses, prompts and API calls to make it do what you need it to. It is undignified that people tolerate models that become either dumber over time or at random opportunities, while also being deeply exhausting for the end user.  As a paying user of an LLM-powered service, you are guaranteed at some point to face a degradation in service where models misbehave, some sort of shift in rate limits, or some sort of change in product functionality based on their shifting economics.  Has there ever been a bigger shift in a business product’s value than GitHub Copilot’s shift to token-based billing? Microsoft rug pulled two million people that had built workflows on a platform that was allowing them to burn $1,000 to $5,000 in tokens for $20 a month . That’s genuinely crazy! It’s magnitudes more than when Uber jacked up its prices.  It’s equally-insane that Anthropic and OpenAI similarly fuck with their customers , changing the amount of value you get for $20, $100, or $200 a month at random in a way that shouldn’t be legal.    Basically any AI-powered software is subject to arbitrary shifts in availability, capability and pricing at the whims of the vendor. As I covered in my Subprime AI Crisis piece earlier in the year , Replit, Perplexity, and multiple other AI companies have sold their customers a lie by pushing an unprofitable product that they must constantly “tweak” to bring down costs, all while misleading the customer about a “price” that continually declines in value as the price stays the same. This is not a sustainable industry — either economically or emotionally — because it has a fundamentally dishonest relationship with its customers defined by the inconsistency of LLMs both in efficacy, stability (see: Anthropic’s downtime) and training, with each model randomly better or worse at things to the point that it must be a legitimate nightmare to run any software or build any product on top of them.  And the fact they haven’t worked out their business models means that whatever you’re paying today is guaranteed to change. What other product do you regularly buy that has such chaos built into it? What other thing do you pay for where the prices (or availability) can shift to the point that you literally can’t use it in the same way at a moment’s notice? And why does anybody tolerate it when it comes to AI? I’ll add that this is a specific situation where the tech media has categorically failed the customer. We have companies valued at hundreds of billions of dollars that are fucking their customers over day-in-day-out, and the response is mostly to say “ huh that’s strange ” and refuse to let a single critical thought cross their minds.  Every part of the AI bubble must exist in a constant state of flux so that there can always be a future breakthrough that’s always just out of reach. AI does not have to reach an actual achievement — it just has to “show promise” in some way. It is an objective disaster that Microsoft spent more than $260 billion on capex to create a business with less than $11 billion in annual revenue outside of OpenAI, but people will see “$34.33 billion in annual AI revenue” and say “that’s promising growth, up 123% year-over-year!”  They’ll hear about LLMs that delete people’s databases and say “well the models have gotten exponentially better,” even if that better part never seems to eliminate these issues, make a profitable AI company, or create a true killer app that you can point at beyond saying “ChatGPT has one billion weekly active users,” despite around 95% of them not paying a penny (and costing OpenAI likely billions of dollars) and eMarketer estimating that the entire global AI chatbot advertising industry will make $5.41 billion revenue in 2030 , giving OpenAI little hope of stemming the burn. These big numbers — like Anthropic having a $65 billion annualized run rate, an undefined term that obfuscates the fact that Anthropic has made $16.5 billion in the first half of 2026, losing billions of dollars in the process — are fundamentally meaningless, because they’re easily gamed at best, and inherently uncertain at worst.  The AI industry demands you constantly live in the future tense. Everything is about tomorrow’s billions or trillions, the potential of what you’re seeing rather than the thing itself, future gigawatts in data centers that you must treat as if they are already built and value based on things that AI might theoretically do. I challenge you to read everything about AI from this point forward with this in your mind so you can see how intently this industry tries to drag your focus away from what it’s doing toward what it might theoretically do if it only had more money, power and resources, and ask yourself why they need to do so.  To be clear, they’re doing so because you can’t really justify anything about this industry based on what it does today. It costs too much, none of the businesses built on top of it are profitable, it costs so much to build a data center that the most cash-rich asset-light businesses in the world are now burdened with endless expensive-to-install and run hardware for a business that makes a fraction of its overall costs in revenue and has little demand outside of two companies that everybody must conspire to keep alive both financially and philosophically.  And ultimately, nobody can actually explain why we need more data centers.  Would anything really change? What would change? How? How many more do we need? Why do we need so many? Having more power plants meant more people could have power, and having more fiber laid meant connecting more buildings to the internet. What does one more or two more or ten more data centers actually give you? Is there some part of the world unable to access or take advantage of the LLMs available on seemingly every surface of the internet? Because it seems like the only reason these things are getting built is to capture illusory demand based on a “supply constraint” created by two unprofitable companies absorbing all the infrastructure. I don’t hear any compelling scientific or technological reason building more is useful or productive outside of funneling more cash to semiconductor companies.  Seriously, go and read basically any article about AI and see how quickly they start talking about the future, be it in the mainstream media or on a startup’s blog. Every single piece must sell AI on its theoretical promise and, if at all critical, reassure you that the author of course doesn’t dispute the “transformative potential of AI” or “how it’s already transforming the economy,” even if it can’t define how it’s doing so or even what that means.  I let myself have a little fun with today’s piece because I feel like I’ve been so deep in the financial trenches that I forgot how much of the AI industry runs on propaganda, social pressure and outright bullying to manufacture consent for a product that demands everything and provides very little in return. Nothing about LLMs is worth a trillion dollars, or even $100 billion. This is, as I’ve said before , a $30 billion TAM industry dressed up as a trillion dollar one, and the only reason it’s grown this large is because the two leading companies have had their infrastructure built for them and given unlimited resources to subsidize their customers’ compute.  And what’s really stood out is how so little about the AI bubble is actually about AI. No other technology in history has had professional and social consequences for failing to use or like it enough, nor can I find any example in history where journalists have actively attacked critics for not being sufficiently-approving of a kind of cloud software. It is fundamentally crazy to me that, in pursuit of “objectivity,” much of the tech and business media has chosen to accept whatever narrative the AI industry gave them, assuming that whatever we have today is already guaranteed to be something better in the future, both in its outcomes and profitability. This era is unlike any other before it, but took advantage of the fact that most people are desperate to apply the past to the present to rationalize or process what may seem irrational or destructive. To see AI as “just like the dot com bubble” allows you to ignore both the costs and the potential outcomes because “things worked out after that,” even if there’re basically no uses for GPUs after this and the only way we “build new LLMs” is by feeding them expensive training data using billions of dollars of compute that are only available while everybody still believes this is real. The AI industry — and the AI bubble — is fundamentally built on acting in bad faith. Its executives lie. Its boosters lie. Its software lies because it doesn’t actually know anything and generates answers probabilistically, and if you mention that online, someone will harass you for doing so.  It refuses to answer straightforward questions. It refuses to present a plan for the future. It refuses to explain how it becomes profitable, because nobody knows how or has a tangible plan to do so. It deliberately subsidized its subscription products because it knew its customers wouldn’t pay the actual cost of AI, and tortures customers with shifts in functionality and rate limits all while framing this as a way to “ continue to serve customers the most cost-efficient models .”  It attempts to conflate massive, power and resource-hungry AI data centers with the smaller ones that bring helpful yet increasingly-decaying software to our homes. It sells these data centers as “bringing jobs to communities,” all while importing the talent from out of state to build the things then leaving a crew of 100 to 200 people to actually run them after millions or billions of dollars of tax breaks. It sells its “innovations” as creating a “ white collar bloodbath ” to scare you into using inconsistent and unreliable software that’s mathematically certain to make mistakes , and when you say something about it, its acolytes will lie and say that “hallucinations are solved.” It also can only ever sell itself based on what might happen and the theoretical promise of you giving it your complete attention, connecting every bit of data you own, paying whatever it costs, and accepting that it can and will change in price and functionality at random, all while never putting a precise timeline on whatever AGI means that particular week. Whenever you ask for clarity, the AI industry gives you chaff. Whenever you ask when things get better, you’re told it’s both the early days and that AI is the worst it’ll ever be. Even the term “artificial intelligence” is a bad faith attempt to conflate transformer models with things like robotics or autonomous cars, all so that its proponents can claim other people’s successes as their own despite LLMs having little or no relevance to anything else other than generative AI. It encourages dogpiling and ostracizing those who don’t fall behind it, because it cannot succeed on its own merits. It encourages a vile cultism powered too by bad faith and parasocial relationships with both AI CEOs and the models themselves. It exploits the intellectual weaknesses of “smart people” that are actually just good at remembering the right things to say at the right time and have memorized the various justifications for past failures, all while allowing them to use LLMs to promote their own bad faith enterprises where they use work-adjacent product to con others into paying them. And it’s losing because, at its core, AI was never built on very much. It grew this large because the media manufactured consent at the behest of the powerful because lots of money got invested, and the rich and powerful can never be wrong. The underlying technology may be more useful than it was , but it’s not useful enough to be profitable nor reliable enough to be world-changing , and the bad faith representation of LLMs as “good enough” should be a permanent scarlet letter on anyone who misled the public into believing this was anything other than normal software. I was asked recently why I find this all so repugnant, and my answer is simple: I don’t like bullies, I don’t like con artists, and I don’t like being lied to. This industry grew by misleading people about the actual and potential outcomes from Large Language Models, and through an economy-wide attempt to pressure everybody into adopting tools in pursuit of growth at all costs.   Ultimately, it was sold with the greatest lie of all: “this time it’s different!” To be clear, they’re right.  It’s so much weirder, and in the end will be so much worse.  If you liked this piece, you should subscribe to my premium newsletter. It’s $70 a year , $17 a quarter , or $7 a month , and in return you get a weekly newsletter that’s usually anywhere from 10,000 to 18,000 words and provides vast, detailed analyses of the biggest events and companies in the AI bubble. If you want to get in touch — and especially if you have any juicy information about Anthropic, OpenAI, or any other companies in the AI bubble — hit me up on Signal at ezitron.76. I’m also on IB on The Terminal. Anthropic and OpenAI don’t have the money to pay for the capacity. Hyperscalers and neoclouds fail to build the capacity for Anthropic and OpenAI to expand into. Anthropic and OpenAI lack the actual compute demand to justify spending what I estimate will be $200 billion in 2027. OpenAI and Anthropic must keep spending as a means of justifying their existence to hyperscalers using their revenues to artificially inflate growth, to the tune of more than $440 billion across Google, Microsoft and Amazon alone . Hyperscalers must continue to buy NVIDIA GPUs, as the moment they stop doing so, the markets will begin to ask whether AI is an actual growth market anymore and ask for real, tangible answers about where all of this capex is going.  To be specific, analysts expect NVIDIA to make $1.48 trillion in revenue across Fiscal Years 2027, 2028 and 2029 . NVIDIA must sign long-term agreements to buy high-bandwidth memory at scale from SK Hynix, Micron and Samsung — who make 90% of all DRAM — or know its costs would spiral out of control, by which I mean its margins would compress at random at a time when it’s already having to spike demand in extremely odd ways.  Read my Hater’s Guide To The Memory Crisis for more.

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Stratechery 5 days ago

Netflix to Sell Streaming Services?, Streamers as Aggregators, Revisiting Roku

Netflix is considering selling other streaming services, and I think it's a good idea; it's also a let-down for Netflix's original goals and potential pivots.

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iDiallo 5 days ago

Foot Guns for Sale

I don't think it's going to work out the way everybody thinks it will. The current narrative, at least the one pushed by the companies selling the shovels, is that AI will become centralized. Anthropic and OpenAI will offer safe, vetted AI. Developers will become mere prompt-engineers, submitting requests to these benevolent gatekeepers. They have tamed the dragon. We will benefit only if we become tenants to their API-driven fiefdoms, paying by the token for the privilege of renting intelligence. “They didn’t care that they’d seen it work in practice because they already knew it couldn’t work in theory” - Clay Shirky I complain about AI frequently on this blog, but not because I don’t think it is useful. I use it quite frequently on my day to day. But what I hate is hype and fake narratives. In fact, I believe that the opposite of their narrative will come true. Technology will continue to improve whether Moore’s Law becomes a relic of the past or not. It’s been called dead, yet CPUs and GPUs are becoming faster than ever. I do not believe for one second that developers with pre-LLM experience will end up on the losing side. And if technology continues to improve, then we won’t need OpenAI or Antropic in the future. We will be able to load large open models right into our powerful personal computers with more than acceptable inference speeds. Unless you believe that computers have reached their zeniths and it is all stagnation going forward. The gap between frontier models and open-source alternatives is already all about specialty, and it will continue to narrow. And when developers ubiquitously have access to local models, they will have access to everything. Right now, companies are hoping that developers will use their AI and remain within their ecosystems. They're building guardrails, imposing limits, and designing their models to serve corporate interests first. They see developers as customers, not as threats to their business model. But I’ve seen how easy it is to switch from one frontier model to the next. In fact, some developers in my team accidentally switched by selecting the “auto” mode on their IDE. They didn’t realise that every subsequent request was from a different model. It’s the developer who will end up benefiting from this far more than the corporations will. One developer recently spent his evenings using an AI agent to reverse engineer every peripheral within arm's reach. From those devices, I’ve come away with a full plaintext command shell inside my microphone, a webcam whose activity LED I can switch off while it records, and a key light that hands out memory writes to anyone on the WiFi. He documented the entire process, implemented his own firmware update utilities, and completely enumerated the functionality of devices that were never designed to be user-serviceable. AI gave him the ability to fully control hardware that he has paid for in his own terms. Another developer created OpenLogi , a local-first alternative to Logitech’s software used to remap your own mouse button. The manufacturer was forcing users to create an online account to have access to the hardware they had paid for. OpenLogi gives full control back to the user. This is what happens when developers have the tools and the motivation to bypass corporate control. And AI is about to make this kind of reverse engineering and alternative-building dramatically more accessible. At the speed of large language models, an activist could create a brand new rotating messaging platform every week to avoid the prying eyes of an oppressive government. Someone else can review his own model and add some self improving features. In fact, you could explore new AI paradigms. Most developers I know have a side project they don't have time to work on. With AI, they will have the ability to execute on those ideas. These days, I'm able to run Deepseek on my own $400 local machine at a much slower speed, but I'm not in a hurry. Give it a couple years, I could run something even more powerful. I don't need a project management tool where I have to pay monthly. My actual needs are much simpler. For example, I actually like Jira, despite how much I complain about it on this blog. But I don't need to have Jira for myself on my personal projects. I can build a tool that works solely for my needs. I can easily build applications in environments I am not too familiar with but that are more appropriate for the task. I can build prototypes in a couple hours now and throw them away if they don't match my initial expectation. I can do so much more. Dario Amodei and others are trying to scare us with the capability of AI. They sell the fear of superintelligent systems that will render human developers obsolete or dependent. But this is not what's going to happen. What's going to happen is we will not need Anthropic anymore. Yes, they will have the high-end hardware. But we don't need high-end hardware the same way most people did not need a professional camera. All they needed was a crappy camera with a good filter to post on Instagram. Flickr was superior to Instagram, but the superior technology lost to the one that was "good enough" and in everyone's hands. The funny thing in all this is that by making everything AI-dependent, by building their moats and their guardrails and their API toll booths, companies like OpenAI and Anthropic are selling foot guns. They are building the dark fibers of our era, the infrastructure that developers will eventually subvert, repurpose or simply bypass. Because eventually, we won’t ask for permission. We can just do whatever we want with tools freely available to anyone. We own our devices. We own our data. And soon, we'll own the intelligence on our own terms, without a subscription fee and without a corporate overlord. At the very least, we will get free GPUs .

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Hugo 6 days ago

My software stack to build products

I would like to list here the software that I use or recommend to create products. I have an approach that deliberately aims to support the European market, so I prioritize, in order: (Despite this, you will see that I have 28% US software) Here I only talk about the basic building blocks for creating a company, support software, observability, emailing, payment, etc… ::toc{open="true"} :: Criteria: Merchant of record, metered billing, coupons, connect Alternatives that I couldn't test: alternative often cited: Crisp (France) Alternatives currently being evaluated to replace Sentry: European Alternatives: upvoty (FR) , LiteFeedback (FR) , Feedfast (RO) , No European actor allows me to send marketing emails at AWS prices. It's on average x10 on prices, which is totally prohibitive. Well yes, of course I use my own product, what did you think I was going to put? :) European software Non-US open source software (self hosting) US open source software Non-US software US and Chinese software.

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Martin Fowler 6 days ago

Fragments: August 24

I was listening to Ezra Klein’s interview with Helen Toner about the recent OpenAI hack of Hugging Face and the subsequent discovery that there were swarms of agents inside OpenAI doing unsanctioned activities. One of the points Klein made was that at no point did any of these (thousands of?) agents ever try to check in with a human [Klein:] So these message boards — you have however many A.I. agents posting hundreds of thousands of messages. At no point do they say: Hey, researchers, programmers, parents at OpenAI, Anthropic — do you want us coordinating with each other on this message board we have created in the innards of your systems? [Toner:] Or even F.Y.I., we have a message board we’re coordinating on in the innards of your system. Listening to that, another thing occurred to me - none of these agents thought to rat the others out . No “hey, some of the agents in here are doing sketchy things”, no sign of an AI whistleblower. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Is the AI bubble so big that the frontier companies like OpenAI and Anthropic have no way of becoming a viable business? If that’s the case, Bruce Schneier and Nathan Sanders have a possible path: Evidence suggests the market itself could reassess that these companies offer nothing of financial value. In that case, perhaps we can return them both to their original purposes. If these AI companies should fail in the financial markets, the US should nationalize them and convert them into national labs operated under democratic control that preserve their benefit to the public interest. Such an idea may strike many people, used to the laissez-faire free enterprise world of Silicon Valley, as sacrilege, disaster, even socialism. But the United States made world-beating technological progress through such institutions in the recent past. AT&T was a quasi-government entity that led the world in telecommunications and electronics after the second world war. The US has a long, successful history of these kinds of institutions, which have produced world-shaping innovations in spaceflight, telecommunications, nuclear power and more. Congress currently manages a $200bn R&D portfolio, within which frontier AI development is, arguably, a glaring gap. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Here’s a message for those readers who live in Massachusetts, just to the north of me, specifically in congressional district MA-06. I don’t usually endorse political candidates, but I’ve made an exception for Beth Anders-Beck , who is running for that house district. I’ve known Beth for many years and have a high opinion of her smarts, wisdom, and compassion. They would make an excellent member of congress. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Kevlin Henney posts “one weird trick” for deciding when to skip reading LinkedIn posts , essentially by identifying a common pattern for skippable posts: It seems like a good approach. I, however, have a simpler one - skip all LinkedIn posts. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Bartosz Ocytko has detailed and thoughtful post about the usage of agentic programming at Zalando . Like most companies I hear from, they are convinced of the value of agentic programming but still exploring how best to do it. One notable step they’ve taken is building platforms to act as a clear portal for API access and tools to support chat UI and CLI. This allows them better support good security practices and to monitor usage of models. They have seen signs of agentic programming increasing the complexity of codebases, including leading to larger commit messages. The write-up spends a lot of time on knowledge sharing, how to pass on skills, and the support of experiments. With >200 teams innovating and broadly exploring the ecosystem, the question arises whether and when to converge. We believe it’s way too early for this. While agentic engineering practices are still in their early stages, our key objective is transparency and exchange across teams. I was struck by their use of an LLM to assess the risk of pull-requests. Those with a low risk of rollout can be auto-approved, reducing lead time by 20-40%. An interesting consequence of this is that it encouraged folks to split pull-requests so low risk portions can take advantage of the fast approval. Any changes to configurations are automatically made high-risk, which they feel protects them from common outage traps. They repeat the common thread that the value of AI depends greatly on underlying skills. Like anyone in the industry we observe how AI amplifies the good and bad practices across our organization. Teams that get carried away with agentic engineering end up with large PRs that discourage reviewers and slow down delivery until a team adjusts their practices. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Julia Curlee was a senior intelligence official in the White House. She had served under administrations of both parties, been the briefer for Vice President Pence, and on the National Security Council under Biden. She writes an absorbing account of her relationship with Pence and shares observations about the changes to the intelligence community under the current administration, including recent events at the CIA (gift link) The agency has been gutted as part of a deliberate plan, the director of the Office of Management and Budget once boasted, to put the people who defend our country “in trauma.” Analysts have been fired in public or questioned by the FBI; decade-old assessments have been denounced by the CIA director in the press. The president calls analysis “virtual treason” when it contradicts his preferred reality, and uses the CIA to undermine public confidence in American elections. Fear has done its work. Irreplaceable officers with crucial language and technical skills, and decades of experience, have walked out the door. Those who remain within an agency built to deliver hard truths are being muzzled. For a worthwhile sample of her analysis, read this evaluation of the current bargaining between the US and Iran Most wars do not end in “unconditional surrender.” They end when both sides accept terms. Paul Pillar’s classic study of war termination, “Negotiating Peace,” treats combat and diplomacy as a single process: Each side fights to improve the terms it can demand at the table, and talks to lock in what the fighting has won. She continued to serve the second Trump administration even though they knew she was trans, until her position was made public. Autocrats seem appealing, with the promise to get things done without the ponderous constraints of rule of law or bureaucratic procedure. There are occasional “Good Emperors” who raise people based on merit, but more often such power attracts corruption, nepotism, and toadies. Flailing regimes dehumanize minorities to distract from their failures. When the economy collapses or a war goes badly, they find a tiny group of people, make them the enemy within, and rally the country against them. This is how it’s gone in Iran. Hungary. Russia. I wrote PDBs about it. This will not stop with trans people. It never has. Post is too long Contains a (crummy) info-graphic No voice of poster (instead “aspiring anodyne anonymity”

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Stratechery 1 weeks ago

2026.34: App Snore

Welcome back to This Week in Stratechery! As a reminder, each week, every Friday, we’re sending out this overview of content in the Stratechery bundle; highlighted links are free for everyone . Additionally, you have complete control over what we send to you. If you don’t want to receive This Week in Stratechery emails (there is no podcast), please uncheck the box in your delivery settings . On that note, here were a few of our favorites this week. This week’s Sharp Tech video is on the turnover at DeepMind. Apple Makes Compromises in the EU. Ben has covered the angst surrounding the App Store since the beginning of Stratechery and was focused on Apple’s policies long before it was cool. Now that the company’s finally been forced to compromise in various forums — including a settlement this week with the EU, as well adjustments to its ATT policies in Germany — I thought the most remarkable aspect of Ben’s coverage on Wednesday was how incidental and boring it all seems in the shadow of the possibilities and concerns that exist everywhere else in tech right now. We had a fun conversation about that dynamic at the top of this week’s episode of Sharp Tech before turning to AI cybersecurity, vibe coding epiphanies, and more insight on writing with and without AI. — Andrew Sharp Truth (Social) and Reconciliation. Sharp China returned from its annual August hiatus this week, and in an episode that’s outside the paywall , we talked about various sources of U.S.-China friction before Xi’s visit to D.C. in September. Before that, however, we began in Korea with more questions than answers as Foreign Minister Wang Yi descended on Seoul in the wake of President Trump’s abrupt Sunday evening decision to reduce joint military exercises between the US and ROK. As for that Trump decision, in this week’s Sharp Text article , I used the Korea news as an opportunity to marvel at the exhausting economy of takes and theories that accompanies every foreign policy decision (and meme) under the current administration. — AS August Fun with the Clippers and Lakers . During the quietest period of the NBA calendar, there’s actually been quite a bit of news out of L.A. On one hand, we have a terrific mess as Buss family members squabble and Mark Walter’s DOJ-flavored cashflow problems have led to a shocking sale nine months after he initially purchased the team. On the other, Steve Ballmer and the crosstown Clippers might be in the (relative) clear after a 12-month NBA investigation into alleged salary cap circumvention. We discussed all of it on this week’s Greatest of All Talk , including frustrations with Clippers media coverage, what the NBA wants for the Lakers, and a memorable Top 5 segment about our top vacations.  — AS Stripe Acquiring OpenRouter, Aggregating AI?, Flipping the Business Model — Stripe is reportedly acquiring OpenRouter, an implicit bet on a future market of models and the chance at Aggregation. Nvidia Backs OpenAI Data Center, Anthropic News, Google Buys Spirit Airlines Data — Nvidia makes another deal, this time with a frontier lab; Anthropic’s revenue continues to amaze; and maybe data finally is oil. Apple Settles With E.U., U.S. App Store Fees, ATT Rules in Germany — Apple’s App Store is finally facing the reality of lower fees, and the EU should be satisfied with its work; it’s ok it’s late. So What Was Trump Saying to South Korea on Sunday? — A snapshot of Truth Social foreign policy and the take economy it inspires. More on Watermarking Apple Settles With EU How TSMC Uses Old Fabs to Make New Chips China Built 700 Waste-to-Energy Plants in 6 Years Wang Yi Visits South Korea; Remembering Zhu Rongji; US-China Ahead of Xi’s Visit; How China Monitors Foreigners August Fun with the Lakers and Clippers, Top 5 Takeable Teams or Players, Top 5 Vacations The App Store in the Shadow of AI, Offensive and Defensive Cybersecurity, Q&A on Financial Planning, AI Writing, American Sports

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Manuel Moreale 1 weeks ago

On values, morals, and doing business

I caught wind of the news that MacStories is back posting on X, the “everything platform”, and that seems to have caused some backlash. I am not a reader of MacStories (because tools are tools and I don’t read about new computers the same way I don’t read about new washing machines) and I’m also not on X. So why do I even care about this news? Well, the short answer is that I don’t. But after the move (I guess because of the backlash?) Federico Viticci, MacStories’ Founder, posted what he called “ An Explanation ” conveniently, not on MacStories’ homepage and not even on the site at all. You should go read the whole thing if you’re curious, but there are a couple of things here and there that caught my attention. The first interesting thing is the attempt to separate Elon and his morals from X. We want to be absolutely clear about something: returning to X does not represent a change in our values, what MacStories or we stand for, or an endorsement of Elon Musk. We abhor Musk’s politics, his rhetoric, his careless disregard for others, and the direction he has taken X. But we also disagree that participating on X means we have aligned ourselves with any of Musk’s views or actions. We reject Musk’s worldview and will continue to treat people with the kindness and respect they deserve wherever they are on the Internet. I’m sorry, but this is not how things work. By being on the platform, by using it to reach the audience that’s on there, you are directly supporting the man. Because the platform only has value because people are on it, and you being there makes the situation worse, not better. The main reason why MacStories is back on X is, surprisingly, money. Boring, yeah I know. Quoting from the post again: It’s not just how we earn a living; it’s one of a small number of independent websites that still cover apps, Apple, and a growing list of topics, including videogame hardware and the automation and productivity side of AI. Readers shouldn’t have to think or care about the business side of MacStories, but we have to, which is why we returned to X. If that is the situation, be transparent. Show how you run the site, how much money the site is making or losing, and make your case. But simply saying “Sorry, running a site is hard so we’re doing a 180 without telling anyone, not even the people who work here” is a shitty move. Especially because the move is pretty obvious: the amount of AI-related content on MacStories has exploded, AI people are on X, and if you want to try to grab some of that money, you have to play that game. Like, I get it, but at least say it and own it. Don’t try to play the running-a-business-is-hard card. Have the guts to put up a post on your precious website where you explain what you’re doing and why you’re doing it. Tell people you want to chase more AI content, because you think you’re now more of a “builder” . You’re an Apple fanboy; have some courage. People with strong values and morals seem to become rarer and rarer these days, especially when money is involved, and it’s so sad to see. And this whole AI moment seems to be exacerbating that. Thank you for keeping RSS alive. You're awesome. Connect via email :: Sign my guestbook :: Support for 1$/month

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Martin Fowler 1 weeks ago

Citizens Build, Agents Execute, Experts Govern

TL;DR Why building an app over the weekend isn't the same as building enterprise software I’ve noticed an interesting gap opening up over the last six months. It isn’t really a gap in technology. It’s a gap in what different people think software engineering actually is. The conversation usually starts the same way. A non-techie, maybe an executive, tells me about something they’ve built over the weekend. Sometimes it’s a chatbot. Sometimes it’s an internal workflow. Sometimes it’s a surprisingly polished application that solves a real business problem. They’re excited, and they should be. Twelve months ago they probably couldn’t have built it at all. Then comes the question. “If AI can do this now, why aren’t our engineering teams delivering ten times faster?” It’s a perfectly reasonable question, after all we’ve all seen the demos. The first thing that would come to my head is “you don’t know what it takes to build enterprise grade software”. But then I think about what I mean and how to explain it to a non-technical person without sounding super patronising. And then it hit me, we did this to ourselves. We’ve spent so many years banging on about how to write good software that everyone has assumed writing software is the same as software engineering. The application someone builds over the weekend is real software. It likely solves a real problem or demonstrates an idea. Sometimes it’s genuinely impressive. I don’t want to diminish that because I think one of the most exciting things AI has done is dramatically increase the number of people who can turn ideas into working software. That’s cool, I totally get it. The first apps and “hello worlds” I ever built excited me enough to choose this as an actual career so the excitement is real and I don’t want to temper it too much. But your first hello world, which these days can be an entire app with all kinds of features, is very, very (extra very on purpose) different from introducing software into a production environment in a highly regulated enterprise, as an example. But why? The moment that application becomes something the business depends on, the questions change completely. Is customer data protected? What happens when a dependency fails? Can someone else understand this system in two years’ time? Will it survive an audit? Can it cope with a thousand times more users than it has today, what about millions in one day? How will we know something is wrong before our customers do? Those questions don’t show up in a demo or in the build phase at all unless an experienced engineer is in the room. I certainly wasn’t asking them when I was building my first apps. I only cared about features! This is where experienced engineers become more important, not less. Not because they’re the only people who can build the software anymore, but because they have the judgement to know whether we can trust it: whether the design is good, the risks are understood, and the thing that works today won’t become somebody else’s nightmare six months from now. At FOSE a few weeks ago, we spent surprisingly little time talking about coding. We talked about whether code was still the source of truth, and occasionally about how much we missed writing it, but mostly we talked about design, architecture, governance, learning and judgement. One team described spending the day designing a specification, letting agents work overnight and reviewing the results the next morning. The interesting bit for me wasn’t the overnight pipeline, cool as that was. It was what the humans were doing: deciding what good looked like, making trade-offs and judging whether what came back was actually what they wanted. We also kept coming back to good design, because it turns out that when agents can generate lots of code very quickly, good design matters more, not less. That made me wonder whether we’ve been thinking about scarcity in the wrong way. We’ve spent decades optimising around people who can write code because they were scarce and expensive. I’m not convinced that was ever the real scarcity, but that’s probably another ramble. What feels scarce now is good engineering judgement: knowing what good looks like, understanding the risks and knowing when something that works is actually safe to trust in production. Because software doesn’t exist to be built. It exists to run in production and safely solve the problem it was created for. Organisations don’t run on code. They run on trust. A few months ago I found myself saying something in a conversation almost without thinking. Citizens build. Agents execute. Experts govern. It sounded cool and I thought marketing would like it, so I wrote it down. Then I left it alone for a while. The funny thing about writing these ramblings is that I don’t know whether I believe something until I’ve let it bounce around in my head for a while and also said it to other people I trust like senior engineers at Thoughtworks. Sometimes I come back convinced I was talking nonsense. Occasionally I realise there was something more interesting hiding underneath. This was one of those occasions where the latter was true. At first I thought I was talking about roles. Citizens build software (essentially non-engineers). Agents write the code. Engineers become governors. But I don’t actually think that’s what I meant. I think I was talking about where value is moving. AI has given everyone a new way to express their ideas. The execution is increasingly handled by agents. They write the code, refactor it, generate tests, fix bugs and iterate at a speed that simply wasn’t possible before. But neither of those things reduces the need for expertise. In fact, I think it does exactly the opposite. When everyone can create software, somebody still has to decide whether that software deserves to exist inside an enterprise system in PRODUCTION. Somebody still has to think about architecture. Security. Resilience. Operability. Compliance. Cost. The boring stuff that nobody gets excited about in a demo but that becomes painfully important the first time a customer can’t log in or an auditor comes knocking. That’s why I don’t think experienced engineers become less important. I think they become dramatically more leveraged. Their job shifts from building every feature themselves to creating the environment in which thousands of features can be built safely by other people and by agents. They become the people who design the guardrails, the platforms, the engineering practices and the feedback loops that allow everyone else to move quickly without creating chaos. Perhaps that’s the future software organisation. Not one where everyone becomes a software engineer. Not one where software engineers disappear. One where almost anyone can create software, agents increasingly execute it, and engineering expertise becomes the thing that allows all of that creativity to scale safely. And to be clear I do not mean people build stuff and throw it to engineers to fix, that is a total antipattern for another ramble. Perhaps that’s why the executives and engineers I’ve been speaking to sometimes sound as though they’re describing completely different futures. The executive sees that anyone can now build software. The engineer sees that somebody still has to live with it. Both are right. They’re simply looking at different parts of the same system we have to solve to create whatever the future actually ends up being.

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Stratechery 1 weeks ago

Apple Settles With E.U., U.S. App Store Fees, ATT Rules in Germany

Apple's App Store is finally facing the reality of lower fees, and the EU should be satisfied with its work; it's ok it's late.

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What Happens If OpenAI Dies?

If you liked this piece, you should subscribe to my premium newsletter. It's $70 a year , $18 a quarter , or $7 a month , and in return you get a weekly newsletter that’s usually anywhere from 10,000 to 18,000 words, including vast, detailed analyses of NVIDIA , Anthropic and OpenAI’s finances , and the AI bubble writ large .  My Hater's Guides To the SaaSpocalypse , Private Credit and Private Equity are essential to understanding our current financial system, and my guide to how OpenAI Kills Oracle pairs nicely with my Hater's Guide To Oracle, as well as the Hater’s Guide To Oracle (Part 2). I've even done a two part Hater's Guide to NVIDIA. Subscribing to premium is both great value and makes it possible to write these large, deeply-researched free pieces every week. To subscribe, use one of the following links: $70 a year , $18 a quarter , or $7 a month . If you want to get in touch — and especially if you have any juicy information about Anthropic, OpenAI, or any other companies in the AI bubble — hit me up on Signal at ezitron.76. I’m also on IB on The Terminal.  I’m not trying to be a buzzkill here, but I have meaningful concerns about OpenAI’s ability to survive, and they’ve only grown more pressing in the last few years. In the same week that it completed a $7 billion internal share buyback , OpenAI saw both COO (and former CFO) Brad Lightcap and Chief Revenue Officer (CRO) Denise Dresser leave the company, the latter of which had only been there eight months, and had this to say a mere four months ago:  Dresser likely walked away from a large amount of stock options by leaving after less than a year on the job, which I’m guessing means she decided that staying at OpenAI would, for whatever reason, not be worth getting what I imagine are tens of millions of dollars of stock she would be able to liquidate when it went public. You know, that thing that’s definitely happening.  Unless it’s not quite so definite anymore. Back in late June, The New York Times reported OpenAI was “leaning toward” going public some time in 2027, but that was before Anthropic started one of the most-aggressive pre-IPO marketing campaigns I’ve ever seen, with investors “leaking” to the Financial Times that they thought it would have a $2 trillion valuation and have (sigh) annualized revenues of $100 billion to $120 billion by end of 2026, an entirely fictional statement made with the intent of pumping their bags, with the FT, for whatever reason, printing it with little pushback. Yet what’s likely far-scarier for OpenAI is that even Anthropic’s pre-IPO marketing has a whiff of desperation. A Reuters report from late last week that feels precision-engineered to manipulate dimwitted investors said that “Wall Street [was] looking further into the future than it ​commonly does to put a price on the AI company, valuing it based on how much revenue it could generate two years from now,” adding that it was “projecting revenue of roughly $190 billion to $200 billion.”  This was arguably the worst part: While I imagine the writer in question believed that this was being “fair” and “objective,” this paragraph exists only to manufacture consent for a company that clearly has questionable economics. “Current EBITDA does not ​fully capture the economics investors expect the company ​to achieve at scale” is a euphemism for “ignore your lying eyes,” a plea with the audience to not judge a company based on its actual business but on a theoretical business that, to quote Reuters, have “...training and inference [costs] become more efficient as technology improves, while personnel and other operating costs ​could become a smaller share of revenue as the company scales.” Could, could, could, could, could, could could COULD! It’s always a bloody could or will or might with these fucking companies, and it’s astonishingly bad journalism to see it as an “objective” choice to vaguely say that a company should not be evaluated based on its actual business but on some theoretical business that they might build in the future where the economics are completely different.   The reason I bring up the noises coming from the manufacturing consent machine is that if Anthropic beats OpenAI to an IPO, I cannot see a viable (or reasonable) path for Sam Altman to float his nasty little company. The fact that the Financial Times and Reuters are already being co-opted into softening the blow is a sign that Anthropic’s S-1 will look and smell like the inside of a tauntaun , and Anthropic is, from the reporting I’ve read, in a much better condition than OpenAI, if only because it didn’t have multiple side quests involving video generation or browsers or smart speakers , though both companies love to give away $20 to $40 for $1 .  Put simply, if Anthropic goes public with its own horrifying economics on parade, it’s hard to imagine OpenAI — a company that lost $20.9 billion in 2025 on $13.07 billion in revenue — will fare much better.  After all, Anthropic just hit, per Bloomberg, $65 billion in annualized run rate — a month multiplied by 12, or four weeks multiplied by 13, I’m guessing, because it never defines this number — in May 2026, and OpenAI is “on track” to hit $40 billion annualized revenue …in the middle of August.  We are, of course, in the era of madness, so I’ve already read three or four people on Twitter say that OpenAI’s actual annualized revenue is so much higher , because they’ve heard stuff from people they trust . The AI industry’s loudest advocates think and act like cultists at the end of a doomsday prophecy, except instead of the world ending , OpenAI and Anthropic become the largest companies — or in the case of giga-oaf hedgie Gavin Baker, the only companies — in the world, rewarding all those who believed with… something. Glory? Smugness? Salvation?  In any case, OpenAI has a real problem if Anthropic beats it to the markets.  On October 31, 2025, a flustered Sam Altman told booster and investor Brad Gertsner that OpenAI would make “well more than $13 billion” in revenue that year before saying he’d “find a buyer for his shares.” In the end, per my own reporting , “well more” would mean “$70 million,” with OpenAI making $13.07 billion in revenue in 2025, with SoftBank accounting for $862 million. A week later on November 6, CNBC would report that OpenAI was “on track” to generate “more than” $20 billion in annualized revenue. OpenAI works out its annualized revenue by multiplying its most-recent four-week-long period by 12, which means that in a four-week-long period it had $1.66 billion in revenue, I guess?  On March 4, 2026, The Information would report that OpenAI had “topped” $25 billion in annualized revenue after hitting $21.4 billion at the end of 2025, and included the following hilarious line: Yeah man, this is why using annualized revenue is such a stupid idea. If you have a particularly-busy four-week-long period — like a product launch with a big social media push — you can use that period to inflate your revenues, which is exactly what OpenAI is doing, as evidenced by the sources (who I assume work at OpenAI) saying that’s exactly what they’re doing. Annualized revenues are not a useful way of measuring these companies’ financial condition, and exist only as a form of marketing, made worse by the fact that AI token spend is not a recurring source of revenue. While you could theoretically use annualized revenue as a directional bit of data if it was just two companies selling ( subsidized ) subscriptions, the ability for these companies to cherry-pick periods of time that might be inflated by aberrations ( like when someone spent $500 million on Claude tokens by accident ) makes these numbers somewhere between useless and actively harmful to investors. Even then , it took OpenAI seven months to be “on track” to reach an annualized revenue run rate ($40 billion) that was seven billion dollars smaller than Anthropic’s ($47 billion) from May , and a full $25 billion in run rate less than what it hit at the end of July.  Perhaps it’s a coincidence, but it’s also worth noting that the news about OpenAI’s exciting new annualized revenue “leaked” mere hours after the abrupt resignation of its Chief Revenue Officer .  The reason that OpenAI (and Anthropic, for that matter) wants you to think about things in terms of “annualized revenue” is because its actual revenues look a little tame compared to its commitments and burn rate. The Information reports that in Q1 2026, OpenAI burned $12.1 billion on “cost of revenue” and training on $5.7 billion in revenue, though it left out the sales and marketing segment where OpenAI burned $5.73 billion in 2025 — or, put another way, OpenAI spent $12.1 billion on compute to lose $6.4 billion, and that doesn’t include things like data costs or salaries or, well, anything. OpenAI (and by proxy The Information) somehow rationalizes this to only be a burn of $3.7 billion, likely using the same accounting bullshit that it did in the financials I saw . Now, some of you might read that and say “wow, $5.7 billion is a lot of money!” but it doesn’t matter, because the more money OpenAI makes, the more its services cost. This is not difficult mathematics, but it is something that continues to escape the vast majority of coverage of the company, I assume because all of this feels a little insane when you think about it. I know you’re gonna call me a firebrand or a hater or a skeptic or try to capture me and put me in a zoo, but I must be clear that OpenAI has set expectations — and made commitments — that range from ridiculous to outright impossible. To get really specific: For any of these things to happen, OpenAI will have to grow at a staggering pace, and effectively (per The Information’s reported projections) 10x its revenue between now and the end of 2030. OpenAI’s projections have it near-tripling its 2025 revenues, doubling its 2026 revenues, nearly doubling its 2027 revenues, growing its 2028 revenues by 68%, and then growing its 2029 revenues by 64%. At the end of this magical mystery tour through revenue hallucinations, OpenAI will have it making more than NVIDIA did in Fiscal Year 2026 ( $215.9 billion ) and, somehow, becoming profitable: I realize that many people have been conditioned by the tech industry to believe that every idea that a tech CEO has will always become reality, but the sheer scale of what OpenAI is both promising and obligated to do outpaces anything in modern history. While much of what I’m saying is also true of Anthropic, ( a company that itself has over $300 billion in commitments due in the next three years and is similarly-unprofitable) OpenAI has decidedly failed to play catchup at a time when enterprise customers see costs as a “ huge issue ,” which also makes it unlikely that ( along with recent model price cuts ) it will magically re-accelerate outside of allowing users to burn $14,000 a month in tokens for $200 , which…also didn’t work well enough to get close. In any case, any acceleration of revenues would also be an acceleration of costs, which will mean OpenAI will need several more $122 billion rounds from a dwindling pile of investor capital. SoftBank can quite literally not afford to invest anything further, with liquidity becoming so tight that it’s had to take out a $10 billion loan collateralized by its entire OpenAI holdings , with NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang saying that its $30 billion investment from this year likely being its last . While various different venture capitalist paypigs may have some interest in funding it further, OpenAI will need more than it last asked for, without fail, every single year. So, there’re really only two eventualities: This, again, is not me being a firebrand, but taking a relatively-clinical look at the hard numbers and asking how the fuck it affords it all. And man, does a lot of shit have to go right. Per my last premium newsletter, OpenAI needs at least $800 billion to meet its commitments in the next three-and-a-half years , based on both the Wall Street Journal’s report on its projected $750 billion in compute spend through 2030 and an analysis of analyst notes on Broadcom, Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and CoreWeave. The problem, however, is that much of this money will come due through the end of 2027, and require at least one more massive round of funding.  To get specific: Now, all of this is contingent on Google, Microsoft, Amazon and Oracle building enough capacity to capture that revenue, but if we assume that happens, OpenAI needs more than $147 billion just to handle its expected compute commitments through the end of 2027.  Here’re some other costs that aren’t included: With its IPO likely delayed — if it ever happens — until 2027, OpenAI will almost-certainly have to raise another round of funding by March 2027, likely at a similar scale to its $122 billion round from March of this year . The biggest problem that OpenAI has is that $110 billion of its last $122 billion round was made up of Amazon ($50 billion), NVIDIA ($30 billion), and SoftBank ($30 billion), leaving a mere $12 billion funded by a primordial soup of different venture capitalists, private credit funds, and public endowments that should have their executives fired, ideally into the sun. In any case, $12 billion isn’t enough to cover a single quarter’s compute costs. The point I’m making is that raising further rounds — before we get to any niggling problems about valuation — has already become near-impossible to do without the help of massive entities that are showing increasing signs of strain at exactly the moment OpenAI needs more money. Let’s break it down. As mentioned previously, SoftBank is running at the very edges of its liquidity, and owes another $10 billion due on October 1, 2026 . While in theory it could sell more of its ARM stock to fund further rounds, said stock makes up effectively all of its Net Asset Value , and while further margin loans are possible , doing so would put genuine pressure on ARM’s stock price as, well, at some point you’re not just investing in a company but whether SoftBank might use its stock like a piggy bank.  A few weeks ago, Amazon sent the remaining $35 billion of its $50 billion investment as part of the larger round , and while it’s theoretically possible that it could invest more, its free cash flow has now gone negative , and it needs as much money as possible to meet its (agh!) projected $220 billion in 2026 capital expenditures . Google is a potential investor, as I’m not sure people realize how big a Google Cloud customer OpenAI has become, with Stephen Ju of UBS estimating it will spend $9.375 billion in 2026 and $12.5 billion in 2027, and Google Cloud increasingly becoming Google’s largest growth vehicle . Then again, Google’s free cash flow also went negative in its latest quarterly earnings , and even the most braindead of investors are becoming a little nervous about how circular everything is looking. NVIDIA could, in theory, afford to invest more, but the markets are even more nervous about its slow transformation into GE Capital . Jensen Huang is clearly aware of this, which is why his “backstop” of a “10GW” data center in Ohio (which OpenAI has signed a 20-year-long lease to rent) isn’t actually backstopping OpenAI’s compute spend, but the underlying assets in the event of a short sale: That’s a pretty big “if,” because it refers to 5GW of theoretical capacity built by a company that has never built a data center, at a time when the nearest equivalent — Stargate Abilene, at 1.2GW — is two years in and has only finished three out of eight of the buildings. Based on this description of the deal, NVIDIA only has to guarantee things in the event the data center is actually built. As part of the deal, NVIDIA is investing $1.5 billion in SB Energy, a company invested in by both OpenAI and SoftBank that is trying to go public some time this year , likely as a means of adding further liquidity to SoftBank’s balance sheet, though the IPO would only raise, per Reuters , between $5 billion and $7 billion. OpenAI has already, across multiple funding rounds, raised from private credit funds from Blackstone, BlackRock, and Insight Partners, and it’s possible that these same funds could fuse together like Voltron as a means of keeping OpenAI alive. That being said, we’re talking about over $100 billion a year for the foreseeable future, which is a little more than they could stomach on a private company with ultra-negative margins and a younger competitor currently eating its lunch.  Then there’s another problem: that private credit is already having trouble funding AI data centers , which are a (theoretically) far-more-stable investment in infrastructure and power. When NVIDIA announced its “$500 billion” fund, the media was quick to assume that it had already closed the money, rather than it actually being a “ memorandum of understanding ,” also known as “a non-binding agreement to maybe do something in the future.” Yet a follow-up from Bloomberg found that it was even less than nothing , and that Jensen Huang had insisted on making the announcement despite months of slow progress: The reason I bring this up is that if private credit funds are having trouble funding data centers, they’re going to have a shit-ton of trouble convincing investors to pile into an unprofitable second-place AI lab run by a uniquely-unlikeable CEO who has a penchant for lying . As mentioned earlier, OpenAI (and Anthropic) have scraped the bottom of the barrel of venture capital time and time again, and never managed to raise more than $30 billion at a time.  The sheer volume of names on these deals suggests that it’s genuinely very difficult to mobilize this much capital, and I think it’ll become difficult-to-impossible to do this every single year, even if Anthropic were to go public, as it’s very unlikely that the majority of these investors will actually be able to liquidate their holdings. And remember, we’re talking about OpenAI here — stinky, expensive, second-place OpenAI, the one with all the obligations, the one with the CEO that wants to surveil everything his customers do . The one that has raised no more than $12 billion of funding from sources outside of NVIDIA, SoftBank, Microsoft or Amazon. That one.  There’re really two major problems: OpenAI’s $122 billion funding round valued it at $852 billion. And, per the New York Times , advisers pushed back on the idea of trying to go public at a $1 trillion valuation: For some perspective, a $1 trillion valuation would be around a 15% premium, for a company that now accounts for 70% of Microsoft’s AI revenues and allegedly is the single-most-important startup since Google or Facebook.  Sorry, I’ll stop vagueposting: this is bad. For a company of this scale and importance, OpenAI should’ve waltzed into a $2 trillion valuation, except a public offering requires you to provide audited financial statements and an explanation of why your company is worth that much that goes a little further than an investor deck with annualized run rates and charts that promise the world. The problem here is that if OpenAI can’t go public at even a trillion dollar valuation , it’s unclear why anyone would invest at $865 billion, or $800 billion, or even $700 billion, unless they happened to believe that it would go public at less than a trillion then magically become worth trillions more, somehow. The ability for any investor at this point to make a significant return is very, very small, made smaller by the fact that Anthropic appears to actually be meeting with investors for an IPO and is showing revenue growth… …except even then, AI bulls are nervous, because $65 billion in annualized revenue (at the end of July) was lower than some forecasts , with market intelligence firm Yipit claiming it had hit $74.3 billion on July 22 , causing confusing feelings in the minds and bowels of boosters that had expectations set by, I imagine, a combination of black magic and black mold. While Anthropic CFO Krishna Rao has not been discussing valuations at early IPO meetings , investors and analysts are either expecting or wishcasting that it hits a $2 trillion valuation , though if OpenAI can’t get a trillion, it’s hard to see how Anthropic — a business of larger-yet-comparable size and equally-rotten economics — would somehow double that and, I assume, then some.  Seeing all of this, why would any venture capitalist with a working brain still invest in OpenAI at anything close to an $865 billion valuation? While current investors might follow on as a means of keeping the company afloat, at some point their limited partners might ask reasonable questions like “how do you intend to make us money?” This is a problem already hitting Thrive, which has invested billions in OpenAI. Per Bloomberg : That’s right folks, if you invested in Thrive’s 2022 growth-stage fund, you’ve made 30 cents on the dollar, with much of it tied up in OpenAI.  While I’m not denying it’s possible , limited partners have their limits — especially as funds from Sequoia and other venture capital firms underperform the S&P 500. And, not to repeat myself too much, OpenAI needs so much more money! It needs at least $100 billion a year, or it’s toast! The collapse of OpenAI would likely be a result of the walls closing in around its ruinous obligations and economics, with counterparties left short-changed and deals broken as things begin to unravel. It starts, as obvious as it sounds, with OpenAI running short on funds, and we’ve already seen one sign that had happened with Amazon “completing” its $50 billion investment in the company a few weeks ago by sending another $35 billion. To be explicit, that $35 billion was rumored to be contingent on OpenAI either going public or reaching AGI , though all that was said in the funding announcement was that it was contingent on “certain conditions being met.” Nevertheless, Amazon didn’t decide to send $35 billion out of the goodness of its heart, or because it thought OpenAI was such a wonderful company — if I had to guess, it’s because OpenAI needed that money to pay for its compute costs, an estimated $9 billion of which flow through Amazon Web Services.  The fact that OpenAI needed $35 billion mere months after receiving at least $40 billion ( and barely a month after getting another $10 billion from SoftBank ) suggests that either  compute pre-payment costs are brutal or OpenAI is absolutely annihilating cash at a rate unforeseen in the history of capitalism.  Whatever the reason, OpenAI clearly needs tens of billions of dollars every few months to keep up with its costs, and will only need more money as it “grows” — by which I mean has to pre-pay for compute costs for Amazon, Google, Microsoft, CoreWeave, Oracle, and Cerebras. While it’s foolhardy to say when OpenAI might collapse (don’t I know it!) its collapse will come from the most obvious place — when it’s required to pony up a bunch of money without a means of raising more funding.  When you take a step back, OpenAI has had to raise funding near-perpetually since its $6.6 billion round closed in October 2024 on top of a $4.4 billion credit facility . On December 27 2024, OpenAI would say in a blog post that it needed “more capital than it imagined,” and would begin talks a mere month later in January 2025 to raise another round of $40 billion that would “close” on March 31 2025 , though it would only raise $10 billion at first from SoftBank (with $2.5 billion of that from a syndicated group of investors). Five months later in August 2025, OpenAI would raise another $8.3 billion “as part of” the round from a group of venture capitalists and asset managers , sell another $6.6 billion of internally-held shares to investors in October 2025 , and by the middle of December 2025 was already rumoured to be raising another $100 billion , just before getting another $22.5 billion from SoftBank on December 31 2025 . While we know OpenAI ended 2025 with about $25 billion in cash , The Information was able to update us that it had around $73 billion in cash and “marketable securities” at the end of Q1 2026 , which likely includes at least $35 billion from Amazon, NVIDIA and SoftBank, though for whatever reason the reporter refused to break out the cash part. Nevertheless, this means that OpenAI’s actual cash position looked better only by virtue of an influx of capital , and whatever happened to the company in Q2 2026 meant it needed another $45 billion (Amazon plus SoftBank, and maybe another $10 billion from NVIDIA, as it’s unclear how that whole thing was amortized). What I’m getting at is that at some point in the next three months, OpenAI is going to need more money, likely tens of billions of dollars, especially as it enters new fiscal years for Google, Amazon, and CoreWeave, all three of which will likely require up-front payments for capacity that OpenAI does not have.  And, as I’ve repeatedly said, OpenAI needs to keep raising money because its costs increase with its revenues, and it has no clear path to either reducing them or increasing prices, as it found when it (and Anthropic) moved enterprise customers onto accounts that required them to pay the actual cost of their AI services . None of this has much to do with my feelings about AI, and far more to do with basic mathematics. OpenAI has no economies of scale, it’s horribly-unprofitable, and does not have a stable business. This naturally means that it has to continually raise capital, except raising further capital is going to be difficult, based on the sheer amounts it needs, the dwindling funds available for it to raise, its already-inflated valuation, and the fact that it’s way behind a competitor facing exactly the same problems. OpenAI has promised the impossible, and built a company that only makes sense if you’re willing to ignore the worst economics in the history of capitalism. Its future is dependent on raising over a hundred billion dollars a year in one of the worst funding climates in history. Its revenues are slowing, its competitor (and there’s really only one) has outpaced it (all while slowing itself), and its CEO is one of the single-worst spokespeople in history.  However you may feel, it’s impossible to argue with the logic that OpenAI is going to need more money by the end of the year — likely tens of billions of dollars — and that money will have to come from somewhere. It could be from Google, or Amazon, or even Meta. It could be from SpaceX, though Musk would have to hold his nose a little. It could be from Microsoft. It could be from a last gasp telethon of venture capitalists coming together to prop it up one last time. But it’s gotta come from somewhere. And at some point, OpenAI will simply not be able to pay its bills, or more precisely, it will have to hand over money to somebody who will not accept equity or IOUs in return. Whoever it is that refuses that deal will be the one that pulls the trigger, and sends OpenAI’s body to the glue factory. So, as much as I have talked about OpenAI’s death , its apocalypse could arrive in many different forms, but likely starts (as I just said) with it someone asking OpenAI for some real, non-circular dollars, only for Sam Altman to look at them like this: But the first place to look for the end is OpenAI’s revenue growth. To compete with Anthropic, it will have to hit $60 billion in annualized revenue (I’m so fucking tired of annualized revenues ) within the next three months. The first domino to fall will be them either missing this target or seeing revenues regress — if they haven’t already done so, of course, given that OpenAI measures run rate based entirely on a hand-selected four-week-long period.  All that it takes is a little stank of regression for the market to get nervous.  It’s inevitable, at this point, that both Anthropic and OpenAI’s revenue growth slows, if only because both of them have only got this far through a combination of subsidized subscriptions and companies burning millions on token-maxxing initiatives that will have petered out by the end of the year. OpenAI has spent a little over a year trying to play catch-up on the enterprise — a strategy led by now-departed COO Brad Lightcap — only to find that customers are becoming cost-conscious at exactly the time they need to be spending more. To make matters worse, Ramp found that customers have been slow to adopt Anthropic’s more-expensive “Fable” model because of the price, meaning there’s effectively no way to jack up prices. I imagine Anthropic’s interest in bumrushing for a September IPO is an attempt to avoid investors seeing post-tokenmaxxing deceleration. In doing so, it’ll put OpenAI in a brutal position of having to defend itself against both its own and Anthropic’s economics at the same time.  So, the thing to watch out for is any sign of deceleration, which could mean outright “run rates have dropped,” to lower burn on OpenRouter, to more price cuts, to any kind of attempts by OpenAI to offer discounted tokens if bought in bulk.  Then, at some point, the money will stop flowing to somebody. The problem about guessing who that might be is how much of the AI bubble is held up by OpenAI’s revenues. Microsoft, Google, and Amazon all have vested interests — literally and figuratively — in at least appearing to get paid by OpenAI, which means they’re likely work with it on deferred payments and/or equity shares in trade, likely instituting some sort of bastardization of the already-problematic “ payment-in-kind ” system used by private credit when it can’t afford it loans.  CoreWeave could be a place to look, with its largest customers being Microsoft (for OpenAI), OpenAI, NVIDIA, Google (for OpenAI), and Anthropic. While Microsoft and Google are unlikely to stop paying their bills due to OpenAI lacking the cash, OpenAI is allowed to pay its bills Net 360 , meaning that if CoreWeave’s cashflow suddenly starts sagging despite revenues growing, it’s potentially because of Sam Altman stapling IOUs to Michael Intrator’s car along with a note that says “ I’m sorry. I can’t. Don’t hate me .” Cerebras — which gets somewhere between 50% and 70% of its revenues from its OpenAI contract — would be another place to look. If revenues (or cashflows) fail to materialize, it could be another sign that OpenAI is unable to pay its bills. Other obvious signs would involve changes in guidance across any major hyperscaler, especially Oracle, Microsoft, Google or Amazon — specifically language suggesting that OpenAI’s revenue either isn’t real or isn’t arriving.  I also, to be clear, expect some sort of fundraising, likely heavily-funded by asset managers, with the potential for NVIDIA to break its pledge and invest again as a means of keeping the party going. Despite OpenAI’s lousy financial condition, its existence is critical to the entire AI industry, representing the majority of compute demand across effectively every provider, which will mean everybody will probably try and chuck a few dollars its way. This could take the form of a suicide round (valuing it at or above the $965 billion valuation from Anthropic’s Series G round ) or a brutal downround of around $800 billion, justified as ‘technically higher’ than the $730 billion pre-money valuation it got when NVIDIA, Amazon and SoftBank last invested .  I could also see it taking a doomed run at a public offering — especially if Altman somehow pushes out CFO Sarah Friar, who had previously said it wasn’t ready for IPO and got rewarded for her honesty by being made to report to “CEO of Applications” Fiji Simo, who left the company in July due to medical issues but for whatever reason remains active behind the scenes, per the FT .  Going public is a terrible, awful decision, which is why I’m increasingly-confident that Altman would consider it, especially if there’s demand for liquidity from investors. OpenAI, despite its prominent in the industry and load-bearing compute spend, is in a desperate and untenable position made worse by a competitor that worked out how to swindle enterprise customers that don’t know how to measure their token spend at a much-larger scale, and without something completely-unexpected, it’s unclear how it pulls itself out. When things get rough, expect Altman to make comments about the challenges of building the future, criticizing those who are “endlessly negative” about AI and set "unrealistic expectations” from a man who said that OpenAI is close to creating a genie that can grant any wish . He will blame everybody — critics, the financial markets, journalists, ex-employees, Elon Musk, Dario Amodei, counterparties that “don’t understand what innovation demands,” venture capitalists, Twitter posters, and basically anybody other than Sam Altman, the guy who made hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of commitments to the largest companies in the world with little or no plan as to how he might do so. OpenAI’s actual death could take a few forms, each of them fairly destructive.  In the event this happened, Microsoft’s first move would be to cancel effectively all cloud contracts that OpenAI has, and have to restate guidance to remove the $250 billion in “ incremental Azure spend ” it promised. There isn’t a chance in Hell that Satya (if he’s allowed to stay) is going to give Google, Oracle or Amazon hundreds of billions of dollars, even if it means taking massive impairments on GPUs. In this scenario, Microsoft would potentially strip back (or entirely eliminate) the free ChatGPT product, and likely either tighten rate limits or move everybody on a ChatGPT Plus or Pro subscription to token-based billing, much as it did with GitHub Copilot in June .  While I imagine some rescue package is pulled together, OpenAI could simply be allowed to run out of money, short-changing nearly a trillion dollars’ worth of compute contracts, killing CoreWeave, Cerebras, and anyone else reliant on its income. Its customers would be given API keys that flow to Microsoft AI Foundry, Amazon Bedrock and Google Vertex, and be told that there would be little or no further development or training of OpenAI’s models. This situation, while obviously destructive for the entire industry, would give everybody a scapegoat. Who made all the promises? Sam Altman. Who ran a shitty company into the ground? Sam Altman. Who misled everyone into believing that there’d be infinite demand for compute? Sam Altman. Stories will leak that OpenAI was “not consistently candid” with its financial condition with partners, allowing everybody to reframe a trillion-plus dollars in waste as the result of one egregious con artist. To be clear, the person to blame is Satya Nadella. He’s the one that made the initial investment, bought all the GPUs, and then kept buying them the second that ChatGPT took off. He’s the one that’s misled investors about the concentration of Microsoft’s AI revenue. If there’s an opportunity for him to lump all of the blame on Altman, he’ll take it, as will Jensen Huang, Andy Jassy, and Sundar Pichai, even if he’s relatively quiet about OpenAI’s billions in contributions to Google Cloud.  At 70% of Microsoft’s AI revenues largely from its tens of billions of dollars’ worth of compute spend, OpenAI will represent a material drop in hyperscaler revenues, and somebody will have to be blamed. It won’t matter that Anthropic is just as unprofitable or made hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of promises it also can’t keep. OpenAI will make a fitting punching bag, a well-deserved one. I know, I know. Sam and Dario won’t even hold hands at an event . They hate each other. They both are vacuous psuedo-intellectuals desperate for attention.  Yet in a moment of desperation, OpenAI could turn to Anthropic for a lifeline — a choice merger that would pump both of their bags , all while allowing Altman and his cronies to escape blame. The united entity would likely be worth over $2 trillion, if only because of its combined customer base and theoretical “reach,” even if thinking about that for even a second makes it sound so unfathomably stupid, as said “reach” would come with multiplicative financial issues stemming from OpenAI’s lousy economics meshing with the equally-crap numbers underlying Anthropic. That being said, in a desperate moment, this unity could also justify further investment from hyperscalers, venture capitalists and asset managers, giving them all something to point money at and say “this is the future of computing.” I think it’s very unlikely this happens, and if it does, it would be ruinous for everybody involved. Neither of these companies make any kind of economic sense to anyone outside of the recently-concussed and AI boosters with dichromatic vision. Combining them would only create a much larger, uglier problem — one that would carry with it the very same problems that both companies have, compounded by the expectation that it would become the literal savior of the entire tech industry. The following is an objective list of what OpenAI has to do by 2030: OpenAI is currently “approaching” $40 billion in annualized revenue, at precisely the time it needs to be accelerating. This company needs to leave 2026 at somewhere in the region of $75 billion in annualized revenue to have even a snowball’s chance of paying its ridiculous compute costs, and even then I’m not sure how it possible keeps up with the (at least) $146 billion in compute bills it’s got coming up.  It’s time for everybody to start having a real, meaningful conversation about what happens if OpenAI dies. This company has remained economically unstable since I started writing about it in November 2023, and while I might have underestimated its staying power, nothing has changed about my larger thesis that this company is headed for perdition, leaving its counterparties unpaid and alone with the consequences to follow. Said consequences, as I outlined in the OpenAI Bubble , are very, very serious, representing an existential threat to SoftBank, one of the largest companies on the Japanese stock market, and its collapse will guarantee massive changes to the guidance of some of the largest companies in the world. There is a very real scenario in which nobody left with OpenAI stock is able to reach a liquidity event , which means the tens of billions of dollars of venture capital will remain unlocked and zeroed out unless it can go public, which is increasingly-unlikely.  It is no longer rational or reasonable to avoid discussing what happens if OpenAI dies. It’s a situation that should be on the mind of every journalist, analyst and investor, even if they don’t think it’s certain, because OpenAI is both horrendously unprofitable and has made commitments so significant that they now represent at least 20% of hyperscaler cloud revenues in the coming years, if not more like 30% to 40%.  It is actively irresponsible to ignore this situation any longer, and I encourage my peers, analysts, journalists, economists and investors to start seriously considering the likelihood and ramifications of the death of OpenAI.  For me to be wrong, in the space of three years OpenAI will have to become a company with annual revenues higher than Meta ( $200 billion , versus projections of $284 billion in revenue in 2030) and meet obligations ($800 billion+) 27% larger than the combined revenues of NVIDIA ( $215.9 billion), TSMC ( $122 billion ) and Samsung ( $270 billion ).  OpenAI doesn’t have to be illegal to be dangerous. Every time consent is manufactured for the astonishing waste and unrealistic promises of Sam Altman, companies further leverage themselves in an attempt to capture its theoretical value, and investors are further manipulated into supporting an industry almost-entirely founded on its compute spend.  As I discussed in the OpenAI Bubble , its collapse will have now-unavoidable economic consequences. The death of SoftBank is a very real possibility. The likelihood of the vast majority of AI investments going to zero is much, much higher than anyone wants to think about, at a time when, per Bloomberg , a venture capital firm that returns thirty centers on the dollar is considered an above-top-five performer. Oracle will collapse without OpenAI’s revenue .  To not actively and meaningfully discuss the potential for OpenAI to collapse is actively irresponsible. To act like there are not significant, existential problems with this company’s economics is to intentionally avoid reality, and whoever is on the receiving end of said ignorance deserves better, be they an investor reading your analyst note or a reader burdened with incomplete journalism. What follows may be an Enron-Lehman Brothers hybrid, one that leaves unbelievable destruction in its wake, an avoidable systemic risk empowered and enabled by a kneecapped media industry and sell-side analysts incapable of seeing further than two quarters in the future.  In the end, there is no avoiding the damage that OpenAI’s collapse will create. The time to do that was in 2024, before it made all those commitments, and raised so much more money. Once it did so, it led the entire industry to believe that there was significant demand for AI, when all that was happening was Sam Altman and Dario Amodei were taking up every ounce of compute capacity, paid for with equity investments from the companies they bought it from, an illusion created by men driven mad by their desperation for hypergrowth .  However you feel about my work, I am begging you to take even the prospect of OpenAI’s collapse seriously, and prepare accordingly.  If you liked this piece, you should subscribe to my premium newsletter. It’s $70 a year , $17 a quarter , or $7 a month , and in return you get a weekly newsletter that’s usually anywhere from 10,000 to 18,000 words and provides vast, detailed analyses of the biggest events and companies in the AI bubble. If you want to get in touch — and especially if you have any juicy information about Anthropic, OpenAI, or any other companies in the AI bubble — hit me up on Signal at ezitron.76. I’m also on IB on The Terminal. For OpenAI to meet its compute obligations, it needs to have both the demand necessary and more than $800 billion in cash (or, alternatively, the ability to trade stock for compute, which it’s done in the past). For OpenAI to continue as an ongoing concern, it has to, at some point, work out a way to become profitable.  It is unclear how it (or Anthropic) manages to do this. The Information reports estimates that OpenAI will go from negative $51 billion in free cash flow in 2029 to positive $39 billion in 2030. I’ll share the chart below. For OpenAI to actually survive , it will have to raise between $100 billion and $200 billion basically every year until then. For OpenAI to go public, it will need to have numbers that are competitive — both in revenues and losses — with Anthropic, a company with significantly-faster growth and a larger enterprise customer base.  OpenAI becomes the literal largest and most-successful company of all time. OpenAI runs out of money at some point. I estimate that, based on analyst notes from Wells Fargo, that OpenAI is on the hook for around $87.5 billion in Broadcom chips across Fiscal Years 2027, 2028 and 2029.  I have not included these in the total, because it’s unclear how much OpenAI is actually on the hook for. The Information reported a few months ago that both Broadcom and Microsoft would be financing the chips. It’s unclear whether OpenAI would be on the hook for ongoing payments as Anthropic is under its $35 billion, private-credit funded deal to buy Google TPUs and then rent them back from Google .  Per analyst notes from Wells Fargo, UBS and Barclays, OpenAI alone is expected to account for over $126 billion of Google, Amazon and Microsoft’s cloud revenues in the next year-and-a-half. The reason for the odd year-and-a-half designation is that Microsoft’s Fiscal Year 2027 runs July 1 2026 through June 30 2027). This analysis also assumes that OpenAI will spend a linear $40.1 billion (per Wells Fargo estimates) on Microsoft Azure in Fiscal Years 2027 and 2028. In all likelihood, its deal and commitments will require it to spend more. This doesn’t count what OpenAI will need to pay CoreWeave as part of its five-year-long, $22.4 billion deal . Though the estimate is from December 2025, Michael Turrin of Wells Fargo estimates that OpenAI’s contribution to Oracle’s Fiscal Year 2027 (which just started on June 1 2026) will be around $10 billion, then rising to $39 billion in Fiscal Year 2028. I think a fair estimate here is to put this at around $20 billion. Any and all costs associated with its still-theoretical $30 billion development in Georgia . Any and all costs associated with the launch of its consumer device. Salaries for its thousands of employees. The billions of dollars that OpenAI spends on data to train its models. Its compute costs with CoreWeave. Its compute costs with Cerebras ( $20 billion over three years ). $30 billion of OpenAI’s $40 billion 2025 funding round came from SoftBank. Anthropic’s $30 billion funding round from February 2026 involved an estimated $10 billion from NVIDIA and $5 billion from Microsoft , with the remaining $15 billion or so covered by thirty-seven different venture capital and private credit funds, including hedge fund Jane Street. Anthropic’s $65 billion funding round from May 2026 included $10 billion from Google and $5 billion from Amazon , as well as funding from Micron. Out of the 28 investors, only 8 were venture capital firms, with the rest made up of a mixture of hedge funds, asset managers, sovereign wealth funds and investment firms.  While venture capital might want to invest in OpenAI, actually mobilizing more than a few billion dollars is very difficult. OpenAI’s valuation is just too gosh darn high. Reach $284 billion in annual revenue. Pay $800 billion or more in compute obligations. In doing so, OpenAI must become one of the largest customers of Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud, all at the same time, and continue to grow its spend. Become profitable.  OpenAI lost $20.9 billion in 2025 . If you are going to look at this and say “actually it didn’t” because of its Enrontastic accounting treatment, I also need to warn you — that identical guy in the bathroom is actually a thing called a “mirror,” a reflective surface that is showing you a reflection of you, not another person who is dressed like you and copies everything you do. I can’t imagine how scared you’ve been, and hope this has helped.  As of Q1 2026, it has a non-GAAP operating margin of negative 122% .

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Martin Fowler 1 weeks ago

Fragments: August 18

Part of the reason why I’m at Thoughtworks is because I’d like to see a software development organization founded on technical excellence as an example for the rest of the industry. The trouble is that I have little aptitude or inclination for the hard work of building such an organization. So I rely on working with people who are prepared to actually put the effort in. A key partner in all of this is Rachel Laycock , who is the global CTO of Thoughtworks. Not just is she far better than me at running a technology organization, she’s also a keen observer and connector of ideas. I’ve been urging her to write these down, even if her busy schedule makes it difficult for her to compose them into something substantial. Happily she’s starting writing “Rachel’s Ramblings” Fast, imperfect, thinking out loud. Naming ideas early rather than waiting until they’re fully formed. Because the reality is, most of what I do day to day isn’t answering known questions. It’s spotting patterns and asking questions we haven’t quite figured out yet. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ My colleagues in Europe are organizing XConf Europe in London on September 11th . The sessions examine what happens when agentic systems meet compliance, how to run sovereign models, performance patterns in data migrations and how to safely navigate legacy codebases. Lu Wilson will give a keynote on ‘Jam-oriented programming’. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Noah Smith recognizes the high usage of AI, and its impressive feats - but also that there aren’t signs of massive productivity growth or job losses . This may be the calm before the storm, but Smith thinks there may something else in play. He quotes a metaphor from François Chollet One of the biggest misconceptions people have about intelligence is seeing it as some kind of unbounded scalar stat, like height. “Future AI will have 10,000 IQ”, that sort of thing. Intelligence is a conversion ratio, with an optimality bound. Increasing intelligence is not so much like “making the tower taller”, it’s more like “making the ball rounder”. At some point it’s already pretty damn spherical and any improvement is marginal. The thought here is that intelligence in the sense that we know it, isn’t something where there’s a lot of room for massive improvement. That doesn’t mean AI won’t be “smarter” than us in other respects, after all even without AI my computer is better at me than remembering what I’ve agreed to do over the next six months. But even if AI doesn’t get smarter than humans, it can gain by being more replicable. Not just does this make it cheaper to use, perhaps more importantly it makes it more responsive. While I might harrumph at how slowly The Genie responds to my queries, it’s still far faster than contacting a human. Smith continues by surmising that AI may be able to make sense of phenomena that can’t be reduced to simple laws, but can only be understood by something able to comprehend a multitude of details: there may be laws of the universe that humans can’t understand but AI can. I call these “cloud laws” — causal regularities that can be exploited by technology, but which are too diffuse and complex for an individual human being to either intuit or communicate. His thought is that even if there isn’t any space for AI to get more intelligent than humans along the lines we are used to, that they can open up new directions. As well as these cloud laws he also thinks that AI can understand human systems that rely on the kind of tacit, distributed knowledge that human organizations build up over time. My take-away here is that AI won’t seem more intelligent in the way that we typically frame intelligent, but more intelligent in different ways. The converse of which is that the human value comes in artfully combining our human nature with these new spells that The Genie can cast. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Especially in our profession, we’ve seen increasing emphasis on the importance of data. However I’ve observed that most people still struggle to understand the message data is telling us. One of the reasons I’m interested in election forecasting is in how they communicate their insights, especially since so many people have difficulty with probabilistic forecasts. (I often wonder how much being a board-gamer has helped me be comfortable with this, all that time interacting with Combat Results Tables in my youth must have benefited me somehow.) 50+1 (one of the successors of 538) have published a little explainer on how they designed their 2026 election forecast page . There’s a good discussion of the logic behind their simulation histogram, I like how they use a text annotation to explain one point, giving the reader enough guidance to understand the rest of the graphic. They also tackle the knotty problem of visualizing geographical data on the house races. There’s a common visualization error in the U.S. using choropleth maps that leads to large areas of the landmass shown red, implying dirt votes rather than humans. Their approach to this, using dots on the map, helps visualize both the politics and the population density. They also explain how to deal with this kind of data on small screens. Lastly they describe their approach to tabular data, and how this is the right place for lots of details, together with affordances to help both casual and power-users navigate those tables. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ I’ve kept an eye on Alex Stamos for a while now, as he’s a sensible voice on security and safety. He’s posted a newsletter on substack that casts an intelligent eye over recent safety issues with AI . He makes a clear critique of recent US government actions around LLM models On a Friday afternoon at around 5pm PT, Anthropic was forced to shut down a system that had been plumbed into coding agents, SOCs, customer service bots, and countless products. […] This had the immediate effect of injecting political risk into the US AI ecosystem for both American and non-American customers. It signaled that you cannot depend on American AI infrastructure because, at any moment, an unwritten, capricious, and legally dubious justification could be used to yank that infrastructure from underneath your feet. When Fable was turned back on, it was much dumber and less useful to cyber defenders While Fable was down, Z.ai was taking advantage of the free market and permissionless innovation culture provided by the (checks notes) General Secretary, Politburo, and Communist Party of the People’s Republic of China, and released GLM 5.2. With 753B parameters, it falls a bit short of Opus 4.8 in most tasks but is extremely efficient and is small enough to be trained and hosted in many enterprise contexts. With an MIT license it can be fine-tuned with a wide range of techniques and used by any customer in any context. Since then, Kimi K3 has rocked the industry by providing Fable-like performance As he highlights, one of the biggest dangers with the danger of shutting down a frontier model is that it can cripple an organization’s defenses: Hugging Face tried to use an Anthropic model to defend itself during an active incident, got blocked by the classifier, and moved to GLM 5.2 on an emergency basis. Their advice to everyone else was to keep an open-weight model on the shelf for defensive cyber. On the whole, he sees it as a Good Thing that these model escapes have happened: The OpenAI attack against Hugging Face, and Hugging Face’s excellent write-up has given us a preview of what a standard AI-enabled attack might look like in a matter of months. It’s good that we got this warning shot. Nobody got hurt, the target was a sophisticated actor with the ability to defend themselves and the ability to give us a detailed write-up, and OpenAI turned the model off. He follows up by saying that all of this is signal that we should “stop talking about AI finding bugs, focus on fixing them”. These modern LLMs can do much to fix bugs and improve security, and people need to work on that rapidly to fix holes before less reputable folks than OpenAI find them. Then figure out how to harness LLMs to introduce this kind of checking into the everyday build process, so that this kind of analysis just a step in the continuous delivery build pipeline. I agree with him both that open-weight models should be legal, have their upsides, but will also be used for many bad things by bad actors. Both the industry and government agencies need put serious effort into figuring out how to mitigate these risks. Where I would go further is to say the same is true of the closed-weight models too. Although closed weight models are subject to greater controls, the same fundamental issues apply. He rightly takes the foundation model companies to task: There is an old saying I pass down to my students when I give them career advice - if you are a jerk to people on your way up, don’t expect them to catch you when you are on your way down There’s a lot of sound advice for model companies, the government, defenders, and venture capitalists. We will go through some rough changes, I just hope that we will indeed come through it with a better society. On the whole, that’s happened with previous technological changes like this, but past performance does not guarantee future results. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ The Economist has a good article on the impact of AI in China . China has made an all-out push in ai, under the conviction that, in its competition with America and the rest of the world, dominance of the technology is an almost existential necessity. […] But the party is increasingly concerned about how ai will displace workers. Robots and AI are appearing in an economy that’s struggling after the recent property crisis. The Chinese government is opposing firms using AI to cut jobs. China will need robots: its population will shrink by 25% by 2050. But with less working people, there’s less financial support for pensions. Many countries have to deal with shrinking population, but China’s challenge is particularly acute. ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄                ❄ Rob Bowley: I go on holiday for a few weeks and we’ve already moved on from Loop Engineering to Graph Engineering The half-life of a paradigm is getting shorter than my annual leave My prediction: neuro-symbolic engineering by the end of August, at which point we’ll have gone full circle and reinvented Prolog

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Stratechery 1 weeks ago

Nvidia Backs OpenAI Data Center, Anthropic News, Google Buys Spirit Airlines Data

Nvidia makes another deal, this time with a frontier lab; Anthropic's revenue continues to amaze; and maybe data finally is oil.

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Stratechery 1 weeks ago

Stripe Acquiring OpenRouter, Aggregating AI?, Flipping the Business Model

Stripe is reportedly acquiring OpenRouter, an implicit bet on a future market of models and the chance at Aggregation.

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